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Transparency has risen to prominence in risk regulation leading government authorities in 
Europe and North America to introduce an avalanche of new policies. While transparency 
promises to achieve many instrumental objectives, there is insufficient empirical evidence on 
the effectiveness of the actual policies being implemented. This study first explored the 
ambiguity of transparency in risk regulation. This informed a review of the seriously 
fragmented literature and an original typology, which clarified what is being made transparent 
by risk regulators (objects), how (mechanisms), why (goals) and for whom (audiences). An in-
depth case study was then conducted on transparency at the European Medicines Agency 
(EMA), the EU agency responsible for pharmaceuticals. The four case methods were extensive 
historical and contemporary documentation; direct observations and interviews conducted 
between 2012 and 2016; and multi-national surveys (UK, France, Germany, Spain) of medical 
doctors (specialists and general practitioners) and patients diagnosed with one of five medical 
conditions (HIV/AIDS, idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis, multiple sclerosis, rheumatoid arthritis, 
osteoporosis) (N=2,015). After providing an in-depth historical analysis of transparency at 
EMA (1995-2016), the case study evaluated three salient policies, which all seek to make the 
data that underpins decision-making in EMA’s scientific committees more ‘visible’ to 
outsiders. 
 
EMA’s policies have important strengths and weaknesses for achieving the regulator’s 
objectives. Transparency was also found to have serious unwanted effects including 
significantly increasing legal action against EMA, enabling unrestricted (high and low quality) 
re-analyses of benefit-risk data, and consuming substantial agency resources. Simply 
publishing large quantities of raw data online is unlikely to be the most effective way of 
achieving the regulator’s transparency objectives. Rather, effective transparency requires 
understanding (1) the limits of full disclosure, (2) the desired quality of transparency (for 
multiple audiences), (3) the capacity of expert and non-expert audiences to assess transparent 
information, and (4) the ability of intermediaries to re-package and communicate benefit-risk 
information effectively. Choosing the right transparency policies ultimately means resisting 
becoming captivated by quantity and must take opportunity costs into careful consideration. 
The thesis concludes by strongly arguing that transparency should be re-conceptualised as a 
(risk) communication process in order to improve policy effectiveness. 
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Chapter I: INTRODUCTION 
 
“We [at the European Medicines Agency] believe that patients have a right to know 
about the scientific basis for the approval and use of their medicines and that 
transparency of clinical trial data is therefore essential” (Bonini, Eichler, Rasi, 
Wathion, 2014). 
 
“One thing is certain, transparency is crucial to [the European Food Safety 
Authority’s] work as we know that it is intimately linked with trust in the risk assessment 
process and hence the value of our work for citizens” (Url, 2013).  
 
These clear commitments to ‘transparency’ from four of the most senior European Medicines 
Agency (EMA) regulators1 and the European Food Safety Authority’s (EFSA) Executive 
Director, Bernhard Url, are not unique. Rather, transparency has become de rigueur in the 
regulation of risk (Hood and Heald, 2006; O’Neill, 2006; Etzioni, 2010), defined as 
“government interference with market or social processes to control potential adverse 
consequences to health” (Hood et al. 2001). A multiplicity of regulatory authorities, 
committees and other bodies in the US, Canada, Europe and beyond have sought to enhance 
transparency so that, broadly speaking, “outsiders can observe what is going on inside the 
organisation” (Heald, 2006a). This has been especially true in policy domains related to health, 
the environment, and safety (Shrader-Frechette, 1991; Löfstedt and Bouder, 2014; Rothstein et 
al. 2016). Examples of such organisations are numerous. They range from those operating at 
the supranational EU level such as EMA, EFSA and the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) 
(Rasi, 2016; Url, 2013; ECHA, 2017), to national-level organisations such as the United 
Kingdom (UK) Health and Safety Executive, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 
and Health Canada (Lexchin and Mintes, 2004; Chakraborty and Löfstedt, 2013), as well as an 
array of ad hoc committees and other public bodies2 (e.g. the Dutch Gezondheidsraad and the 
US National Research Council) (Bijker et al. 2009). Collectively they have introduced what 
can be described as an avalanche of new policies designed to enhance transparency. 
 
Few would argue with the point that transparency is in principle a good idea (Trachtenberg, 
2015). Maintaining and strengthening transparency is viewed as a modern day essential with 
many stressing that the public have a right to know how risks to their health and the 
                                                
1 Sergio Bonini (Senior Medical Officer), Hans-Georg Eichler (Senior Medical Officer), Nöel Wathion (Deputy 
Director) and Guido Rasi (3rd Executive Director). 
2 To be clear, risk is regulated in a complicated multi-level governance system where regulatory bodies are 
characterised by overlapping jurisdictions and multi-actor alliances (see Renn et al. 2011).  
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environment are regulated (Stiglitz, 2003; Naurin, 2006; Fung, 2013). Others have emphasised 
that transparency can contribute to a strong democracy (Piotrowski and Borry, 2010; Tan, 
2014) and should be viewed as an ethical obligation or even a human right (Birkinshaw, 2006). 
Although there are organisations that seek to enhance transparency – such as the eponymously 
named ‘Transparency International’ – there “does not seem to be any organisation whose 
raison d’être is to decrease transparency” (O’Connor, 2016: 2). Transparency is also often seen 
as the inverse of secrecy, dishonesty and cover-up (Black, 1997; Birchall, 2011). For example, 
a lack of transparency implies the regulators are “purposefully withholding information that 
would otherwise be in the public domain” (Löfstedt and Way, 2016a: 1) and gives rise to 
suspicions about the regulators (Stiglitz, 2002; Grigorescu, 2007; Birchall, 2011), as well as 
their legitimacy (Zurn, 2004; De Fine Licht et al. 2014). 
 
The concept has also been associated with the notion of ‘good governance’ and an array of 
instrumental public policy objectives (Hood and Heald, 2006; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). As 
the former Supreme Court Justice, Louis Brandeis, famously commented in the early 20th 
Century: 
 
“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight 
is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman” 
(Brandeis, 1913). 
 
More recently, multiple instrumental goals for transparency have been put forward by 
academics, policymakers, and other influencers (Meijer et al. 2015; Löfstedt and Way, 2016a). 
These include arguments that transparency can strengthen the information position of citizens, 
enable meaningful public participation (Stiglitz, 1999), improve the quality of risk regulation, 
and prevent regulatory capture (Carpenter and Moss, 2013; Dudley and Weigrich, 2015), as 
well as induce industry to adopt less risky behaviour (Fung et al. 2007; Weil et al. 2013) and 
build public trust in risk regulation (Frewer et al. 2003; Grimmelikhuijsen, 2010; Löfstedt et 
al. 2011). For example, one argument is that information about regulatory authorities (e.g. 
decisions, actions and deliberations) needs to be made available so that outsiders can determine 
whether they are acting in the public’s interest or not (Grigoescu, 2007). Transparency is thus 
viewed very highly by many or as Christopher Hood (2006a: 3) comments: “transparency is a 
term that has attained quasi-religious significance in debate over governance and institutional 
design”. 
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Yet, despite the importance placed on transparency, few studies have critically examined the 
effectiveness of the risk regulators’ various transparency policies (Löfstedt, 2013). No one 
currently knows whether the actual policies initiated have been (or will be) effective or not in 
achieving their intended public policy objectives (Etzioni, 2010). There is clearly an important 
difference between expecting a transparency policy will achieve a desired effect and 
determining whether it has actually done so (see Coglianese, 2012 for a discussion). In turn, a 
growing literature has emphasised that measuring and evaluating the effectiveness of 
transparency policies, in different contexts, is essential (Heald, 2003, 2006a, 2006b; Etzioni, 
2010; Coglianese, 2012; Löfstedt, 2013; Gupta and Mason, 2014; Trachtenberg, 2015). 
Emerging findings from outside risk regulation have now shown that policies designed to 
enhance transparency can indeed have positive effects, although they will not necessarily do 
so, can have severe unwanted effects, and must be balanced against important trade-offs (e.g. 
resource consumption and opportunity costs) (Hood, 2001; Hood and Heald, 2006; 
Grimmelikhuijsen, 2010, 2012; Gupta and Mason, 2014). However, few studies have been 
conducted in the field of risk regulation. What is needed is a more sophisticated understanding 
of transparency in risk regulation and a critical assessment of the policies introduced by the 
regulators in achieving their intended public policy outcomes. 
 
This PhD thesis provides an exploration and critical examination of transparency in risk 
regulation, while paying particular attention to the European pharmaceutical policy domain. In 
so doing, the thesis critically examines the effectiveness of the transparency policies introduced 
by one risk regulator, namely, the EMA and addresses the question: 
 
How effective have the European Medicines Agency’s input transparency policies been 
in achieving its public policy objectives?  
 
The rest of this introductory chapter proceeds as follows. First, the chapter explains that 
transparency is an ambiguous concept and can take many different forms in risk regulation 
alone (section 1.1). In order to answer the research question, clarity over these forms is thus 
much needed. This includes distinctions between what is being made transparent, how, why 
and for whom (Gupta and Mason, 2014). A key research objective is therefore to offer an 
original typology of transparency that can be used to analyse and compare different policies. 
Second, the chapter explains how the ‘effectiveness’ of transparency policies will be measured 
and evaluated in this thesis (section 1.2). In particular, transparency is valued instrumentally 
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(rather than intrinsically) and effectiveness means that individuals are able to receive, process, 
digest and use the ‘transparent’ information made available by the regulators (Heald, 2003, 
2006a, 2006b). Third, the chapter briefly elaborates on the EMA’s regulatory responsibilities 
as well as its most notable transparency policies (section 1.3). This includes a justification for 
why the EMA provides an important (and interesting) case for examining the concept of 
transparency in risk regulation. Fourth, the chapter outlines how the rest of this thesis is 
organised (section 1.4). 
 
(1.1) Transparency policies 
 
The first component of the research question that requires elaboration centres on: ‘What exactly 
are transparency policies?’ Clarifying key concepts and definitions is critical for evaluating the 
effectiveness of any policy, regulation, or other intervention (Coglianese, 2012). However, a 
key issue with transparency is that it is an ambiguous concept that is often defined with little 
rigour (Florini et al. 1999; Michener and Bersch, 2016). Despite frequently being used and 
advocated in public speeches and official documents, the term “is more often invoked than 
defined” (Hood, 2006a: 3). Broad definitions and metaphors are commonly used such as 
“lifting the veil of secrecy” (Davis, 1998: 121) or “making the invisible visible” (Hillebrandt 
et al. 2014: 4). Perhaps a more useful one attempts to make clearer what is being made visible: 
 
“[Transparency is] the conduct of [regulation] in a fashion that makes decisions, rules 
and other information visible from the outside” (Hood, 2010: 989). 
 
The main issue with all of these definitions, however, is that they are too vague and do not help 
analysts distinguish between different forms and divergent meanings (Langley, 2001: 75-77). 
As Gupta and Mason (2014b: 5) put it: “An association of transparency with visibility leaves 
aside […] what is being made visible, by whom, and for whom; the desired quality and/or 
quantity of transparency; and the (governance) effects expected to flow from it” [italics in 
original]. This ambiguity has caused confusion in the literature and policymaking or what 
Meijer et al. (2015) describe as “dialogues of the deaf”. 
 
The ambiguity of transparency has been dealt with in at least three main ways in the now 
extensive multi-disciplinary literature (Gupta and Mason, 2014). First, some authors have 
lamented the lack of a shared definition (Etzioni, 2010; Seidman, 2011). For example, Etzioni 
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(2010) argues that transparency is an overrated concept that suffers from a distinct lack of 
empirical analysis and critical discussion over its meaning. Second, some authors have sought 
to unpack the normative and political underpinnings of the concept (Gartsen and De Montoya, 
2008; Birchall, 2011). For example, Birchall (2011) discusses the relationship between 
transparency and secrecy arguing that tensions between the two terms need to be addressed 
(e.g. secrecy can be desirable and beneficial). Third, several authors have developed 
transparency policy frameworks and typologies (Lodge, 2004: 129; Heald, 2006a; Prat, 2006; 
Coglianese, 2009; Mitchell, 2011; De Fine Lincht et al. 2014; Gupta and Mason, 2014; Meijer 
et al. 2015). Two approaches have been widely used by transparency scholars and are 
particularly relevant to this thesis. Heald (2006a) sketches out an anatomy of transparency that 
distinguishes between what is being made transparent (i.e. the objects of transparency). Meijer 
et al. (2015: 1) provide an interpretative framework and helicopter view that seeks to “guide 
and structure assessments of government transparency”. Both of these approaches have 
provided much needed sophistication to analysing government transparency policies and 
distinguishing between different forms (see Cuccinielo et al. 2017). Yet, neither of these 
approaches, nor those adopted by other scholars, can be directly applied to risk regulation, at 
least without being adapted.  
 
Thus what is needed is a transparency typology that can distinguish between different forms in 
risk regulation (Chapter II). Offering such a typology can serve at least two main purposes. 
First, a typology is necessary for evaluating the effectiveness of different transparency policies 
introduced in various regulatory contexts. Bringing sophistication into the debate can help 
scholars, as Hood (2007: 195) puts it: 
 
“…move away from a banal view of transparency (that is, positive but unexamined) to 
a world of ‘transparency with adjectives’, in which trade-offs appear and the different 
adjectival forms of transparency can come into conflict”. 
 
Developing a typology is therefore essential for answering this thesis’s research question. 
Second, a typology can be used by other researchers and practitioners examining the concept. 
In particular, it promises to bring clarity and structure to the often disjointed debates on the 
effectiveness of policies initiated in different policy domains and regulatory contexts. For 
example, evaluations of transparency policies in areas ranging from food safety and 
pharmaceuticals to chemicals and the environment can be compared. Indeed, comparisons 
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between the evaluations made in this thesis (Chapter VIII) can be made in future research (e.g. 
studies examining other regulatory bodies). 
 
(1.2) Evaluating effectiveness 
 
The second component of the research question centres on how transparency might be valued, 
evaluated, and measured in this thesis. A burgeoning literature has sought to examine 
transparency for having an instrumental value (Meijer et al. 2015; Cucciniello et al. 2017). 
Researchers have sought to answer important questions such as: “How can transparency be 
best implemented?” or “What are the effects of various transparency policies?” (Hillebrandt et 
al. 2014). For example, De Fine Licht (2014) experimentally tested the effects of transparency 
on generating legitimacy and found that a straightforward positive correlation is naïve. 
Instrumental approaches notably contrast with a second strand of the literature that has taken 
an intrinsic approach, which views transparency as “an end in itself” (Dror, 1999; Hood, 2006b; 
O’Neil, 2006; Florini, 2007; Etzioni, 2010). For example, Birkinshaw (2006: 55-56) debates 
whether transparency should be elevated to human rights status (i.e. the right-to-know) based 
on “the protection for individuals against inefficient, oppressive or even bullying government”. 
Although intrinsic approaches have provided rich debate, this thesis adopts an instrumental 
approach to valuing transparency and follows David Heald’s argument that “elevating 
transparency to an intrinsic value should be resisted” (see Heald, 2003, 2006b, 2006b for a 
discussion).  
 
A second question centres on how transparency policies might be evaluated instrumentally in 
this thesis. While many authors have debated how regulatory policies more generally might be 
evaluated (e.g. regulations, policies, tools or processes) (Jacobzone et al. 2007; OECD, 2009), 
some have specifically discussed transparency policy evaluations (Hood, 2006b; Etzioni, 2010; 
Coglianese, 2012; Cucciniello et al. 2017). For Coglianese (2012: 12), instrumental 
“evaluation[s] answer […] the question of whether a treatment” (e.g. a transparency policy or 
collection of policies) “works in terms of reducing a problem”. For example, if a transparency 
policy seeks to build public trust then measuring changes to public trust that were caused by 
that policy would provide an ideal approach (although doing so may not necessarily be 
feasible).  
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Furthermore, Coglianese (2012) identifies three main types of evaluation: regulatory 
administration, behavioural compliance, and outcome performance. Regulatory administration 
studies relate to the “activity or delivery” of a transparency policy (e.g. How well have the 
regulators implemented a transparency policy?) (ibid, 2012). Behavioural compliance studies 
relate to whether behaviour complies with certain regulatory or policy standards (e.g. what 
level of compliance with transparency policies has there been from targeted actors?). Outcome 
performance studies relate to the actual effects of a transparency policy and whether changes 
in behaviour result in the regulators’ desired outcomes (e.g. what were the outcomes of the 
transparency policy compared to the regulators intended goals?) (ibid, 2012). Although 
regulatory administration and behavioural compliance studies are important, evaluating the 
resulting outcomes of a transparency policy is “what matters most” (ibid, 2012). In other words, 
different transparency policies will have “differential effects on the achievement of public 
policy objectives” (Heald, 2012: 30) and evaluating whether the regulators’ policies have 
achieved these objectives is of central importance (Coglianese, 2012). This thesis therefore 
focuses on outcome performance for evaluating regulatory transparency policies 
instrumentally. 
 
Two main approaches to evaluating outcome performance instrumentally have been adopted 
in the transparency literature, namely: ‘nominal’ and ‘effective’ measurements (Heald, 2006a). 
Nominal measures of transparency might involve creating an index, league table or proxy of 
some sort (Relly and Sabharwal, 2009; Heald, 2006a). Examples include Alt and Lassen’s 
(2006) index of institutional fiscal transparency, Transparency International’s (2017) 
Corruption Perceptions Index, and the World Bank’s Economic and Institutional Transparency 
Index and Political Transparency Index (Naurin and Lindstedt, 2010). Indeed, this approach 
has been particularly popular in finance and banking (Alt et al. 2002; Siklos, 2010; Heald, 
2012; Hollyer et al. 2014) but is by no means limited to this domain (e.g. Finel and Lord, 1999). 
One main advantage of nominal measurements is that they can provide simple, generalised and 
actionable information that lends itself to policymaking (Mustafa et al. 2011). Researchers 
have therefore spent a great deal of time creating more comprehensive nominal measures, 
making suggestions for improving statistical analyses and promoting their own indices (e.g. 
Ko and Samajdar, 2010). However, the main issue with nominal measures is that they do not 
provide a measure of the effectiveness of the regulators’ transparency policies. In particular, 
several authors have emphasised that there is a clear distinction between the two (e.g. 
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Forssbaech and Oxeheim, 2015), which Heald (2006a) refers to as the “transparency illusion”. 
This occurs when one index or another may show that transparency is appearing to increase, 
but the reality is actually very different (ibid, 2006).  
 
The central argument is that “for transparency to be effective, there must be receptors capable 
of processing, digesting and using the information” made available (ibid, 2006: 35; Michener 
and Bersch, 2016). There are many reasons why this criterion may not be met thus limiting the 
usefulness of nominal measures (see e.g. Roberts, 2006: 111-119). This includes information 
recipient overload (e.g. due to data dumping); the insufficient timeliness of information 
provision (e.g. receiving information after a decision has been made); misleading or inaccurate 
information (e.g. poor record keeping); changes to the effectiveness of policies over time; 
governments spinning unfavourable information (e.g. window dressing); and individuals being 
ill-equipped to interpret the transparent information (e.g. due to time, resources or expertise) 
(Roberts, 2006: 111-119; Gupta and Mason, 2014). For example, if the objective of a 
transparency policy is to inform the ‘lay’ public about the rationale for coming to a regulatory 
decision, then publishing hundreds of pages of raw risk assessment data online is unlikely to 
be effective as the public would be ill-equipped to process, digest or use the information. In 
comparison, the same data may be more useful for risk assessment ‘experts’. In order to 
measure effectiveness, an examination of the audiences of transparency – who are expected to 
receive, process, digest and use the information made publicly available – is required. 
Therefore this thesis evaluates the outcomes of the regulators policies instrumentally by using 
effective, rather than nominal, measures of transparency. 
 
A subsequent question centres on how effectiveness might be measured. Perhaps the most 
difficult challenge with measuring and evaluating the effectiveness of transparency policies is 
identifying whether the policy was indeed the cause of a regulatory outcome. This is because 
there are many confounding variables in real-world settings that are difficult to mitigate in both 
quantitative and qualitative study designs (King et al. 1994; Shapiro, 2002; Coglianese and 
Bennear, 2005; O’Neill, 2006; Coglianese, 2012). For example, Hood (2006b) makes clear that 
identifying a causal association between transparency and trust is hard “partly because of 
‘noise’ – everything else that has gone on at the same time (such as generational change, 
technological change, the spread of education, and particular events such as [regulatory 
scandals and crises])”. 
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With that said, several authors have argued that effectiveness can still be measured and 
evaluated usefully. For example, Coglianese (2012) outlines several methods ranging from 
controlled and randomised experiments to observational studies (quasi-experiments) and 
qualitative studies (King et al. 1994). In the wider transparency literature an increasingly 
popular approach has been to conduct policy experiments (De Fine Licht, 2014; Löfstedt and 
Way, 2016a, 2016b; Cucciniello et al. 2017). For example, Grimmelikuijsen (2010) examined 
the effects of transparency on trust experimentally and found that individuals who received 
more information about government were more negative regarding their perceived 
competence. Experiments can be particularly useful as they can help to mitigate confounding 
variables. However, they also suffer from other limitations including, perhaps most notably, 
serious concerns about a lack of real-world validity. What is needed is an approach that can be 
used to evaluate the effectiveness of the regulators’ transparency policies within its real-world 
context. In so doing, this thesis provides a case study of the transparency policies initiated by 
one regulatory authority, the EMA (see Chapter IV for a detailed discussion). 
 
(1.3) The European Medicines Agency 
 
The third component of the research question centres on the rationale for choosing the EMA’s 
transparency policies as a case study. The EMA is the decentralized European Union (EU) 
agency “responsible for the scientific evaluation, supervision and safety monitoring of 
medicines developed by pharmaceutical companies for use in the EU” (EMA, 2017a). 
Therefore one of the agency’s main responsibilities is to scientifically evaluate applications 
submitted by pharmaceutical companies seeking authorisation (i.e. a licence) to market (i.e. to 
sell) a medicine in Europe, which is valid in all EU member states, as well as in the European 
Economic Area (EEA) countries of Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway (EMA, 2017a). 
Pharmaceutical companies are obliged to use the so-called ‘centralised procedure’ for certain 
medicines (e.g. for biotechnology products and those treating HIV/AIDS, cancer and diabetes) 
(see EMA, 2017b for a full list). However, for medicines that are not required to go through 
EMA’s centralised procedure, companies can seek approval through a member state regulatory 
authority such as the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) in the 
UK or the Spanish Agency for Medicines and Healthcare Products (AEMPS) in Spain3. In 
                                                
3 When applying through member states, pharmaceutical companies can also apply for simultaneous 
authorisations in more than one EU country through the ‘decentralised procedure’ or the ‘mutual recognition 
procedure’ (see EMA, 2017a). 
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addition, and amongst other activities, EMA is also responsible for safety monitoring (e.g. 
coordinating the EU’s pharmacovigilance system), referrals (e.g. evaluating a safety concern 
brought up by the Commission or a member state) and inspections (e.g. ensuring compliance 
with good manufacturing practices) (EMA, 2017a).  
 
Since its inception in 1995, the agency has demonstrated a firm commitment to enhancing 
transparency (Chapter V) (EMA, 2009; 2014a). In particular, the agency has introduced a 
diverse array of policies (EMA, 2017c). During the early years, the agency was congratulated 
for its strong commitment to transparency and communicating proactively with the many actors 
involved in pharmaceutical regulation (Abbasi and Herxheimer, 1998; Elgie, 2005; Kent, 2005; 
Gehring and Kraphol, 2007). Notably the introduction of European Public Assessment Reports 
(EPARs), that seek to provide high-quality information on medicines to healthcare 
professionals and patients (see EMA, 2017d), was viewed by many as a turning point in the 
transparency of the traditionally secretive pharmaceutical environment (Lekkerkerker, 2005). 
Although the agency “inevitably” received increased scrutiny (ISDB, 1998; Abraham and 
Lewis, 1999; Garattini, 2005; Garattini and Bertele, 2007), transparency was viewed as highly 
desirable and important for EMA. In turn, the agency went on to introduce many more policies 
that both met and went beyond its legal obligations (EMA, 2009).  
 
Since 2010, however, the agency has “come under fire” for not being transparent enough 
(Hampton, 2011). Many organisations and individuals have criticised EMA ranging from 
medical journal editors and external researchers (e.g. data miners), to campaign groups and 
opinion leaders, as well as politicians and a succession of European Ombudsmen (Chapter V) 
(Löfstedt and Bouder, 2014; Bouder et al. 2015; Institute of Medicine, 2015; Way et al. 2016). 
In turn, the agency has introduced a “tsunami” of new transparency policies (Löfstedt and Way, 
2016a), which its 3rd Executive Director, Guido Rasi, made clear will provide an 
“unprecedented” level of openness and transparency in EMA and its scientific and non-
scientific activities (EMA, 2014a). Most notably, the agency has now provided for the first 
time public online access to clinical study reports4 which detail the main scientific data 
underpinning decision-making in its human medicines committee (EMA, 2014b; Bonini et al. 
                                                
4 Clinical study reports are documents written by pharmaceutical companies in application for authorisation (i.e. 
a licence) to market (i.e. sell) a medicine in the EU when applying through the EMA’s centralised authorisation 
procedure. They include detailed scientific and non-scientific data and information on the studies conducted to 
examine the safety, quality and efficacy of a medicine including clinical overviews, summaries, protocols, 
documentation and statistical methods.  
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2014; EMA, 2016a). Specifically, on 20th October 2016 the agency uploaded, for the first time, 
approximately 260,000 pages of data and information for over 100 clinical study reports 
relating to (1) a medicine used to treat multiple myeloma (a cancer of the bone marrow) called 
Kyprolis (carfilzomib), and (2) a medicine used in adults with gout to reduce high levels of 
uric acid in the blood called Zurampic (lesinurad) (EMA, 2016a). This represents an 
unprecedented disclosure of data on the studies underpinning scientific regulatory decision-
making and something that has not been seen before in the pharmaceutical domain (Rasi, 
2016). 
 
Beyond the fact that EMA is a risk regulator that has introduced policies designed to enhance 
transparency, there are several other reasons why the agency provides an ideal case study for 
this thesis. First, despite its commitment to the concept EMA has continued to be criticised 
(Chapter V) (see Way et al. 2016 for a discussion; Godlee, 2012, AllTrials.net, 2017; Doshi et 
al. 2012; Goldacre, 2012; Willmott, 2013, 2014). Criticisms range from the need to provide 
more clarity about scientific committee decisions (e.g. on the approval or rejection of a 
licensing application) (Willmott, 2013, 2014) to strong pressures to publish the actual scientific 
data that underpins those decisions (e.g. Doshi et al. 2012, 2013a). EMA therefore presents a 
particularly interesting case of an organisation that has seemingly done as much as possible to 
enhance transparency, yet has found itself coming under intense scrutiny from many actors. 
 
Second, the agency is frequently under the public spotlight. EMA operates in a particularly 
challenging policy domain or as Groenleer (2009: 141) puts it, they are regulating “such 
politically sensitive and emotionally-laden issues as pharmaceuticals […], which not only 
involve enormous economic interests but also concern the public health of millions of EU 
citizens”. Therefore there is much at stake for the public and EMA needs to get its transparency 
policies right. 
 
Third, the pharmaceutical domain has a complicated multi-level governance structure where 
transparency and risk regulation have consequences for many actors including industry, non-
government organisations, the medical community, healthcare professionals, patient and doctor 
representative groups, patients themselves and the public (Ghering and Kraphol, 2007; Vos, 
2011). Indeed, there are multiple competing interests over the regulation of pharmaceuticals 
with a variety of different actors. Transparency would therefore very reasonably seem to be 
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particularly important as is it important that individuals understand the regulators decisions and 
the reasons for them.  
 
Fourth, examining one agency provides the opportunity to examine different forms of 
transparency introduced by a single organisation in great depth. Therefore future comparisons 
of EMA with other organisations can be conducted. Indeed, clarity and sophistication over the 
different forms of transparency is much needed before multi-organisational comparisons can 
be made (Chapter II). This can be achieved with a case study approach using multiple methods 
to examine the EMA (that is, the case study unit) in depth (Chapter IV). 
 
(1.4) Contribution of this thesis 
 
The first main contribution of this thesis is that it provides much needed clarity over the concept 
of transparency in risk regulation through the creation of a typology. There is significant 
confusion in the literature and among practitioners (Meijer et al. 2015). Debates more often 
than not end with an agreement that transparency is important but with little discussion about 
what forms of transparency are needed in the achievement of specific public policy outcomes. 
Consider the words of EU Commission President, Jean-Claude Junker, when announcing a new 
set of policies that aim to make EU decision-making “more open and transparent” to the public: 
 
“We could do the best possible work but it will be worth nothing if we do not earn the 
support and trust of the citizens we are working for. So let us be more transparent, 
because in fact we have nothing to hide. Let us show that this time it really is different 
and that together we are able to really change and renew Europe.” (Jean-Claude 
Junker, 2014).  
 
Although these comments specifically concern the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership free trade agreement negotiations (see Lester and Barbee, 2013), they provide a 
good example of how transparency is often called for (e.g. in official speeches) but with little 
clarity over what is expected to be made transparent, how, why, and for whom (Gupta and 
Mason, 2014). This thesis provides a way of disentangling different forms of transparency that 
are directly connected to varying effects in different contexts. Therefore the typology of 
transparency in risk regulation offered in this thesis promises to enable researchers and 
practitioners to debate different forms of transparency with more clarity.  
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The typology can also be used to bring together the fragmented transparency literature (in risk 
regulation). The wider literature on transparency has become extensive. Yet, it is seriously 
fragmented with many different strands focusing on different issues such as governance by 
disclosure, open government, accountability, democracy, legalism and many others (Florini et 
al. 1999; Hood and Heald, 2006; Gupta and Mason, 2014). Researchers have also examined 
the concept from different perspectives and using different methods (O’Connor, 2016). The 
typology can bring together the multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary literature examining 
different forms of transparency relating to risk and risk issues. This argument is akin to that of 
Kasperson et al. (1988) who provided a framework that attempted to “overcome the fragmented 
nature of risk perception and risk communication research by developing an integrative 
framework capable of accounting for findings from a wide range of studies” (cf. Pidgeon et al. 
2003; Breakwell, 2007, 2014). To be clear, the transparency typology does not provide a theory 
of transparency in risk regulation but rather seeks to bring together both theoretical arguments 
and empirical findings into one organising framework, which can incorporate a range of studies 
originating from areas as diverse as law, political science, geography, sociology, psychology 
and beyond. 
 
The second main contribution of this thesis is that it provides much needed empirical research 
on transparency in risk regulation. Transparency does not always have positive outcomes and 
can have severe unwanted effects (Hood, 2001; Hood and Heald, 2006; Meijer et al. 2015). 
Moreover, recent findings reveal that transparency can be well suited at addressing some issues 
and poorly suited at addressing others (Cucciniello et al. 2017). What is needed is an 
understanding of when transparency is effective and when it is not and why. However, there 
has been a dearth of empirical work examining the effects of transparency under various 
conditions, and in what contexts different policies can be effective or not (Etzioni, 2010; 
Cucciniello et al. 2017). Most studies have been theoretical or anecdotal. The majority of 
studies that have provided empirical evidence have also been experimental in their design (e.g. 
Grimmelikhuijsen et al. 2010; De Fine Licht et al. 2014). Therefore providing a real-world 
empirical examination of the transparency policies initiated by one regulatory agency can 
significantly contribute to the empirical literature on transparency in risk regulation. In 
addition, the thesis has the potential to be used for comparisons with future analyses of 
transparency in risk regulation whether that is in comparing different countries and 
jurisdictions, policy domains or both. 
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The third main contribution of this thesis is that it can provide concrete recommendations for 
EMA and its transparency strategy. The agency has not conducted a systematic review of its 
transparency policies (Löfstedt, 2013). It is also coming under greater pressure both on its 
approach to transparency and how it has been using its resources to enhance transparency (Way 
et al. 2016). Therefore this thesis provides an in-depth analysis of EMA that can help to inform 
the regulators’ transparency strategy. This is particularly important as there is a need for EMA 
to become more sophisticated with its approach to transparency and, as discussed in the 
previous section, its policies affect the lives of millions of EU citizens many of whom have 
long-term disabling medical conditions.  
 
(1.5) Thesis organisation 
 
The thesis is organised as follows. A typology of transparency in risk regulation is first offered 
(Chapter II). The typology sets forth a clear distinction between various transparency policies 
introduced in risk regulation. This includes what type of policies the regulators are making 
transparent (i.e. objects), how (i.e. mechanisms), why (i.e. goals/reasons), and for whom (i.e. 
audiences). Creating these clear distinctions leads on to a structured review of the burgeoning 
but seriously fragmented literature relating to transparency in risk regulation (Chapter III). This 
centres on the arguments for and against different forms of transparency in risk regulation 
focusing on policy domains and regulatory contexts related to health, the environment, and 
safety.  
 
The research methodology is then presented (Chapter IV). The chapter first elaborates on how 
the effectiveness of EMA’s transparency policies are measured and evaluated in this thesis. 
This includes an understanding that the perspectives of multiple competing actors is required. 
It also sets out the rationale for choosing an in-depth case study.  
 
The subsequent three chapters present the results and analysis of the EMA case study. First, a 
historical analysis examines how the agency’s transparency policies evolved over time 
spanning from its inception in 1995 to December 2016 (Chapter V). A background on the 
creation of EMA is detailed, which focuses on how concerns about transparency were present 
even before the agency was established. Three subsequent and distinct phases in the 
development of EMA’s transparency policies are then identified and discussed in turn. This 
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includes the early years (1995-2000), a period of consolidation (2000-2010), and what is 
described in this thesis as “the New Pharmaceutical Transparency Era” (2010-). Amongst other 
findings, the analysis shows that EMA’s approach to transparency and the type of policies it 
has initiated has changed significantly since its inception. Most notably, since 2010 EMA has 
focused much of its resources and attention on the data and information that underpins 
decision-making in its scientific committees and, especially, clinical trial and suspected adverse 
reaction data. The historical analysis leads on to and provides the foundations for an in-depth 
examination of EMA’s five main informational input transparency policies (Chapter VI). These 
centre on three clinical trial data transparency policies and one policy on uploading suspected 
adverse drug reaction data online. The results and analysis of the patients’ and medical doctors’ 
surveys are then presented (Chapter VII). 
 
In the penultimate chapter, an evaluation of the effectiveness of EMA’s transparency policies 
is provided by discussing the EMA case study results (Chapter VIII). The chapter specifically 
addresses the research question. Broadly speaking, the chapter explains that EMA’s 
transparency policies have both positive and negative outcomes and in order to answer the 
debate about effectiveness an understanding of whose perspective counts is central in the multi-
actor pharmaceutical environment.  
 
Finally, the thesis concludes by explaining how the research has contributed to the broader 
literature (Chapter XI). It also provides four recommendations that centre on what should be 
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Chapter II: DEVELOPING A TRANSPARENCY TYPOLOGY 
 
This chapter presents an original typology of transparency in risk regulation. Several authors 
have offered organising typologies and frameworks that seek to disentangle the fragmented 
transparency literature (Lodge, 2004; Prat, 2006; Heald, 2006a; Coglianese, 2009; Mitchell, 
2011; De Fine Lincht et al. 2014; Gupta and Mason, 2014; Meijer et al. 2015). This includes a 
transparency toolbox (Lodge, 2004) and government transparency assessment framework 
(Meijer et al. 2015), as well as multiple other distinctions between different forms of the 
concept (e.g. reasoned versus process transparency5) (Hood, 2007; De Fine Licht et al. 2014). 
Although these approaches have provided much needed sophistication, none of them can be 
directly applied to risk regulation (at least for the purposes of this thesis). This section therefore 
provides an original typology that will form the foundations of this chapter and thesis. In 
particular, the typology makes important distinctions between different forms of transparency 
in risk regulation. This includes clear distinctions between various policy objects (what is being 
made transparent?), mechanisms (how are those objects being made transparent?), 
aims/reasons (why are the regulators making them more transparent?), and audiences (for 
whom are the regulators making these objects more transparent?).  
 
(2.1) The need to develop a typology 
 
The literature on transparency in risk regulation is seriously fragmented. The concept figures 
in a quite remarkable array of published texts and disciplines including law, architecture, 
democracy, national defence, surveillance, regulation, public administration and others 
(Florini, 1999; Fisher, 2010; Meijer et al, 2015; Cucciniello et al. 2017). One of the reasons 
why the literature is so fragmented is that transparency is an ambiguous concept (section 1.1). 
In risk regulation alone, different transparency policies have sought to make many regulatory 
processes more transparent and in different ways. For example, EMA has introduced policies 
that seek to enhance the transparency of the data that underpins its regulatory decision-making 
by publishing clinical study reports online (section 1.3) (EMA, 2014a, 2014b, 2016a). In 
contrast, EFSA, the decentralised EU agency responsible for food safety, has introduced 
another quite different policy that seeks to enhance the transparency of its managerial decision-
making process by web-streaming all board meetings (Vos, 2009). Although both authorities 
                                                
5 For an explanation of reasoned versus process transparency see De Fine Licht et al. (2014). 
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have sought to enhance transparency, these two policies clearly provide very different forms 
of transparency.  
 
Transparency policies have also been advocated by different actors – such as by regulators, 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), industry, and other influencers – for often rather 
different reasons and in different contexts. For example, the US Toxics Release Inventory seeks 
to induce targeted actors (e.g. industry) to adopt less risky behaviour (see Kraft et al. 2011). 
The TRI database has been advocated as a novel policy tool and a form of ‘soft’ governance 
by its advocates (Fung et al. 2007; Kraft et al. 2011) or what Mitchell (2011) categorises as 
“Transparency FOR governance” [emphasis in original]. In contrast, one of EFSA’s most 
recent policies has provided public access to “a treasure trove” of food safety data, which 
ultimately seeks to improve the evidence base for regulatory decision-making, increase public 
scrutiny of regulation and enable the re-use of data for other purposes or what Mitchell (2011) 
categorises as “Transparency OF governance” [emphasis in original]. Again, these two 
examples clearly provide very different forms of transparency, which seek to achieve very 
different goals, for very different audiences, and in different regulatory contexts. 
 
 (2.2) Transparency objects 
 
What do risk regulators seek to make more transparent? At least three objects of transparency 
in risk regulation can be identified (Figure 2.1)6 (Heald, 2003: 729, 2006: 30), namely:  
 
• Informational inputs 
• Transformative processes (including procedural and operational components) 
• Policy outputs 
 
These three objects are the specific scientific and non-scientific regulatory events and processes 
that risk regulators choose or may be required to make more visible to outsiders (ibid, 2006).  
  
                                                
6 In Heald’s (2003, 2006) original analytical framework two additional objects of ‘linkage processes’ and 
‘outcomes’ are included as well. 




Figure 2.1: Diagram showing three objects of transparency that risk regulators might seek to make more visible. 
Adapted from Heald (2006a: 30). 
 
Informational inputs are the first transparency object (Figure 2.1). They include all the data and 
information that is gathered and used by risk regulators to inform the decision-making process. 
Therefore inputs are the main scientific and non-scientific evidence that underpins decision-
making (e.g. in a scientific committee). Regulators might seek to make, for example, open 
comment periods, licensing applications, raw scientific data, academic journal articles, or other 
relevant information more transparent. Examples include clinical study reports (e.g. in 
pharmaceuticals), food risk assessment data (e.g. in food safety), hospital mortality rates (e.g. 
in patient safety), crime statistics (e.g. in policing), industrial pollution emission data (e.g. in 
environmental protection), surgical performance results (e.g. in healthcare), automobile 
rollover accident data (e.g. in health and safety), and so on (Fung et al. 2007). For example, 
while pharmaceutical regulators – such as EMA, FDA or Health Canada – require clinical trial 
data in order to approve or reject a licensing application, health and safety regulators – such as 
the UK Health and Safety Executive or the US Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
– require incident data (e.g. accident and sickness absence rates) to identify and monitor 
workplace hazards.  
 
Going further, regulatory organisations may be required to obtain further input information that 
they may not have in their possession. For example, Article 5 of the 1998 Aarhus Convention7 
on environmental information disclosure includes far-reaching obligations for regulators (and 
                                                
7 The Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters. 
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other public authorities) including the requirement that, in some cases, they are legally obliged 
to collect and then disseminate environmental information (see Mason, 2014a: 89).  
 
Transformative processes are the second transparency object (Figure 2.1) (see Heald, 2006a: 
31-32). They are the means by which inputs are transformed into outputs and can be sub-
divided into procedural and operational components (Heald, 2003: 729). The procedural 
component of transformative processes “relates to the rules, regulations and procedures 
adopted by an organization” such as the rules on what decisions can be made and how (ibid, 
2006: 31). Regulators may want to make transparent, for example, the organisation’s standard 
operating procedures, work instructions, guidelines, or the rules relating to conflicts of interest. 
Procedural process objects can collectively be understood as transparency about the ‘rule book’ 
(ibid, 2006: 31) or “the rules to be followed” (Lodge, 2004: 128). Lodge (2004) goes further 
and makes clear that this rule book will also have been created through its own separate 
decision-making process (i.e. the decision-making process for setting rules and standards). This 
process can in itself be sub-divided into the three transparency objects described in this section: 
inputs (e.g. the evidence for making a new rule), processes (e.g. deliberations about a proposed 
new rule), and outputs (e.g. the actual rule and guidance documents) (Figure 2.1). In 
comparison, the operational component of transformative processes refers to “the application 
of these rule books to particular cases” (Heald, 2006a: 32). This can be best understood as how 
the rules are interpreted and applied to making a decision. For example, the regulators might 
want to make the actual discussions taking place between decision-makers, such as scientific 
committee discussions, more transparent.  
 
Decision-making outputs are the third transparency object (Figure 2.1). This most commonly 
refers to the actual decisions or policies made during the decision-making process as well as 
the reasons for them. For example, an expert pharmaceutical committee might refuse or 
approve a new medicine (e.g. after reviewing a licensing application from a pharmaceutical 
company) while a chemical safety committee might recommend a chemical to be banned (e.g. 
after conducting a risk assessment). The regulators may want to make their decisions as well 
as their reasons for making those decisions transparent. For example, the Dutch 
Gezondheidsraad, an independent Dutch advisory body charged with providing government 
with scientific advice on matters of public health, often produces a report or summary of its 
opinions and may go on to explain the rationale for its conclusions (e.g. in a public speech) 
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(Bijker et al. 2009). Indeed, there are many outputs from the decision-making process that can 
be made more transparent that are directly relevant to the decision made and context. This 
might include communicating a safety alert, providing recommendations, updating guidance 
documents, or providing new benefit/risk information. 
 
(2.3) Transparency mechanisms 
 
How have risk regulators sought to make different objects more transparent? The second 
distinction that needs to be made are the policy mechanisms or means for making different 
objects more transparent. Since the late 20th century, the main mechanisms for enhancing 
transparency have predominately involved regulators providing more information online in 
what has been described as ‘internet-mediated’ transparency (Meijer, 2013), ‘computer-
mediated’ transparency (Meijer, 2009) or ‘e-government’ (Wong and Welch, 2004). That is 
not to say that all mechanisms have been limited to the Internet. Examples of offline 
mechanisms might include receiving paper-hand-outs during a public meeting that are 
unavailable online (Meijer et al. 2012) or allowing physical public access to an archive or 
repository (Hetherington, 2011). With that said, this thesis focuses on computerised or 
‘internet-mediated’ transparency mechanisms. 
 
Mechanisms for enhancing decision-making transparency can be coupled with the three objects 
of transparency already identified (i.e. inputs, processes and outputs). First, input mechanisms 
have primarily involved uploading information used to inform the decision-making process 
online such as the actual comments from public consultations or reports on the scientific studies 
used to inform the regulatory process. Second, transformative process mechanisms seek to 
make either procedural or operational components more transparent. While some mechanisms 
involve simply uploading data and information online (e.g. standard operating procedures, 
committee guidelines etc.), others require that the regulators collect the information before 
being able to do so (e.g. taking meeting minutes before uploading them online) (Piotrowski 
and Borry, 2010). Further still, more radical operational process mechanisms include providing 
audio or video recordings and even web-streaming meetings live (EFSA, 2002; Piotrowski and 
Borry, 2010). Third, output mechanisms are designed to make decision-making outputs more 
transparent. This might involve an expert providing an ex-post explanation in layman’s 
language of a decision taken (e.g. in a press conference), posting a question and answer sheet 
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online explaining the rationale for a decision taken or publishing a scientific advisory 
committee report online (Woloshin and Schwartz, 2002; Issing, 2005; Bijker et al. 2009: 117-
124). Improving how decisions and the reasons for them are communicated with outsiders has 
traditionally been a major occupation of risk perception and communication research (Slovic, 
2000; Kahneman, 2011; Fischhoff et al. 1995, 2011). 
 
Several further broad distinctions between different transparency mechanisms can be made. 
First, mechanisms can be formal or informal. While a formal mechanism for enhancing 
transparency might include publishing meeting minutes online, an informal type might include 
information that is ‘leaked’ or a lobbyist learning about policy details at a wine bar (Meijer et 
al., 2012). Transparency does not have to be a deliberate or conscious action of an organisation. 
Second, a clear distinction can be made between real-time transparency, “information that is 
released as soon as it is created” (e.g. live web-streams of meetings), and retrospective 
transparency, “information available only after embargoes or time delays” (e.g. publishing 
meeting minutes online later) (Heald, 2006a). Timeliness is an important transparency policy 
consideration such as for enabling meaningful participation and making policy information 
available before a regulatory decision has been made (Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer, 2012; 
Coglianese, 2012). Third, a broad distinction can be made between proactive and reactive 
transparency policies. While proactive policies often involve uploading information online 
(e.g. posting all input information onto a web-portal), reactive policies might include 
responding to requests for information such as with Freedom of Information (FOI) requests 
(Birkinshaw, 2006; EMA, 2010a). For Fox (2007: 665), this represents an important distinction 
between proactive versus demand-driven dissemination. 
 
(2.4) Transparency goals 
 
Why have regulators sought to enhance transparency? Many instrumental arguments for 
enhancing transparency have been provided in different regulatory contexts (Chapter I). Some 
have argued that transparency can curb corruption and stimulate more efficient and effective 
decision-making by contributing to ‘good governance’ (Hood and Heald, 2006). Other 
arguments range from its apparent ability to strengthen the information position of citizens and 
enable (meaningful) public participation in decision-making (Stiglitz, 1999) to arguments over 
improving the overall quality of risk regulation and reducing conflicts of interest (Carpenter 
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and Moss, 2013), as well as inducing industry to reduce risks to public health and the 
environment (Fung et al. 2007; Weil et al. 2013) and building public trust in risk regulation. 
Indeed, a multiplicity of transparency goals have been put forward in different (regulatory) 
contexts. 
 
Although many of these transparency goals have been discussed, at least three overriding ones 
outlined here have taken prominence in risk regulation. First, transparency seeks to enable 
greater participation. Arguments have primarily centred on the idea that transparency can 
reduce information asymmetries between decision-makers and the public and that this is an 
essential pre-requisite for meaningful public participation in government decision-making 
(Stiglitz, 1999; Michener and Bersch, 2016). Second, transparency seeks to enable outsiders to 
re-use scientific data and other decision-making information. Some of the main arguments 
have been that outsiders can use this information in order to, for instance, double check the 
regulators’ decisions or (re)use it for other purposes (e.g. conducting follow-up studies or open 
data programmes). Third, transparency seeks to (re)build trust in institutions and confidence 
in decision-makers. Although often loosely connected, many risk regulators expect they will 
be viewed as open and honest as they will not be hiding any information. This is understood 
to, in turn, build public trust. 
 
(2.5) Transparency audiences 
 
Who are regulatory transparency policies intended for? Transparency policies have various 
audiences and it is important to clarify who is revealing what information to whom (Gupta and 
Mason, 2014: 25). The direction of transparency discussed in this chapter is inwards, whereby 
“outsiders can observe what is going on inside [a regulatory] organisation” (Heald, 2006a)8. 
Frequently these ‘outsiders’ are left implicit such as in official speeches where a policymaker 
might note that information is being made ‘publicly available’ but with little clarity over which 
actors are being referred to (Chapter I). In risk regulation, outsiders vary widely and might 
include the public, other regulatory bodies, external researchers, industry, scientific journal 
editors, the media, non-governmental organisations, and many others (as well as any 
                                                
8 Other directions of transparency can also be distinguished between including upwards, downwards and outwards 
forms (see Heald, 2006a: 27-28 for a discussion). For example, outwards transparency might be associated with 
government surveillance of the public such as in relation to the British Government Communication Headquarters’ 
(GCHQ) attempts to monitor public internet usage (e.g. regarding terrorism handbook downloads) (see e.g. Brin, 
1998; Andrew, 2009).  
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combination of these simultaneously). Indeed, different risk-related policy domains have 
further labels that can distinguish between other targets of transparency policies such as 
farmers, healthcare professionals (e.g. nurses, doctors or pharmacists), toxicologists, patients, 
and so on.  
 
The different audiences of the regulators’ transparency policies are, however, often poorly 
articulated and loosely connected to different goals. For example, although releasing thousands 
of pages of safety-related information may be useful for expert outsiders wishing to re-analyse 
or re-use information to check-up on the regulators’ decisions, it is clearly less useful, and 
could perhaps even be confusing, to non-expert members of the general public. In contrast, 
while providing an ex-post explanation of a decision-taken (i.e. output mechanism) may be 
more helpful to a lay member of the general public (e.g. in understanding how and why a 
regulatory decision was made), the same policy would be less helpful for an external researcher 
that wants to re-analyse/re-use scientific data used to inform the decision-making process. For 
this example specifically, a further distinction can therefore be made between indirect and 
direct transparency (Hood, 2007). While indirect transparency can be defined as information 
that can only be verified by technical experts (e.g. complex raw data), direct transparency can 
be classified as information that is visible to or verifiable by the public at large (e.g. well 
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Chapter III: TRANSPARENCY IN RISK REGULATION 
 
“There is no easily identified community of transparency scholars, nor is there 
agreement on appropriate methods or theoretical constructs”. (Robert O’Connor, US 
National Science Foundation, 2016) 
 
This chapter utilises the typology developed in Chapter II in order to review the literature on 
transparency in risk regulation. First, an overview of the most widely discussed mechanisms 
for making regulatory processes and events (i.e. outputs, processes and inputs) more 
transparent is provided. This discussion particularly emphasises how transparency in risk 
regulation can be directly linked to the evolution of risk communication research and practice 
since at least the mid-1980s. Second, a more in-depth discussion relating to decision-making 
‘input’ policies is provided. This is primarily because these types of transparency policies have 
become increasingly popular (and controversial) in European risk regulation since 2010 
(including at the EMA) (see Way and Löfstedt, forthcoming; EMA 2014a, 2014b). Therefore 
input policies will become the main focus of the empirical chapters of this thesis (see Chapter 
IV for a discussion). The review of input transparency policies examines three main 
perspectives taken in the literature, namely: (1) soft risk regulation; (2) scrutinising regulatory 
data; and (3) data quantity and quality. Third, the literature examining the goal of building 
public trust, that is relevant to all mechanisms and objects, is reviewed. Although there are 
many overriding goals of transparency, this specific goal is reviewed because the majority of 
risk regulators argue that building public trust in risk regulation is the ultimate goal of 
enhancing transparency.  
 
(3.1) Debating transparency policies 
 
Over the past 30 years risk regulators have introduced many new policies that seek to make 
different decision-making events and processes more transparent. At the same time an 
extensive academic literature has emerged on the topic of transparency that includes debates 
over the arguments for and against different mechanisms – such as publishing regulatory data 
or uploading scientific committee meeting minutes online – that are designed to make different 
objects (i.e. outputs, processes, or inputs) more transparent. This section provides an overview 
of this fragmented literature organised into three sub-sections: output mechanisms (3.1.1), 
process mechanisms (3.1.2), and input mechanisms (3.1.3). 
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(3.1.1) Output mechanisms 
 
One of the overriding reasons for making outputs more transparent is so outsiders can 
understand what decisions the regulators (and other bodies) have made, how they came to their 
decisions and why9. One main mechanism for doing so is to create a (scientific) report. As 
Bijker et al. (2009: 107) put it, “the ideal is, of course, that [the decision-making process] yields 
advice of such high quality that the evidence and arguments in the reports will do all the 
persuasive work by themselves and will convince policy makers, professionals, and the public 
that the advice should be followed”. In turn, outsiders can take appropriate action based on the 
ideal of evidence-based decision-making. However, a large literature has shown that simply 
creating and sharing well-written reports is rarely sufficient for achieving output transparency 
(Bijker et al. 2009; Arvai and Rivers III, 2014). This is especially true when decisions concern 
risk and risk issues relating to public health and the environment which can affect many actors 
and the lives of millions of people (Renn et al. 2011).  
 
Moreover, debates over output transparency mechanisms can be directly linked to the sub-field 
of risk communication (Arvai and Rivers III, 2014), which, for Fischhoff (2009: 940), 
“examines the processes that determine how communication with lay people [and external 
experts] enhances or degrades their decision-making ability”. To be clear, output transparency 
requires that outsiders can receive, digest, process and use the information made available by 
the regulators and so it needs to be ‘communicated’ (section 1.1). Since at least the late 1970s, 
this sub-field has evolved significantly with researchers and practitioners gaining a greater 
understanding about the complexities of communicating risk information effectively (e.g. the 
outcomes of decision-making). Several comprehensive literature reviews have detailed the 
evolution of risk communication relating to, for example, the environment/technology 
(Kasperson and Stallen, 1991; Boholm, 1998; Fischhoff, 1995; Leiss, 1996; Löfstedt and 
Frewer, 1998; Slovic, 2000; Frewer, 2004; McComas, 2006), food safety (Löfstedt, 2006; 
Wardman, 2008; Frewer et al. 2014), pharmaceuticals (Bennett et al. 2010; Fischhoff et al. 
2011; Chakraborty and Bouder, 2013; Way et al. 2017) and others (e.g. Boholm, 2015). The 
intention here is not to ‘re-invent the wheel’ by re-fashioning these already comprehensive 
                                                
9 To be clear, this is regardless of whether the decision-making process itself was fully open and participatory or 
not. 
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literature reviews. Rather, some of the major milestones and conceptual avenues in risk 
communication theory and practice can be linked to the concept of output transparency. 
 
Early risk communication mechanisms – that dominated in the 1970s and early 1980s – sought 
to persuade outsiders to accept the outputs of regulatory decision-making (Kasperson and 
Stallen, 1991; Fischhoff, 1995; Leiss, 1996). Risk communication was viewed as the last stage 
of risk management after the expert risk assessment process and selection of risk management 
options had been completed (Jardine and Driedger, 2014: 258). Risk communicators primarily 
took a technocratic top-down approach to communicating outputs, which aimed to “teach the 
public about ‘real’ risk so they can act ‘rationally’ and make informed decisions about what 
risks to take or not to take” (Boholm, 2008). Often described as the “deficit model” (Hilgartner, 
1990), the ultimate goal was to ‘rectify’ the gap and align perspectives between the ‘lay’ public 
and risk assessors (and other scientists) in order to bring the public’s risk perceptions in line 
with ‘expert’ assessments (Woolgar, 1996; Frewer, 2004; National Academy of Sciences, 
2016: 2-9). Output transparency has therefore traditionally been confined to a one-way model 
of conveying knowledge and informing the public about decisions made by ‘expert’ decision-
makers (National Academy of Sciences, 2016).  
 
Over the past 50 years, risk communication research and practice has evolved significantly 
(Fischhoff et al. 2011; Fischhoff, 2013; Canadian Academy of Sciences, 2015; National 
Academy of Sciences, 2016). One of the most notable milestones was the US National 
Research Council’s (NRC) publication, titled ‘Improving Risk Communication’ (NRC, 1989). 
The book represents a paradigm shift in risk communication because, as Jardine and Driedger 
(2014: 258) comment, “risk practitioners began to reframe the issue of risk communication as 
an application of communication theory and practice rather than simply an extension of risk 
assessments”. For example, in a seminal paper (Fischhoff, 1995) identified eight important – 
but empirically unsubstantiated (Breakwell, 2007) – developmental stages in the practice of 
risk communication. Among many other arguments, the article emphasises that conveying 
factual knowledge alone – such as by writing a well-written scientific report – is unlikely to be 
sufficient for achieving the regulators’ risk communication goals (Brewer, 2011; Fischhoff et 
al. 2011, 2013; National Academy of Sciences, 2016). 
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The sub-field of risk communication has since explored many new conceptual angles 
(McComas, 2006; Boholm, 2015). These range from arguments over the need to build public 
trust in risk regulators and assessments (Wynne, 1980, Siegrist and Cvetkovich, 2000; 
Poortinga and Pidgeon, 2003; Löfstedt, 2005; Siegrist et al. 2007; Earle, 2010) to recognizing 
the importance of the social amplification and attenuation of risk (Kasperson et al. 1988; Renn, 
1991; Pidgeon et al. 2003; Breakwell, 2007, 2014) and promoting public participation and 
deliberation (Petts and Brooks 2006; Pidgeon and Rogers-Hayden, 2007; Wesselink et al., 
2011). Amongst many other findings, the risk communication literature has also debated 
numerous mechanisms for communicating about risk and risk issues that have varying 
advantages and disadvantages in different contexts10 (Slovic, 2000; Arvai and Rivers III, 2014; 
Fischhoff et al. 2011, 2013; Boholm, 2015). This includes arguments for and against 
mechanisms ranging from written information (e.g. press statements, information leaflets and 
committee reports) (Morgan et al. 2002; Fleishman-Mayer and Bruine de Bruine, 2014; Way 
et al. 2017) to infographics (Spigelhalter et al. 2011), visual and audio tools (Downs, 2014) 
and social media more generally (Moorhead et al. 2013; Brossard, 2013; Neeley, 2014). 
Therefore output transparency can be directly linked to this now extensive literature. 
 
(3.1.2) Process mechanisms 
 
The concept of process transparency can also be directly linked to risk communication research 
and practice. A major area of academic and policy interest has centred on the importance of 
public participation and deliberation in the decision-making process (Petts and Brooks 2006; 
Pidgeon and Rogers-Hayden, 2007; Wesselink et al. 2011; Löfstedt, 2005; Löfstedt et al. 
2012). Up until the late 1970s European risk regulation was dominated by a ‘consensual’ 
approach to decision-making that focused on negotiated and paternalistic systems (Kelman 
1981; Brickman et al. 1985; Vogel 1986, 2012; O’Riordan & Wynne 1987; Moran, 2003). This 
meant that there was little process transparency (at least in Europe). As Marquand (1988: 178 
In: Moran, 2003) explains with regard to 1970s Britain: 
 
“The atmosphere of British government was that of a club, whose members trusted each 
other to observe the spirit of the club rules; the notion that the principles underlying 
the rules should be clearly defined and publicly proclaimed was profoundly alien.”  
                                                
10 These are rarely described in risk communication research and practice as ‘output transparency mechanisms’. 
A more common label would be, for example, risk communication ‘tools’ (EMA, 2014; EFSA, 2016; Way et al. 
2017). 




The consensual approach notably emphasised a cosy and friendly relationship between the 
regulators and regulated and was characterised by closed-door meetings with elite 
representatives (Moran, 2003). As Jasanoff (1993 In: Vogel, 2001: 2) put it: “policy decisions 
about risk remained (closed to the public) … the preserve of experienced bureaucrats and their 
established advisory networks”. Although the European system was considered effective at the 
time (Vogel, 1986; Löfstedt, 2004)11, it has since become antiquated with some going as far as 
saying it is “no longer viable” (Majone and Everson, 2001: 129), “obsolete” (Leiss, 2000) or 
even “dead” (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011; Bartle and Vass, 2007; Löfstedt et al. 2009). For 
Löfstedt (2004), in place of consensual decision-making a new “participatory-transparent 
model” of regulatory decision-making emerged that, amongst other changes12, places a greater 
emphasis on participation and deliberation in European regulatory decision-making (also see 
Löfstedt et al. 2011; Löfstedt, 2004; Löfstedt et al., 2009; Rothstein et al. 2013; Meijer et al., 
2013). 
 
In this context, one central argument has been that process transparency is essential for 
meaningful participation and effective risk communication (Frewer, 2004). Perhaps Paul 
Slovic, writing in 2000, put it best:  
 
“The limitations of risk science, the importance and difficulty of maintaining trust and 
the subjective and contextual nature of risk point to the need of a new approach – one 
that focuses on introducing more public participation into both risk assessment and risk 
decision-making to make the decision process more democratic, to improve the 
relevance and quality of technical analysis, and increase the legitimacy and public 
acceptance of the resulting decisions” (Slovic, 2000). 
 
Two documents provide key milestones in this trend towards promoting public participation 
and enhancing process transparency (see National Research Council, 1996 and US 
Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management, 1997). As 
Jardine and Driedger (2014) explain, these documents “represent a fundamental change from 
a focus on communication effects to a recognition that communication is a process that is 
                                                
11 For example, Vogel, writing in 1986, comments: “Britain’s emphasis on voluntary compliance has not proved 
any more- or less- effective in achieving its objectives than the more adversarial and legislative approach adopted 
by policymakers in the United States”.  
12 One large strand of the literature has also sought to understand the drivers and reasons for this shift (e.g. Pollit 
and Bouchaert, 2011; Vogel, 2014; Weiner et al. 2014), although this is beyond the scope of this review chapter 
(also see Hood, 2006b; Ruijer and Meijer, 2016). 
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inextricably linked to the analysis and deliberation of the risk area being communicated” 
[italics in original] (Jardine and Driedger, 2014). In turn, a new model of risk communication 
developed that centred on consensus building and conflict resolution (Renn, 2008; Fischhoff, 
1995; Leiss, 1996; Petts and Brooks, 2006). In other words, researchers and practitioners began 
to recognise the need to “integrate communication and consultation throughout the risk 
management process so that public values can inform and influence the shaping of risk 
management strategies” (Jardine and Driedger, 2014).  
 
In seeking to enhance procedural and operational process transparency, several main 
mechanisms have since been introduced by risk regulators. The first set of mechanisms centres 
on the online publication of numerous procedural process documents such as those relating to 
expert representative guidelines and standard operating procedures. Although many regulatory 
bodies have disclosed such documents, only very few authors have debated the arguments for 
and against doing so (Piotrowski and Borry, 2010; Lowenstein et al. 2011; Cain et al. 2011). 
With that said, one main argument is that publishing procedural documents online is essential 
for enabling public participation and accepting regulatory decisions (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2010; 
De Fine Lincht et al. 2014). If the public knows the limits of what decisions the regulators can 
make then they may be more willing to accept those decisions and the legitimacy of the process 
(Grimmelikhuijsen, 2010; De Fine Lincht et al. 2014). On the other hand, a few authors have 
also criticised specific mechanisms. In particular, Lowenstein et al. (2011) explored various 
psychological factors that can complicate the disclosure of scientific committee conflict of 
interest statements. For example, one issue is that when committee experts disclose potential 
conflicts of interest they can be subject to strategic exaggeration, “the tendency of advisors to 
inflate the bias in their advice to counteract any discounting that may occur due to disclosure” 
(Lowenstein et al. 2011: 423).  
 
In contrast to procedural transparency, the lion’s share of the literature has focused on 
operational process mechanisms (Hilgartner, 2000; Bijker et al. 2009; Vos, 2009). One 
particularly popular mechanism has been to upload the minutes of meetings online. Well-
written and clear meeting minutes can be easily digestible and readily understandable for 
outsiders. However, two main limitations of meeting minutes are that they can be uploaded too 
late in the decision-making process to enable meaningful participation (i.e. decisions have 
already been made) and important policy details may have been intentionally or unintentionally 
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omitted. For example, Yin (2009: 103) comments that the “verbatim” transcripts of official US 
Congress hearings have been deliberately edited – by the congressional staff and others who 
may have testified – before being printed in final form”. 
 
A second more radical mechanism is to web-stream meetings live. This can provide outsiders 
with an instantaneous and complete visual and audio insight into meetings. Examples include 
EFSA’s decision to web-stream all board meetings in 2002 (Vos, 2009) or the 1989 
introduction of television cameras in the UK House of Commons, the latter of which sought to 
engender greater public respect for the work of MPs and encourage greater public participation 
in government (Coleman, 2004). One main advantage is that outsiders do not have to attend 
meetings in person. For example, the Norwegian Association of Local and Regional 
Authorities stated in 2005 that “all municipalities should implement webcasting of local 
council meetings by the end of 2009” so that the public can observe local council meetings 
“independent of time and distance” (Berntzen, 2013). Therefore there are important policy 
considerations for introducing different mechanisms for enhancing operational process 
transparency. 
 
There are also arguments that encompass both procedural and operational processes. These 
include the promised ability to enable outsiders to monitor the powers of the regulators and 
build public trust in risk regulation (see Meijer et al. 2015). However, at least two main 
arguments have been particularly prominent in the literature (Frewer, 2003; Wynne, 1989; 
Fironio, 1990; Wardman, 2008). The first is that process transparency is expected to strengthen 
the information position of citizens so that all actors can meaningfully contribute to the risk 
management process (Bovens et al. 2008; Piotrowski and Borry, 2010). This is strongly linked 
to a large literature on building a strong democracy (Meijer et al. 2015) as well as arguments 
that leaving risk assessment and management to ‘scientific experts’ is ineffective and too 
technocratic (Wynne, 1989; Bijker et al. 2009; Vos, 2012). Therefore many scholars argue that 
process transparency is an essential pre-requisite for meaningful participation as information 
asymmetries between the regulators and regulated can be reduced (Stiglitz, 1999; Meijer et al. 
2012; Michener and Bersch, 2016).  
 
The second main argument is that process transparency can help outsiders better understand 
risk regulation including the difficulties of and limits to decision-making. This incorporates 
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arguments relating to improving procedural fairness and acceptance, increasing public control 
of decision-making and, as De Fine Licht et al. (2014: 114-115) put it: 
 
“… [process transparency and deliberation can] both inform the citizens of the facts in 
the case and clarify—and possibly increase the tolerance for—different normative 
values and worldviews defended by representatives of different groups and perspectives 
that feed into the decision”.  
 
In turn, this is expected to raise the public’s willingness to accept regulatory decisions (De Fine 
Licht et al. 2014: 115). Those outside the regulatory process are expected to ‘see’ the workings 
of regulatory agencies such as how responsibilities are divided amongst different groups (e.g. 
industry and regulators) (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2010:117). The public can gain a clear 
understanding of how many risk issues are highly complicated and require difficult trade-offs 
to be made. For example, some have argued that enhancing process transparency can help to 
explain the inherent uncertainties in risk-related decision-making (Beck et al. 2015; Institute 
of Medicine, 2016; National Academy of Sciences, 2016). 
 
However, although there are persuasive arguments, other researchers have provided counter-
arguments (Vos, 2009; Bijker et al. 2009; Hilgartner, 2000). One is that process transparency 
can reveal to outsiders that they lack real influence in the decision-making process leading to 
frustration or as Ulbig (2008 In: De Fine Licht, 2014: 116) puts it: “voice with little influence 
produces more negative reactions than no voice”. One particularly noteworthy conceptual 
approach has centred on Erving Goffman’s (1959) concept of ‘dramaturgy’, the study of how 
meaning is generated in drama and performance (Kennedy, 2010), which draws on the 
metaphor of a theatre to explain human behaviour (see Hilgartner, 2000 for a discussion). By 
deploying this concept, a growing number of scholars have made an important distinction 
between ‘frontstage’ and ‘backstage’ decision-making (Hilgartner, 2000; Bijker et al. 2009; 
Vos, 2009). The main argument is that, similar to a theatre setting, maintaining some level of 
‘backstage activity’ is essential to the effective workings of scientific committees for at least 
three main reasons.  
 
The first reason is that conducting all decision-making activity in public can result in scientists 
and other experts being pressurised by interest groups (e.g. political and interest lobby groups) 
(Bal et al. 2004). In turn, this can result in paralysing the regulatory process. Decision-makers 
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can be left exposed if they are unable to discuss certain sensitive and complicated issues in 
private or as Vos (2009: 257) puts it:   
 
“…allowing access to meetings of scientific bodies is considered by some authors to be 
particularly troublesome, as this could lead to the political pressuring of scientists and 
hence to a further politicisation of science, risking paralysis of the process”. 
 
This is not a hypothetical scenario and has happened before such as with scientists in the 
Scientific Veterinary Committee during the BSE crisis (Vos, 2009: 258). Therefore there are 
strong arguments for why maintaining some level of ‘backstage’ activity is important for the 
effective functioning of scientific committees. 
 
A second closely connected argument is that keeping scientific discussions backstage can 
enable participants to feel free to discuss issues openly and hence produce high quality opinions 
through debate. A seminal book by Bijker et al. (2009) found that many discussions at the 
Dutch Gezondheidsraad needed to be non-transparent in order to resolve differences in opinion 
between the various actors involved in decision-making (Löfstedt and Bouder, 2014). For 
Coglianese (2009), this might be described as ‘fishbowl’ transparency where every move and 
decision made by decision-makers is scrutinised. Thus some authors have argued that some 
aspects of process transparency – or full ‘fishbowl’ transparency – should be limited so that 
scientists can exchange opinions backstage but also incorporate the views of other important 
actors onstage (Löfstedt and Bouder, 2014).  
 
A third main argument has been that enhancing process transparency may actually erode rather 
than build public trust (see section 2.3.4 for further discussion). In particular, some authors 
have expressed concerns that outsiders and especially the public will become disenchanted with 
how regulators seemingly “muddle through and bicker throughout the decision-making 
process” (Löfstedt and Bouder, 2014: 77; also see Lindbloom, 1959). For example, a growing 
body of research has shown that communicating uncertainties in risk regulation is complicated 
and challenging and can ultimately, if handled poorly, result in eroding trust in the risk 
management and assessment system (see Löfstedt and Bouder, 2017 for a discussion; Johnson 
and Slovic, 1998; Beck et al. 2016; National Academy of Science, 2016). 
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Going further, a closely connected strand of the literature has examined important issues with 
public participation and deliberation that process transparency by itself would be unlikely to 
resolve (Löfstedt, 2004). Four main issues are highlighted here. First, there are important time 
and resource limitations. Public participation can be costly and decision-makers cannot feasibly 
discuss all aspects of the risk assessment and management process for every risk issue (Rowe 
and Frewer, 2000; Abelson and Gauvin, 2006). For example, one national debate on genetic 
modification held by GM Nation in 2003 was initially estimated to cost around £250,000 but 
quickly escalated to over £600,000, which excluded hidden financial costs as well as additional 
time burdens on central government (Momenta, 2003). Second, there are clear difficulties with 
recruiting participants (Löfstedt, 2004). Combined with low participant response rates that can 
drop below 1% (Löfstedt, 1999; Renn, 2008), issues of self-selection bias (and unrepresentative 
samples) can create biases towards particular groups and agendas (Löfstedt, 2004; Pidgeon et 
al. 2005). Third, participants can have fundamentally contradictory principles, beliefs and 
ideals resulting in few ways of reconciling risk controversies and little hope of coming to 
mutual agreements (Pellizzoni, 2001). Fourth, often debates and discussions favour what 
should be done over what can be done without fully recognising practical limitations (Rozzi, 
1997; Coglianese, 2007). 
 
Due to these issues and more several scholars have demonstrated that there are many barriers, 
obstacles and limitations to implementing effective process transparency (and participation in 
general) (Petts and Brooks 2006; Wesselink et al. 2011). There have also been many different 
ways that organisations have adapted to process transparency requirements and subsequently 
changed their practices. For example, Rothstein (2013) argues that the UK Food Standards 
Agency has often coped and adapted to public participation pressures rather than truly foster 
public engagement and participation in decision-making despite receiving good reviews from 
consumer groups (e.g. the Consumers Association’s ‘Which?’ magazine). For Pidgeon and 
Rogers-Hayden (2007), attempts to engage the public upstream and in the risk characterisation 
and assessment process has also been problematic (also see National Research Council, 1996). 
Ultimately, integrating public participation into risk-decision-making has largely failed to live 
up to expectations (Rossi, 1997; Flyvberg and Richardson, 2002; Löfstedt, 2004; Petts and 
Brooks, 2006; Coglianese, 2007) and process transparency is not problem free (Bijker et al. 
2009; Vos, 2009). 
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(3.1.3) Input mechanisms 
 
Over the past 10 years, many new input transparency policies have been introduced by 
regulatory agencies (see Way and Löfstedt, 2016; also see Fung et al. 2007: 12-13). 
Environmental regulatory domain policies have received some of the most attention and 
include the US Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) (Stephan, 2002; Kraft et al. 2011), the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) (Dingwerth and Eichinger, 2011) and amendments to the US Safe 
Drinking Water Act (Environmental Protection Agency, 1996). Policies from outside the 
environmental realm include EMA’s clinical study reports transparency policy (Chapter VI) 
(EMA, 2014b), the FDA’s adverse drug reaction reports policy (Chakraborty and Löfstedt, 
2012), EFSA’s Data Warehouse Project (Url, 2013; Way and Löfstedt, forthcoming), the US 
Food Safety and Inspection Service’s (FSIS) data release project (FSIS, 2016), and many 
others.  
 
For all of these policies, the main mechanism for enhancing input transparency has centred on 
publishing the data and information that underpins risk regulation online (Way and Löfstedt, 
forthcoming). This includes a collective wealth of information relating to, for example, clinical 
trials and side effects (e.g. in pharmaceutical regulation), genetically modified organism risk 
assessments (e.g. in food safety regulation), hospital mortality rates (e.g. in health and social 
care regulation), industrial emissions data (e.g. in environmental regulation), crime statistics 
(e.g. in policing), road safety accidents data (e.g. in transport regulation), and so on. Yet, 
despite the wave of new input policies introduced in recent years, they have received 
surprisingly little attention in the academic literature (see Cucciniello et al. 2017), especially 
when compared with output and process policies. The following section provides a more 
comprehensive review of input transparency policies as they will become the central focus of 
the empirical chapters of this thesis. 
 
(3.2) Focusing on input transparency 
 
At least three main perspectives on input transparency policies have taken prominence in the 
fragmented literature: soft risk regulation (2.3.1); scrutinising regulatory data (2.3.2); and data 
quantity and quality (2.3.3).  
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(3.2.1) Soft risk regulation 
 
One perspective in the literature centres on the idea that uploading informational inputs online 
can act as a form of ‘soft’ risk regulation (Fung et al. 2007; Mitchell, 2011; Kraft et al. 2011; 
Gupta and Mason, 2014). This is labelled hereafter as ‘regulation by disclosure’ but has also 
been referred to as ‘governance by disclosure’, ‘regulation by revelation’, ‘targeted 
transparency’, ‘information governance’, ‘information as regulation’ and others (Stephan, 
2002; Fung et al. 2007; Gupta. 2008; Mitchell, 2011; Gupta and Mason, 2014). In this 
literature, transparency is understood as a “light handed” and innovative regulatory tool that 
can be used to overcome the shortcomings of traditional command and control approaches 
(Kleindorfer and Orts, 1998; Kraft et al. 2011). Notably, the latter is often criticised for being 
too constraining, costly and unreasonable (Bardach and Kagan, 1982) or as Coglianese (2016) 
clarifies: 
 
“Such objections [to command and control regulation] are loudest when rules 
inflexibility require every regulated entity to take the same actions – or adopt the same 
technology fixes – even if under some circumstances, or for some entities, the required 
action or technology might be expensive, ineffectual, or even counterproductive”.  
 
Many transparency by disclosure policies work by requiring targeted actors – such as producers 
of goods and services – to “disclose information about their activities that they would prefer 
not to disclose” (Mitchell, 2011: 1885). However, other policies – and the focus of this section 
– require the same actors to accept disclosure of such information by others (e.g. the regulators) 
(Mitchell, 2011). For example, the US Environmental Protection Agency’s Toxics Release 
Inventory requires industrial emissions polluters to publish pollution data online (Kraft et al. 
2011). In contrast, the regulators could publish this information themselves (e.g. by uploading 
pollution permits and other regulatory data online). Although there are important differences 
between who discloses the information, the central argument for all regulation by disclosure 
policies is broadly the same (Fung et al. 2007). Disclosing informational inputs relating to 
products and services – such as data on pollution, food safety, medicines, hospital mortality 
rates, police crime statistics etc. – is expected to induce targeted actors (e.g. producers of goods 
and services) to change their behaviour and reduce specific risks to the public (Stephan, 2002; 
Dingwerth and Eichinger, 2010; Mol, 2010; Mitchell, 2011; Gupta and Mason, 2014).  
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This is expected to work in two stages. In the first stage, disclosing informational inputs is 
expected to empower the public to reduce risks to their health and/or the environment by 
enabling them to choose safer and better products and services (Fung et al. 2011). In other 
words, information is disclosed via a publicly accessible web-portal and is subsequently 
perceived by the public – such as by individuals reading data online (directly) or via 
intermediaries such as the media or NGOs (indirectly) (Mitchell, 2011) – thus resulting in a 
better informed public. This is premised on the understanding that consumers have imperfect 
information about (powerful) actors in society (e.g. industry and government) (Stiglitz, 1999), 
which creates disparities in information about risk (see Fung et al. 2007: 31-33 for a 
discussion). Reducing these information asymmetries is therefore expected to empower 
consumers to make more informed decisions (Stiglitz, 1999; Michener and Bersch, 2016).  
 
Depending on the regulatory context (and the data released) the public can make many safer 
and better decisions. Employees can choose safer working environments (e.g. with workplace 
hazards data), patients can choose better performing hospitals (e.g. with hospital performance 
data), environmentalists can boycott products made in high polluting industrial facilities (e.g. 
with industrial pollution data), parents can choose safer neighbourhoods (e.g. with crime data), 
drivers can choose safer cars (e.g. with accident data) and so on (Fung et al. 2007: 12-13). For 
example, a key recommendation in the Francis Review13, a UK public inquiry into serious 
failings at the Mid-Staffordshire National Health Service (NHS) Foundation Trust, was that 
the hospital and its staff should allow “true information about performance and outcomes to be 
shared with staff, patients and the public” (Francis, 2013: 75). One reason for providing such 
information – that is also received by the healthcare regulator or commissioner – is to enable 
the public “to compare relative performance” between hospitals and thus reduce information 
asymmetries (ibid, 2013). Therefore regulation by disclosure transparency policies can be 
classified as capacity building tools, defined as “policies or programs that increase the ability 
of people to act on their concerns” (Stephan, 2002: 191). 
 
In the second stage, the actions of consumers – or at least the expected actions of consumers – 
are hoped to prompt targeted actors to adopt less risky behaviour. Employers might create safer 
working environments, hospital managers might improve patient safety, industrial facilities 
might reduce pollution levels, manufacturers might develop safer cars, and so on. For example, 
                                                
13 The full title of the report is ‘The Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry’. 
    
50 
 
in the environmental context, the 1998 Aarhus convention seeks to “reduce the incidence of 
environmental externalities by rectifying information deficits and asymmetries” (Mason, 
2014a: 87). Then consumers can choose between better and less risky products and services. 
Mitchell (2011) explains several reasons why targeted actors might change their behaviour. 
This includes organisations (see Mitchell, 2011: 1886): 
 
1. becoming aware of their own (poor) behaviours (e.g. in preparation for public 
disclosure);  
2. becoming aware that their behaviours may not be appropriate (e.g. the fact that the 
regulators feel disclosure is necessary); 
3. having to explain or attend to behaviours that they otherwise might ignore and/or; 
4. revealing information to other producers (e.g. concerns that they are underperforming 
compared to competitors). 
 
However, the most widely discussed mechanism is that disclosure is expected to shock the 
public and shame producers of goods and services into changing their activities (Stephan, 2002; 
Fung et al. 2007; Mitchell, 2011; Weil et al. 2013). As Roberts (2012) puts it: “leak, publish 
and wait for the inevitable outrage”. Assuming the information made publicly available 
conflicts with the public’s prior expectations (Mitchell, 2011), it has the potential to shock them 
and raise their perceptions of risk (Stephan, 2002). In turn, producers can be shamed into 
changing their activities and reduce risks from their products and/or services. For example, 
producers could lose, or at least expect to lose, custom or suffer reputational damage. Several 
authors have also emphasised that the shock and shame mechanism is more likely to work 
through intermediaries rather than consumers themselves (Kraft et al. 2011; Gupta and Mason 
2014: 16-17). For example, intermediaries could interpret the disclosed information, 
communicate it to the public and gain support for shaming producers (Kraft et al. 2011). Taken 
together, by disclosing information, the public are expected to be “empowered to take 
decisions, without [the regulators] specifying what these decisions should be, and that the 
aggregate effect of those decisions will lead producers to adopt (or maintain) [less risky 
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(3.2.2) Scrutinising regulatory data 
 
A second perspective on input transparency centres on the re-use and re-analysis of regulatory 
data. This literature can be strongly connected to the two concepts of accountability (Bovens, 
2008; Hood, 2010) and legitimacy (De Fine Licht et al. 2014), as well as long term declining 
levels of public trust in risk regulation (Löfstedt and Bouder, 2014; Tuler and Kasperson, 
2014). The central argument is that publishing the evidence that underpins decision-making 
online is essential for facilitating external scrutiny (e.g. by external experts and the public). 
Outsiders can “see” the data for themselves without anyone else interpreting what that evidence 
means (Way et al. 2016).  
 
Central to this fragmented literature is the understanding that a substantial amount of input 
information is not currently available beyond the regulators and industry (Löfstedt et al. 2011). 
This is especially true for privately-funded, rather than publicly-funded, research such as data 
collected in support of licensing applications, pollution permits or other regulatory activities 
(McGarity and Wagner, 2008; Michaels, 2008; Goldacre, 2008; Shrader-Frechetter and 
Oreskes, 2011). For example, many privately-funded studies are not reported in peer review 
journals (Song et al. 2010; Goldacre, 2012; Dwan et al. 2013), yet are used as key evidence in 
support of regulatory decision-making. Although there are many reasons for this, a main one 
centres on traditions of confidentiality and privacy (see Section 2.3.3), which some critics have 
argued favour industry too strongly (Roberts, 2006). 
 
Advocates of full input transparency have provided many reasons why all data and information 
used in risk regulation should be make publicly available online. One argument is that outsiders 
need input data in order to judge whether the regulatory evidence base is robust and unbiased 
(e.g. risk assessment data). In particular, outsiders – and especially the scientific community – 
need to be able to see the actual risk assessments and judge whether privately-funded evidence 
is credible (also see Silbergeld, 1993; Montague, 2004; Forbes et al. 2016: 1069). Although it 
may indeed be of high quality, critics argue that outsiders cannot judge this for themselves 
(Shrader-Frechette and Oreskes, 2011). In turn, high quality expert scrutiny is expected to 
provide the regulators with a more robust evidence base for decision-making and added 
capacity for evaluating the quality of the evidence.  
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In arguing for input transparency, many advocates have criticised privately-funded research 
and data (Abraham and Lewis 1999; Michaels, 2008; Song et al. 2010; Corporate European 
Observatory, 2015; Forbes et al. 2016). In the pharmaceutical domain, critics have argued that 
studies funded by industry are more likely to produce positive than negative results (Angell, 
2004; Song et al. 2010; Goldacre, 2012; Dwan et al. 2013). In risk assessment more generally, 
Michaels (2008) argues that private risk assessment companies (e.g. Exponent or ChemRisk) 
produce biased results that have, for example, denied the risks of hazardous pollutants, 
endocrine disrupters, harm from cigarettes, asbestos, and many others. These arguments are 
also accompanied by trust-eroding news stories and events where industry has undertaken 
overtly fraudulent activities that seriously damage credibility. This includes the 2016 
Volkswagen clean diesel engines fraud (Crete, 2016) and companies being fined huge sums for 
creating inaccurate findings (e.g. industry hiding results) (see e.g. Jack, 2014). 
 
A second closely connected argument has been that regulatory data needs to be scrutinised 
whether it has been funded by industry or not (Forbes et al. 2016). In particular, some advocates 
have pointed to issues with the scientists themselves. This includes pressures on scientists to 
publish favourable results such as for recognition, career development or funding requirements 
(Forbes et al. 2016). Others point to scientists acting inappropriately, fraudulently or with 
highly questionable conflicts of interest (Fang and Casadevall 2011; Ebrahim et al. 2014). For 
example, critics have pointed to ‘Climategate’, that is, the University of East Anglia climate 
change unit email controversy, and the retraction of Andrew Wakefield’s article fraudulently 
linking the Mumps Measles and Rubella vaccine to autism (Boyce, 2007). Retraction watch, 
for example, is a blog that reports on the retraction of scientific papers and whose website 
provides on-going examples of incidents of poor researcher conduct (see 
www.retractionwatch.com).  
 
In support of these arguments, some researchers have pointed out that much scientific research 
is not replicable (see Buthe et al. 2015 for a discussion; Bohannon, 2012). This is closely linked 
to an additional strand of the literature that focuses on open data and innovation whereby open 
science is expected to enable attempts to replicate study findings (McKinsey and Company, 
2013; Madelin and Ringrose, 2016). Therefore one main argument is that enabling external 
scrutiny is needed in order to allow outsiders to try and replicate studies themselves (Bohannon, 
2015). For example, Martin Pidgeon of the Corporate European Observatory (CEO), a 
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European research and campaign group, criticised EFSA for being irresponsible with regard to 
transparency and information disclosure: 
 
“Transparency isn’t only needed to improve public confidence in EFSA’s work but also 
in order to ensure EFSA’s assessments are based on sound science. A fundamental 
principle of science is replicability: the methodology and results of the industry tests 
need to be made public so that other scientists can replicate the test and see if they get 
the same result.” (CEO, 2013). 
 
There are therefore many arguments for publishing informational inputs that centre on 
criticisms of industry data and the science and scientists that underpin decision-making. 
 
A third argument is that publishing informational inputs online can enable outsiders to 
scrutinise not just the evidence itself but the regulators’ interpretation of that evidence (Dudley 
and Weigrich, 2015: 3). The central idea is that transparency can “empower the public to 
observe the actions of the regulators to whom they have delegated power or of other powerful 
actors in society” (Mitchell, 2011: 1885). For example, uploading informational inputs can 
enable those outside the regulatory process to scrutinise the regulators’ choice of evidence, 
interpretation of that evidence and whether there were any conflicts of interest. As Baxter 
(2012: 147) puts it: “greater disclosure all round would at least enable other stakeholders and 
the media to focus a spotlight on improper collusion”. Input transparency is expected to enable 
outsiders to identify whether the regulators succumbed to “selective or biased attention” 
(Lodge, 2004: 126) and/or self-interested action (Baxter, 2012). Some scholars have gone 
further by arguing that the regulators will also “behave better” if they know they are being 
“watched” (Meijer et al. 2015). As Dudley and Weigrich (2015: 3) put it: 
 
“…when methods of regulatory analysis are prescribed and regulators have to publicly 
report the data, models, assumptions, and technical rules on which regulatory 
proposals are based, public scrutiny can motivate them to be prudent about using the 
evidence in general and conducting cost-benefit analysis in particular”. 
 
Similar to criticisms of privately-funded research, input transparency advocates often support 
their arguments by citing various high-profile scandals and criticisms that have been linked to 
risk regulators. This includes accusations of revolving door policies and regulatory capture by 
industry, which occurs when “agencies tasked with protecting the public come to identify with 
the regulated industry and protect its interests against those of the public” (Carpenter and Moss, 
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2013). Examples of these scandals and criticisms are numerous. Ex-EU commissioner for 
Health and Consumer Policy, John Dalli, was linked to a tobacco lobbyist while responsible 
for introducing tougher anti-smoking legislation (Gotev, 2016). A senior ex-EMA 
pharmacovigilance risk assessment committee (PRAC) member, Silvio Garattini, criticised the 
agency for being too cosy with industry (Chapter V) (Garatini, 2007). Volkswagen appointed 
ex-EU climate commissioner Connie Hedegaard only a few months after the 2016 emissions 
scandal (Eriksson, 2016). Jose Manuel Barosso, joined Goldman Sachs shortly after stepping 
down as EU Commission president (Macdonald and Baczynska, 2016). Thomas Lönngren 
joined a consultancy firm called NDA shortly after stepping down as EMA Executive Director 
(Chapter V) (Makhasvilli and Stephenson, 2013). At EFSA, conflicts of interest policies were 
heavily criticised in 2010 after one of its committee chairs, Diana Banati, was linked to an 
industry lobby group, the International Life Sciences Institute (Boseley, 2014a). After 
resigning from the institute and maintaining her position at EFSA, she went on to resign as 
chair at EFSA and become head of European policy at the lobby group (Boseley, 2014a).  
 
(3.2.3) Data quantity and quality issues 
 
A third perspective on input transparency relates to the quantity and quality of data and 
information published online. One important question centres on the desirability and feasibility 
of uploading all input information (Gupta and Mason, 2014). This is hereafter referred to as 
‘full input disclosure’. On the one hand, there are many aforementioned reasons why full input 
disclosure might be beneficial (e.g. relating to regulation by disclosure or scrutinising 
regulatory evidence). The public have a right to information and access to documents, which 
is enshrined into law (e.g. Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and 
Council) (Birkinshaw, 2006; Zarsky, 2014: 123). Advocates of open government, open data, 
information innovation, and the so-called “big data” movement also often stress that full 
disclosure is necessary (although see Zarsky, 2014) (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2013). 
Many have argued, for example, that limiting what information can be made available would 
limit the promises of open data (Bertot et al. 2014). 
 
On the other hand, there are valid reasons why full input disclosure may not be desirable or 
feasible (Lord, 2006; Birchall, 2011; Gupta and Mason, 2014). One argument is that there are 
important trade-offs between the overall costs of releasing vast quantities of regulatory 
    
55 
 
information and burdens on regulatory authorities and their resources (Grimmelikhuijsen, 
2012; Meijer et al. 2015). For example, the UK FOI Act (2000) has been criticised for imposing 
unnecessary and excessive burdens on public authorities (see UK Ministry of Justice, 2012). 
One issue is that excessive resource consumption can result in the regulators being unable to 
commit resources to other, perhaps more effective or useful, public policy interventions 
(Etzioni, 2010). As Meijer et al. (2015) put it: 
 
“…the benefits may merit substantial investments in transparency, but there are also 
opportunity costs. Money spent on transparency cannot be used to strengthen other 
citizen participation, checks and balances or learning mechanisms in different—and 
possibly more effective—ways”.  
 
Therefore transparency is not cost-free and opportunity costs need to be taken into 
consideration when advocating full input disclosure (Etzioni, 2010).  
 
A second and much more widely discussed argument is that full input disclosure is unattainable 
and undesirable due to the merits of confidentiality, privacy and anonymity14 (O’Neill, 2006; 
Lord, 2006; Birchall, 2011; Gupta and Mason, 2014: 15 Heald, 2006: 64; Zarsky, 2003; 2014). 
Full input transparency is limited by legal obligations. For example, EFSA’s ‘Transformation 
to an Open EFSA’ discussion paper makes clear that the agency is obliged and committed to 
protect privacy and commercially sensitive information in order to remain compliant with EU 
laws set out in its founding regulation (see article 38 and 39 of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002). 
Similarly, the UK FOI Act (2000) includes the requirement that “when a request is made about 
a private citizen, nondisclosure is mandated if the invasion would be clearly unwarranted” 
(Zarsky, 2003: 997). Rather than reviewing the now extensive literature on confidentiality, 
privacy and anonymity, the importance of these three distinct but related objects is briefly 
exemplified. 
 
Confidentiality refers to the limits that are placed on who is authorised to use input data and 
information. Although there are many reasons for confidentiality (e.g. relating to national 
defence and security) (Halstuk et al. 2006), one main argument is that confidentiality can 
protect the market and economy (Zarsky, 2014). This often centres on commercial 
confidentiality and the understanding that “businesses require a minimal level of privacy to 
                                                
14 To be clear, these three objects are related but distinct (Heald, 2006b). 
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allow them to refrain from revealing their business practices, thus facilitating an innovative 
and competitive market” (Zarsky, 2003: 1002). For example, much input information contains 
data collected by a company that would be valuable to its competitors. This has led some 
commentators and industry groups to argue that if commercial confidentiality is not maintained 
then this could result in “free riding” (Eichler et al. 2013) 
 
Privacy refers to the affairs of the individual and the state of being free from public attention 
(Heald, 2006: 65; Birkinshaw, 2006). Input documents can contain a broad range of personal 
information “that is identifiable to that individual” including, but not limited to, an individual’s 
health, genetic code, family, sexual preferences, credit history, eye colour, income, and so on. 
If this information is not protected, then its publication may lead to important issues. According 
to Zarsky (2003, 2014), this includes: 
 
1. criminal misuse or abuse of personal data (e.g. blackmail or exposing vulnerable 
individuals); 
2. problems arising from errors in databases (e.g. unfair treatment of specific individuals); 
3. the use of personal data to discriminate between users (e.g. aggressive price 
discrimination) and; 
4. the use of such data by content providers and advertisers to manipulate and impinge on 
personal autonomy (e.g. unfairly persuading or manipulating individuals).  
 
For example, one of the UK’s largest NHS-approved online pharmacies, Pharmacy2U, 
received a £130,000 fine for breaching the UK Data Protection Act by selling personal data 
from 21,000 NHS patients and online customers (Green, 2015). Highlighting the potential for 
misuse, the information was, in turn, bought by (1) an Australian lottery company that is subject 
to an investigation about trading standards and (2) a UK charity that used the details to ask for 
donations from people with learning difficulties (see Green, 2015). 
 
Anonymity refers to the state of being unidentifiable as an individual and, as Zarsky (2003: 
1024) puts it, involves “disconnecting the information collected from the individuals to whom 
it pertains”. Anonymising input documents has been viewed as a way of overcoming 
confidentiality and privacy issues by removing identifiable information such as through 
redacting information with black boxes (e.g. EMA, 2016b). This might include redacting 
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names, addresses, and other personal information. However, even the most sophisticated 
anonymisation techniques are imperfect due, in particular, to resource burdens from 
anonymising data (e.g. on those redacting information) and arguments that anonymisation is 
not actually possible (Abbasi and Chen, 2008). For example, Narayanan et al. (2012) discuss 
several ways of identifying individuals in documents that have redacted information such as 
through automated linguistic stylometry, which can be used to compare writing styles in a 
document (e.g. writing patterns) against texts that haven’t been anonymised (e.g. published 
articles, blogs etc.)  
 
These arguments and others have led many commentators to state that that the full disclosure 
of information is unattainable and/or undesirable (Gupta and Mason, 2014: 15). For every 
doctrine there is almost always a counter-doctrine (Hood, 2006b) or as O’Neill (2002: 18) puts 
it:  
 
“We fantasise irresponsibility that we can promulgate rights without thinking carefully 
about the counterpart obligations, and without checking whether the rights we favour 
are consistent”.  
 
Therefore many therefore view ‘full’ or ‘maximum’ input transparency as “naive” (e.g. de Fine 
Lincht et al. 2013) and, in many cases, would rather identify an optimal ‘level’ (Hillebrandt et 
al. 2014) such as through partial disclosure (Gupta and Mason, 2014). Furthermore, although 
some authors have contextualised these counter-arguments as responses to transparency 
pressures and organisational defence strategies (Hood et al. 2001; Roberts, 2006; Hood, 2007; 
Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011), others have strongly argued that the full disclosure of 
informational inputs can damage privacy and confidentiality (Zarsky, 2003, 2014; O’Neill, 
2006). Ultimately there are important limits and policy considerations directly relating to the 
quantity of input information that the regulators can legally or feasibly release. 
 
Along with quantity, a large scholarship has also debated input data quality issues. This 
literature has centred on the desired attributes of disclosed input information, which include, 
but are not limited to, whether it is accessible, comprehensible, comparable, accurate, 
actionable or relevant (Gupta and Mason, 2014). As discussed in the introductory chapter 
(section 1.2), “For transparency to be effective, there must be receptors capable of processing, 
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digesting, and using the information” (Heald, 2006: 35). There are, however, many issues 
relating to the quality of data, which mean that these criteria may not be met.  
 
Three main examples can exemplify the importance of data quality (Roberts, 2006). First, input 
information may be incomplete or unreliable due to, for example, poor record keeping or data 
manipulation (Roberts, 2006). One well-known practice in accounting and finance is window 
dressing where, for instance, bank managers “manipulate accounting values around quarter-
end reporting dates to make accounts appear more favourable” (e.g. by making short-term 
financial transactions) (Allen and Saunders, 1991: 386). Second, input information may be too 
complicated for recipients to process or digest. In other words, outsiders may lack the capacity 
to interpret or use the disclosed data. The implicit rationale behind input transparency is: 
“Information is received; it is posted online; and it readily finds an audience, which in turn 
makes sense of it” (Roberts, 2006). This logic assumes that information recipients can 
understand the information and have incentives, capacities and alternatives that can foster 
changes in their behaviour (Mitchell, 2011). Recipients must also be interested in the 
information in order to achieve the regulators’ goals. As Mitchell (2011) explains: 
 
“…the causal chain linking increased transparency to behavioural change by targeted 
actors often is broken by information recipients who lack any interest in, or have 
interests that run counter to, accessing or responding to the new information being 
generated”. 
 
Third, input information may not be actionable. Providing too much information can drown 
recipients in disclosure (Gupta, 2008). ‘Snowing’ is a term used for when organizations, 
intentionally or otherwise, disclose vast amounts of information with little quality control thus 
reducing the effectiveness or usability of transparent information (Hood, 2007). For example, 
Etzioni (2010: 5) comments:  
 
“...a 47-page mortgage can lull people into a false sense of security, as they mistakenly 
believe that more details means more honesty. […]. If the industry were required to 
offer a standard mortgage with easy-to-understand terms, consumers might receive less 
direct information but would gain information they would be able to digest and use”.  
 
Moreover, these data quality arguments are also relevant to input transparency intermediaries 
who interpret such information “thus acting as receptors” (Heald, 2006: 35; Etzioni, 2010: 12-
14; Mitchell, 2011; Gupta and Mason, 2014: 16-17). In the risk communication literature these 
    
59 
 
intermediaries might be categorised as ‘information channels’, defined as “a conveyance 
device that collects information from a source or sources, repackages it and then disseminates 
it” (Dunwoody and Griffin, 2014: 222). One issue is that in order for transparency to be 
effective “complex infrastructures of monitoring and verification are needed to render 
disclosed information usable” (Mitchell, 2011). This is important as intermediaries are more 
likely to have the required time, expertise and resources to understand the information and 
convey it to ill-equipped outsiders (e.g. those who lack the expertise or time).  
 
A second issue is that, in order to fulfil their role, intermediaries will inevitably have to first 
repackage and then convey the input information (Etzioni, 2010). As Dunwoody and Griffin 
(2014: 222) explain: 
 
 “[The] primary goals of mediated channels are to be highly selective in choosing 
information, and then to embed the selected information in narratives that seek to 
summarise, analyse or be persuasive about the events or processes of interest”. 
 
This role of intermediaries for enhancing transparency has led many scholars to argue that risk 
information can easily be misinterpreted or repackaged in a way that suits the intermediaries 
that may go against the regulators’ advice or expectations (O’Neill, 2006; Manson and O’Neill, 
2008; Etzioni, 2010; Way et al. 2016). Some scholars have argued that the public, who are 
often ill-equipped to make first order analyses of data made available through transparency 
requirements, will receive one-sided arguments from experts and critics of regulators such as 
from the media or campaigning organisations (O’Neill, 2006; Mason and O’Neill, 2008; 
Etzioni, 2010).  
 
These two issues can be exemplified with an illuminating example (see Löfstedt and Way, 
2016a; also see Etzioni, 2010: 12-14 for further examples)15. Over 20 years after the Toxics 
Release Inventory was first established, the US’s largest disclosure programme that releases 
pollution data on thousands of facilities across America annually, USA Today (2008) released 
an article documenting widespread pollution levels surrounding just under 128,000 American 
schools (Kraft et al. 2011). The reporters concluded that “the potential problems [of chemical 
risks] that emerged were widespread, insidious, and largely unaddressed” (Gilbert 2008 In: 
Kraft et al. 2011: 187). However, after “considerable review”, the Department of Natural 
                                                
15 Note: this example was first reported by the author in Löfstedt and Way (2016). 
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Resources found that the reporters had misinterpreted and poorly analysed the data from the 
publicly available Toxics Release Inventory database (Kraft, et al 2011: 216). Yet, the report 
still caused widespread concern from parents across America, which was not easily relieved by 
refuting the news agency’s findings (Kraft et al. 2011). 
 
(3.3) Building public trust 
 
Beyond the many arguments specific to different transparency mechanisms, there are also 
several main goals of transparency that are relevant to all objects and mechanisms (Section 
2.1.3). This includes the goals of promoting meaningful public participation, enhancing 
legitimacy and enabling the re-use of data for experts outside the regulatory process (section 
2.1). For example, when re-analysing input data (e.g. for external scrutiny) a data analyst will 
need to know what decisions the regulators made in order to judge whether they came to 
accurate conclusions. Although there are indeed many goals, for many regulatory authorities, 
the overriding goal of enhancing transparency is to build public trust in risk regulation. For 
example, after announcing a new input transparency, the EMA made clear: 
 
“[The Agency] has committed to continuously extending its approach to transparency. 
[…]. The Agency has embarked on this process because it believes that the release of 
data, making it accessible to all who wish to see it, is about establishing trust and 
confidence in the system” (EMA, 2015a: 1). 
 
Indeed, building public trust through transparency is viewed as the ultimate goal for many 
organisations outside of risk regulation (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2010). Many of the arguments 
relating to trust are implicit in the previous sections. Therefore the purpose of this section is to 
make the main arguments for and against the effects of transparency on trust explicit. 
 
Several authors have distinguished between transparency optimists and pessimists, primarily 
because their arguments are often based on anecdotal rather than empirical evidence (Hood, 
2006b; Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer, 2012). Both optimists and pessimists recognise the 
importance that information plays. Specifically, providing more information on regulatory 
decision-making (e.g. posting safety-related documents online) is understood to have either a 
positive trust building effect (transparency optimists) or a negative, trust eroding effect 
(transparency pessimists).  
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One main optimist argument can be categorised as the ‘extended citizen-knowledge effect’ 
(MacDonald, 2006). When transparency is lacking, outsiders (e.g. the public) are understood 
to be ill-informed about regulatory decision-making (e.g. the rationale for why a course of 
action was taken) (O’Neill, 2006). They are thus poorly placed to judge the trustworthiness of 
the regulators and their decisions and whether the regulators are deserving of their trust 
(O’Neill, 2006). For instance, Kasperson (2014: 4) highlights that low trust levels can be 
particularly challenging when “the risk communicator is not well known or [is at least 
perceived to be] closely linked to the risk bearer”. In contrast, when transparency and openness 
are present, outsiders are expected to be in a fully informed position to judge effectively the 
trustworthiness of the regulators (Etzioni, 2010), or as O’Neill (2006) puts it: outsiders will be 
able to “secure a basis for more trustworthy performance”. They will be able to observe the 
regulators’ actions and whether they agree with, for instance, their decision-making rationale. 
‘Outsiders’ will also better understand the workings of regulatory agencies including the limits 
of regulatory activity, how responsibilities are divided amongst different groups (e.g. industry 
and regulators) and that many risk issues are highly complicated and require difficult regulatory 
decisions to be made (section 2.2.2) (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2010: 177). “Better informed citizens 
are [therefore] expected to have more trust” (Hood, 2006b) as they will be viewed positively 
(e.g. open, honest, competent) in an “extended citizen knowledge effect” (MacDonald, 2006). 
 
A closely connected ‘optimist’ argument is that transparency will create cultures of openness, 
which will be perceived as trustworthy by outsiders (Roberts, 2006; EFSA, 2014). When 
transparency is lacking the regulators are expected to act poorly (e.g. corruption, 
mismanagement etc.) as they will know they are not being ‘watched’ by those outside the 
regulatory process (Brandeis, 1913; Prat, 2006; Bauhr and Grimes, 2014). For instance, 
Transparency International often argues that a lack of transparency can result in corruption, 
mismanagement and poor performance (Transparency International, 2016). Therefore a lack of 
transparency is understood to contribute to a culture of secrecy, which Roberts (2006) notes 
was judged to be a central cause of many major regulatory failures such as the BSE crisis. 
However, when transparency is present the regulators will know they are being observed or 
watched and are expected to behave better, or as the 18th Century Philosopher, Jeremy 
Bentham, stated in his famous dictum: “the more strictly we are watched, the better we behave 
[and this is] an indisputable truth…that is one of the corner stones of political science” 
(Bentham, 2001: 277 In: Hood, 2007). The central understanding is that ‘sunlight’ and public 
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‘surveillance’ will not allow regulators to conceal or ‘hide’ information leading, in turn, to 
better regulatory behaviour and management. Transparency as sunlight is therefore expected 
to create a ‘culture of openness’ (Hood, 2006b), which can combat cultures of secrecy that are 
defined by concealment, corruption and poor regulatory performance (Birkinshaw, 2006). In 
turn, the regulators are expected to be perceived positively and will be deserving of public trust. 
 
Taken together, the extended knowledge effect and cultures of openness arguments are 
understood to work in synergy. Transparency throughout the regulatory process is expected to 
allow the public to observe, watch and judge the trustworthiness of regulators (i.e. extended 
citizen-knowledge effect), while the regulators themselves are expected to behave better and 
therefore provide more reason for ‘outsiders’ to place trust in them (i.e. culture of openness 
argument) (O’Neill, 2006; Etzioni, 2010). In turn, the regulators are expected to be perceived 
positively and as trustworthy because outsiders will recognize that they are competent, honest, 
and open public agents that are deserving of their trust. As Hood (2006b) explains: regulatory 
agencies “adopt a culture of openness, citizens end up knowing more, and trust in democratic 
government goes up”. 
 
However, although there are many optimistic transparency arguments, there are also many 
‘pessimistic’ ones (O’Neill, 2006; Etzioni, 2010; Hood and Heald, 2006). So-called 
transparency ‘pessimists’ have put forward many arguments focusing on potential 
counterintuitive and unintended effects of transparency on trust. One central expectation is that 
transparency will lead to scandals of misinformation and public confusion of regulatory 
decision-making, which will, in turn, lead to negative trust eroding effects. Onora O’Neill, in 
particular, has argued that transparency requirements primarily benefit ‘outside’ groups and 
external critics – who do not have the same requirements imposed on them – who may misuse 
or ‘spin’ the information made available:  
 
Transparency requirements can benefits expert ‘outsiders’ by enabling them to access 
information about the performance of intuitions and their officeholders. This is 
particularly helpful to expert critics of government, business and professional 
performance. Expert critics often have the time and ability to grasp and use the 
information in ways that the wider public does not. Transparency is therefore 
particularly useful to the media and to campaigning organisations, who can discover 
information that bears on others’ performance (while they themselves are generally 
exempt from like transparency requirements).” (O’Neill, 2006: 88). 
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A key understanding with this argument is that the public are “ill-placed” to make direct 
judgements of regulatory decision-making data (e.g. lack of time and expertise) and will 
therefore have to rely on second-order judgements made by those that are likely to want to 
criticise regulators in the first place (e.g. critics or campaigning organisations) (see section 
2.3.3). This may include spinning, misinterpreting or ‘poorly’ analysing information about 
events and/or processes made publicly available. Other scholars have gone further by arguing 
that the regulators could, in turn, be justly and unjustly continually blamed for poor 
management issues and nit-picking of policies leading to an erosion of public trust (Worthy, 
2010; Bovens, 2003). 
 
A second argument is that ‘outsiders’ may become disenchanted with the reality of regulatory 
decision-making. For example, backstage discussions made public by ‘fishbowl’ style policies, 
where all activities and conversations of decision-makers are monitored, might result in public 
disenchantment of decision-making as regulators may be seen as bickering and muddling 
through the decision-making process rather than coming to clear and certain decisions (section 
2.2.2). In turn, the regulators may be seen to be less competent, which will result in declining 
public trust. Therefore some have argued that some degree of ‘backstage’ activity has to take 
place in order for decision-makers to maintain and strengthen public trust (Bijker et al. 2009). 
In other words, without the ability to conduct these affairs freely, the regulators may look weak 
or incompetent, which in turn, is expected to erode trust. 
 
A third main ‘pessimist’ argument is that transparency will result in behaviour changes that 
will directly affect the usability and usefulness of information resulting in confusion and an 
erosion of public trust (Hood, 2007). For Hood (2006b, 2007), this represents a futility and 
jeopardy argument that is pessimistic in expecting limited and negative effects of transparency 
on trust. For example, when a banker opts to make a phone call or meet a colleague in private 
rather than send an e-mail (e.g. to avoid FOI disclosure requirements) then less information is 
created that can be made transparent. This would mean that the really important information 
would not be observable to the public and the organization would avoid blame. Other more 
perverse behavioural changes might include organizations intentionally keeping poor records 
or flooding recipients with too much information (e.g. snowing or window dressing) (see 
Section 2.3.3 for a discussion). For Tsoukas (1997) one of the key issues with transparency is 
that more information will de-facto result in less understanding, confusion and, in turn, erode 
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public trust. Therefore there are many theoretical arguments for and against the ultimate goal 
of building public trust in risk regulation.  
 
(3.4) Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter reviewed the fragmented literature on transparency in risk regulation. After first 
offering an organising typology, a wide range of policy mechanisms that are designed to make 
different regulatory objects more transparent were identified and debated. These were sub-
divided into three categories: output mechanisms, process mechanisms and input mechanisms. 
First, the multiplicity of output transparency mechanisms introduced by risk regulators was 
first directly linked to the sub-field of risk communication. These range from written 
information (e.g. press statements, information leaflets and committee reports) (Morgan et al. 
2002; Fleishman-Mayer and Bruine de Bruine, 2014; Way et al. 2017) to infographics 
(Spigelhalter et al. 2011), visual and audio tools (Downs, 2014) and social media more 
generally (Moorhead et al. 2013; Brossard, 2013; Neeley, 2014). Although these output 
mechanisms – or risk communication ‘tools’ – were not reviewed individually, it was made 
clear that the extensive risk communication literature has provided many arguments for and 
against introducing different mechanisms for enhancing output transparency and in different 
regulatory contexts. 
 
Second, the literature on procedural process transparency mechanisms – that has primarily 
centred on publishing procedural documents online such as conflict of interest statements or 
scientific guidance documents – was reviewed. Despite many regulatory bodies introducing 
such policies, only a handful of studies have examined the advantages (e.g. Piotrowski and 
Borry, 2010) and disadvantages (e.g. Lowenstein et al. 2014) of doing so. In contrast, 
operational process mechanisms have received the lion’s share of academic attention with most 
articles debating the publication of meeting minutes online or the more radical mechanism of 
web-streaming meetings live. While some scholars have strongly advocated these mechanisms 
(e.g. to increase the public’s willingness to accept regulatory decision-making) (De Fine Licht 
et al. 2014), others have demonstrated that there are important issues, challenges and 
limitations with full operational process transparency and opening up decision-making to all 
outsiders (e.g. paralysing the regulatory process) (Bijker et al. 2009; Vos, 2012). 
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Third, the main mechanism introduced by risk regulators for enhancing input transparency has 
been to publish the data and information that underpins decision-making online. Notably, these 
policies have become increasingly popular over the past 10 years with risk regulators 
introducing a collective tsunami of new policies. Two main arguments for introducing such 
policies are that input transparency can act as a form of soft risk regulation (i.e. regulation by 
disclosure) and can enable outsiders to scrutinise the data and information that underpins 
decision-making including the regulators’ interpretation of the evidence. On the other hand, a 
growing scholarship has shown that there are important reasons why full input disclosure may 
be undesirable and unfeasible not least due to the counter-part obligations and merits of 
confidentiality, privacy and anonymity. 
 
In the final section, a brief discussion on the overriding transparency goal of building public 
trust in risk regulation was provided. Although there are many goals of transparency that are 
relevant to multiple different forms, the goal of building public trust has been prominent in risk 
regulation. The review illuminated that there are both optimistic and pessimistic arguments 
relating to the effects of transparency on trust but also that there has been a distinct lack of 
empirical research beyond policy experiments. 
 
Overall, perhaps the most important outcome from this literature review chapter is the finding 
that the large majority of debate on different forms of transparency has relied on anecdotal 
evidence and theoretical reasoning. Much of the literature has also been confused and 
decontextualized from its regulatory context and real world setting primarily due to the 
ambiguity of transparency. This is especially true with regards to input transparency policies. 
What is needed now is more empirical studies on input transparency policies in particular, that 
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Chapter IV: METHODOLOGY 
 
“Given the high value put on transparency, its ideological currency, and scholarly 
interest, it is surprising to find that there are few empirical studies of the effects of 
transparency. […]. There continues to be a dearth of studies empirically testing the 
theoretical claims of transparency advocates, even as legislation and institutional 
support for their case accumulates exponentially” (Etzioni, 2010: 6). 
 
This chapter provides a detailed explanation of the methodology adopted in this thesis. This 
centres on the use of a case study to empirically examine the effectiveness of EMA’s 
transparency policies (Chapter I). A variety of approaches could be chosen for examining the 
phenomenon of transparency in risk regulation (Coglianese, 2012). These include case studies 
but also controlled and randomised experiments, observational studies (quasi-experiments), 
histories, field studies, and ethnographies (Yin, 2009; Coglianese, 2012). Although there has 
been a dearth of empirical research historically (Chapter III), the most popular approach has 
been to use nominal measures (e.g. to create an index or proxy of some sort) (Heald, 2006) or 
more recently to conduct policy experiments (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2010; De Fine Licht et al. 
2014; Löfstedt and Way, 2016a, 2016b; Cucciniello et al. 2017). However, there is no single 
‘right way’ of conducting social science research (Martin and Flowerdew, 2005). Different 
quantitative and qualitative methodologies inevitably have their own strengths and weaknesses. 
Thus it is essential to openly acknowledge and explain the strengths and weaknesses of the 
methodology chosen in this thesis. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section explains what case studies are and how 
they can be differentiated from other empirical inquiries. It also explains why three critical 
conditions for conducting case studies are applicable to and appropriate for this thesis. These 
are (1) the type of research question chosen; (2) the inability of the investigator to control 
behavioural events; and (3) the study’s focus on contemporary rather than historical events 
(Yin, 2009: 8). The second section addresses two main criticisms of case study research. It 
subsequently emphasises the need to develop a systematic and detailed research design. The 
third section explains that this study uses an overall explanatory case study design with a 
preliminary exploratory stage. The study is also a single case of the EMA’s transparency 
policies with three embedded sub-units of analysis. The four main data collection methods are 
then explained and justified. These are extensive historical and contemporary documentation 
(including archival analysis); direct observations and interviews at 18 elite multi-actor policy 
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meetings; and surveys of patients (N=1,010) and medical doctors (N=1,005). An extended 
explanation of how and why surveys were embedded into the case study design is provided 
primarily because there remains debate over the use of surveys in case study research (Gable, 
1994; Robson and McCartan, 2016). The fourth section explains how the case study data is 
analysed and presented in order to directly address the research question and hence evaluate 
EMA’s transparency policies and contribute to the broader transparency literature. This is 
followed by a concluding discussion on the study’s limitations.  
 
(4.1) The case study approach  
 
Case studies are widely used in the social sciences and have been for a long time (see Hemel, 
1992; Gillham, 2000). This includes investigations related to ‘transparency’ (e.g. Moon, 2003; 
Bijker et al. 2009; Coglianese, 2012). In this thesis, a case study is defined as “a strategy for 
doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context using multiple sources of evidence” (Robson and 
McCartan, 2016: 150). This means that a case study is not a method but can be used as “a 
stance or approach” for conducting empirical research on the concept of transparency (Robson 
and McCartan, 2016: 150). According to Yin (2009: 18), case studies have two specific 
definitional components. The first is that: 
 
“[A case study] investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-
life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident” (Yin, 2009: 18).  
 
This means that case studies have the advantage of enabling the researcher to investigate the 
contemporary phenomenon of transparency, which exists “in the here and now” (Gillham, 
2000: 1; Gibbert et al. 2008: 1466). In contrast, histories are unable to do so as they provide 
evidence about non-contemporary phenomena (Yin, 2009; Crow and Edwards, 2012). Case 
studies also have the advantage of enabling the researcher to investigate the phenomenon of 
transparency in its real-life context and so when “important contextual conditions” need to be 
considered (Yin, 2009: 18; Yin and Davis, 2007). They cannot be conducted devoid of their 
context (Miles et al. 2014) and, as Flyvberg (2006: 236) argues, “the most advanced form of 
understanding is achieved when researchers place themselves within the context being 
studied”. They are especially useful when “the boundaries between phenomenon and context 
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are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2009). In other words, case studies are particularly useful in this 
case as it is difficult to draw precise boundaries between the phenomenon of transparency and 
the context in which it is found (Gillham, 2000). In contrast, a weakness of experiments is that 
they deliberately divorce the phenomenon of transparency from its real-life context typically 
by ‘controlling’ for certain contextual conditions (e.g. Grimmelikhuijsen, 2010, 2012; De Fine 
Licht et al. 2014) (Yin, 2009).  
 
The second definitional component of case studies centres on how data is collected and 
analysed (Gilham, 2010; Robson and McCartan, 2016). As Yin (2009: 18) explains:  
 
“…because phenomenon and context are not always distinguishable in real-life 
situations, other technical characteristics, including data collection and data analysis 
strategies now become the second technical definition of case studies”.  
 
Case studies draw on “multiple sources of evidence” that each have their relative advantages 
and disadvantages (Gilham, 2010; Robson and McCartan, 2016). This is because they cope 
“with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest 
than data points” (Yin, 2009: 18; Yin, 1994). Therefore they enable the phenomenon of 
transparency to be studied through multiple lenses (Baxter and Jack, 2008). As a result, they 
rely on multiple sources of evidence that benefit from the prior development of theoretical 
propositions for collecting and analysing data (Yin, 2009: 18). This means that one source of 
evidence is unlikely to be sufficient (or sufficiently valid) in this case study (Gilham, 2010). 
Furthermore, it is now widely accepted that that both qualitative and quantitative methods can 
be used in case study research (Gerring, 2006), although “qualitative data are almost invariably 
collected” (Robson and McCartan, 2016: 149).  
 
Beyond this two-part definition, three critical conditions are required for adopting a case study 
(Yin, 2009: 8), all three of which are relevant to this thesis on transparency in risk regulation. 
The first critical condition centres on the type of research question being posed (Yin, 2009). 
There are various ways of categorising research questions that can be linked to specific 
empirical enquiries (Hendrick, 1993; Blaikie, 2007: 6-7). One common and well-known 
categorisation distinguishes between ‘who’, ‘what’, ‘where’, ‘how’ and ‘why’ type questions. 
In the transparency literature (Chapter II), investigators have often chosen ‘how many’ and 
‘how much’ type questions. For example, some of the most common questions have centred 
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on the quantity of documents an organisation has released (or not) as a measure of 
‘transparency’ (e.g. Alt and Lassen, 1999; Doshi and Jefferson, 2013b, 2016). In contrast, this 
thesis seeks to answer a ‘how’ type question (Chapter I). The study seeks to understand how 
effective EMA’s transparency policies have been in achieving the agency’s objectives. Case 
studies (as well as histories and experiments) are particularly appropriate for answering such 
‘how’ (and ‘why’) questions (Stake, 2005; Yin, 2009). According to Yin (2009: 9), this is 
because these questions “deal with operational links needing to be traced over time, rather than 
mere frequencies or incidents”. It is therefore appropriate to use a case study in this thesis 
because the research question being asked is a ‘how’ question rather than, for example, a 
‘what’, ‘when’ or ‘how many’ type question. 
 
The second critical condition concerns the extent of control the investigator has over actual 
behavioural events for answering the research question (Yin, 2009). Experiments have become 
an increasingly popular method for examining what effects ‘transparency’ has on different 
public policy objectives such as trust (e.g. Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012), legitimacy (e.g. De Fine 
Licht et al. 2014) or empowering citizens (e.g. Löfstedt and Way, 2016a; 2016b). One main 
strength of such experiments is that they can measure causality and hence the effects of one 
variable on another. Yet, at the same time these experiments involve deliberately “divorcing” 
the phenomenon of transparency from its real-world context (Yin, 2009) thus reducing real-
world validity (Robson and McCartan, 2016). In other words, experiments seek to assess 
whether an effect actually exists and have a high level of rigour and control but do not mirror 
real life situations (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012). In contrast, case studies have the advantage of 
enabling the researcher to examine transparency policies “when the relevant behaviours cannot 
be manipulated” (Yin, 2009: 11). For measuring how effective EMA’s transparency policies 
are in achieving the agency’s objectives, it is not possible for the investigator to manipulate 
behaviours without divorcing those behaviours from their real-life context. Thus it is 
appropriate to use a case study in this thesis because the investigator does not have control over 
actual behavioural events that are needed to answer the research question. 
 
The third critical condition concerns the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to 
historical events. Histories are most useful for looking at past events where “no relevant 
persons are alive to report, even retrospectively, what occurred and when the researcher must 
rely on primary and secondary documents as well as artefacts” (Yin, 2009: 11). Several 
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transparency scholars have adopted such approaches for analysing transparency over time 
(Hood, 2006a; Meijer, 2015; Way and Löfstedt, forthcoming). For example, Meijer (2015) 
conducted an historical analysis of government transparency in the Netherlands over the past 
250 years. Case study designs can include, and often do include, histories as one of several data 
collection methods. However, they also include techniques that go beyond historical data 
through collecting contemporary evidence (e.g. observations or interviews) (Yin, 2009). This 
is important because, although historical context is essential, this thesis focuses on examining 
the current policies initiated by the EMA and the current perspectives of multiple actors living 
in the here and now. It is therefore appropriate to use a case study because the primary focus 
of this thesis is on the effectiveness of contemporary transparency policies as opposed to 
historical events. 
 
(4.2) Traditional prejudices  
 
Case studies have not always been as widely used and accepted in social science research as 
they are now (David, 2005; Yin, 2013; Robson and McCartan, 2016). They have traditionally 
received a great deal of criticism. For example, in a strongly worded paper, Campbell and 
Stanley (1966: 6-7) stated that “such studies have such a total absence of control as to be of 
almost no scientific value”. However, many critics, including Campbell (1975), have since 
become great advocates of case study research (Flyvberg, 2006). These authors have primarily 
argued that the approach has been misunderstood or simply used incorrectly (Flyvberg, 2006; 
Robson and McCartan, 2016), which some authors now describe as ‘traditional prejudices’ 
(e.g. Yin, 2009). In seeking to avoid common pitfalls in conducting case study research, two 
of the most persistent prejudices are addressed here. 
 
One traditional prejudice against case studies centres on their apparent ‘non-generalisability’ 
(Yin, 2009; Gilham, 2010). Flyvberg (2006) summarises this criticism as follows: “One cannot 
generalise on the basis of a single case therefore the case study cannot contribute to scientific 
development”. In other words, several authors have argued that one cannot generalise from a 
single case rendering the research approach as non-scientific. While some critics have argued 
that case studies should only be used for pilot studies (e.g. Abercrombie et al. 1984), others 
have strongly argued that their non-generalisability presents a devastating blow and renders 
case study research almost useless (Campbell and Stanley, 1966; Diamond, 1996: 6).  




However, these arguments are misleading (see Flyvberg, 2006 for a detailed discussion). One 
main argument is that the generalisability of a case study depends on what case one is referring 
to. For example, by taking Karl Popper’s logic of ‘falsification’, one can quickly see that a 
study identifying even a single case of one black swan can falsify the assumption that all swans 
are white (Flyvberg, 2006). A second argument is that case studies are not generalizable 
statistically but they are generalizable analytically (Yin, 2009). As Yin (2009), concisely puts 
it: “The short answer is that case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical 
propositions and not to populations or universes”. They seek to expand and generalise theories 
(analytic generalisation) but they do not seek to enumerate frequencies (statistical 
generalisation) (Yin, 2009). Therefore a key argument is that generalisability should not be 
confined to sampling and statistical significance (i.e. statistical generalisation) in social science 
research (Donmoyer, 2000). 
 
A second traditional prejudice towards case studies is their apparent lack of rigour (Campbell, 
1975; Daft and Lewin, 1990; March et al. 1991; Irani et al. 1999). Some authors have argued 
that case studies have methodological flaws including being too subjective and giving too much 
scope for the researcher’s own interpretations (Diamond, 1996; Hyett et al. 2014). These 
authors often argue that there is “a bias towards verification, that is, the tendency to confirm 
the researcher’s preconceived notions” (Flyvberg, 2006: 221). Therefore case studies have been 
criticised for not applying scientific methods that seek to curb out “one’s tendencies to stamp 
one’s pre-existing interpretations on data as they accumulate” (Diamond, 1996 In: Flyvberg, 
1996: 234). Some critics go further and argue that case studies are too often conducted in a 
sloppy fashion, unsystematically or even dishonestly (e.g. Bromley, 1986).  
 
However, these traditional prejudices against case studies have in themselves been criticised 
(Flyvberg, 1991: 137-138). One argument is that case study research should not be conflated 
with case study teaching (see Garvin, 2003). Yin (2009) clarifies that case study teaching 
‘devices’ deliberately alter case study materials to emphasize a particular point. In contrast, 
case study research forbids doing so and requires that empirical data is rigorously and fairly 
presented (Yin, 2009: 14). A second argument is that bias, dishonesty, and subjectivity can be 
introduced into almost any research design and is not unique to case study research. This 
includes historical research (Crow and Edwards, 2012), experiments (e.g. interpreter bias) 
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(Rosenthal, 1996, 2009), surveys (Fowler, 2013), and others (see e.g. Podsakoff et al. 2012). 
For example, one of the main arguments against case studies – bias towards self-verification – 
exists and applies to all methods (Flyvberg, 2006). Some have gone further by arguing that 
case studies actually contain a greater bias towards falsification than bias towards verifying 
pre-conceived notions directed by the investigator (e.g. Flyvberg, 2006: 237). Thus it is widely 
agreed that case studies are no less rigorous than any other research method and criticisms are 
“misguided” (Campbell, 1975: 225).  
 
These criticisms highlight the need to create a systematic and detailed case study research 
design. Such a research design can provide a blueprint detailing “what questions to study, what 
data are relevant, what data to collect, and how to analyse the results” (Yin, 2009: 26). Indeed, 
many different designs could have been chosen for empirically examining the concept of 
transparency in risk regulation. The specific design adopted in this thesis is where this chapter 
turns next. 
 
(4.3) Choosing the EMA case 
 
A single case study design of the EMA and its transparency policies was chosen for this study. 
The boundaries of the case are defined by (1) the time period of January 1995 (when the agency 
was established) to December 2016 (shortly before this thesis was finalised) and (2) the 
agency’s transparency policies that were introduced (or proposed to be introduced) during that 
period. Therefore the case study excludes other agency activities not related to transparency. 
‘Transparency policies’ are defined and categorised using the typology developed in Chapter 
II and so include the full range of transparency objects, mechanisms, goals and audiences. Four 
main reasons why EMA was chosen were explained in the introductory chapter and are not 
repeated here (see section 1.3). Rather, this section provides a more detailed understanding of 
the research design.  
 
Single cases can be distinguished from multi-case designs (e.g. comparing EMA with other 
decentralised EU agencies). One main reason for limiting the study to a single case is that it 
would not have been possible to examine the concept of transparency in as much depth if 
multiple cases were chosen and compared. The investigator was constrained by resources 
including being the only case study investigator and having a fixed time limit to collect and 
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analyse data. Transparency is also a relatively new concept of interest in risk regulation and 
conducting a substantial amount of prior exploratory work was resource intensive. With that 
said, future empirical enquiries can use the typology (Chapter II), literature review (Chapter 
III), and study findings (Chapter V-IX) to compare the EMA case with other regulatory 
authorities responsible for risks to human health and the environment.  
 
EMA can also be considered as a ‘typical’ single case (or what is sometimes known as the 
‘representative’ case), which can be distinguished from those categorised as critical, extreme, 
revelatory, or longitudinal (Yin, 2009: 47-50). EMA is ‘typical’ of a regulatory authority 
responsible for risks to human health and/or the environment that has introduced many policies 
designed to enhance the transparency of its scientific and non-scientific activities. For example, 
similar to numerous other regulatory authorities (e.g. other EU decentralised agencies, FDA 
and Health Canada), EMA have introduced the full range of transparency policies that seek to 
make both decision-making events and processes (i.e. inputs, processes, and outputs) more 
visible to outsiders (Chapter V). This is not to say that EMA does not have unique 
characteristics including with regard to transparency (e.g. regulating pharmaceuticals, its 
organisational structure, its specific responsibilities etc.). Rather, the agency is typical of the 
numerous risk regulation organisations that have strongly committed to enhancing 
transparency by introducing a range of policies. 
 
(4.4) Explanatory case design 
  
The case study had an explanatory design for examining the effectiveness of EMA’s 
transparency policies16. Explanatory cases can be used “to explain causal relationships and to 
develop theory” (Mills et al. 2010: 370) and so was appropriate for answering this study’s 
research question: 
 
How effective have the European Medicines Agency’s input transparency policies been 
in achieving its public policy objectives?  
 
                                                
16 All investigations were carried out in accordance with King’s College London rules on ethical approval 
(REP/13/14-100). 
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However, before the main explanatory case study was conducted, a preliminary exploratory 
study of the EMA’s transparency policies was necessarily undertaken. In other words, the 
exploratory case served as a preliminary step in the overall explanatory case study design (see 
Robson and McCatan, 2016: 61). To be clear, although the exploratory case started in October 
2012, the EMA’s transparency policies were continually ‘explored’ throughout the data 
collection period as new policies were proposed and introduced by the agency. The main 
overriding reason for conducting a preliminary exploration was that there has been a distinct 
lack of sophisticated research on transparency either on EMA or in the pharmaceutical domain. 
This is especially true when compared with the environmental policy context (e.g. Gupta and 
Mason, 2014). This meant that few clearly formulated hypotheses of transparency in 
pharmaceutical regulation could be tested without initially exploring and understanding EMA’s 
policies.  
 
The first main objective of the preliminary study was to identify and distinguish between 
EMA’s transparency policies and subsequently categorise them according to the (emerging) 
typology of transparency in risk regulation (Chapter II). Although EMA has introduced many 
policies, few policymakers or academics have clearly distinguished between different types. 
The exploratory study provided a clear understanding of EMA’s past and developing policies 
including what aspects of risk regulation EMA seeks to make more transparent (i.e. objects), 
how (i.e. mechanisms), why (i.e. goals/reasons), and for whom (i.e. audiences). The exploratory 
study also provided an essential historical context for the agency’s contemporary policies. 
Although the case study research started in October 2012, EMA introduced many transparency 
policies since its establishment in 1995. Thus in order to examine the effectiveness of EMA’s 
policies it was essential to first place them in historical context.  
 
The second main objective was to formulate a more precise research question (Chapter 1) 
(Mills et al. 2010). Case studies seek to answer specific questions and “framing good questions 
is the most important part of the research procedure” (Gillham, 2000). However, the research 
question was fairly loose to begin with in this study, which is not uncommon in case study 
research (Gillham, 2000). A relatively new field of scientific investigation was studied in this 
thesis – the effectiveness of transparency in risk regulation – in which few real-life empirical 
research questions have been addressed (Etzioni, 2010) (Chapter III). Therefore conducting an 
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exploratory study was essential for this study because the research question could not be clearly 
formulated without doing so (Mills et al. 2010). 
 
After these two objectives had been achieved, the main explanatory component of the study 
commenced in mid-2013. The main EMA case had three embedded sub-units of analysis (Yin, 
2009). These provided the necessary depth of analysis for answering the main research question 
and as Baxter and Jack (2008) comment: “The ability to engage in such rich analysis only 
serves to better illuminate the case”. Conducting an alternative holistic approach would have 
been inappropriate (Yin, 2009). Such a study would not have provided the necessary level of 
detail required for empirically examining the effectiveness of EMA’s transparency policies. 
For example, examining all policies holistically would have blurred important distinctions 
between different types introduced by the agency. 
 
The three embedded sub-units of analysis were EMA’s three main input transparency policies 
(Chapter VI): 
 
• Sub-unit 1: EMA’s online clinical trials register called EU-CTR (clinicaltrialsregister.eu) 
• Sub-unit 2: Publishing summary-level clinical trial results on EU-CTR 
• Sub-unit 3: Publishing clinical study reports online (clinicaldata.ema.europa.eu) 
 
These three policies were chosen as sub-units of analysis for three main reasons. First, they all 
seek to enhance the transparency of the information that underpins decision-making in EMA’s 
scientific committees. In other words, they can be categorised as EMA’s main ‘input’ 
transparency policies (Chapter II). The literature review showed that such input policies have 
received some of the least empirical attention (Chapter III). In contrast, output policies – and, 
to a lesser extent, process policies – have received some of the most empirical attention17. Thus 
investigating input transparency policies promised to contribute significantly to the emerging 
literature (Chapter III).  
 
Second, all three input policies were either introduced or revised during the study period. For 
example, in November 2012, EMA’s 3rd Executive Director, Guido Rasi, announced that the 
                                                
17 Although it is worth noting that most output policies can be categorised as risk communication studies in the 
fragmented literature rather than transparency policy studies per se. 
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agency would be committed to developing new transparency policies for proactively publishing 
input data online: 
 
“Today represents the first step in delivering our vision. We are not here to decide if 
we will publish clinical-trial data, only how. We need to do this in order to rebuild 
trust and confidence in the whole system.” (EMA, 2012a). 
 
This meant that, from the very beginning of the case study period, there was a unique 
opportunity to follow and examine the evolution of EMA’s input policies in real time. This 
includes following the key transparency policy materials, people, and events (see Wood, 2016). 
EMA also received substantial external pressure to introduce new input policies between 2010 
and 2016 (Chapter VI). This meant that discussing the effectiveness of these three policies with 
key actors and audiences was highly topical and hence complemented data collection. 
 
Third, the three embedded sub-units provided a mixture of input policies that can be compared 
and contrasted. Each policy seeks to make different levels of clinical trial data more transparent 
(Chapter VI). Each policy also seeks to make input data more transparent for various audiences 
ranging from patients and doctors to external researchers and other regulatory bodies, as well 
as industry. Multiple levels of analysis on EMA’s input policies could therefore be made in 
order to address the research question comprehensively. This includes “within the sub-units 
separately (within case analysis), between the different sub-units (between case analysis), [and] 
across all the subunits (cross-case analysis)” (Baxter and Jack, 2008: 550). 
 
After the three sub-units had been identified, the evolving typology of transparency in risk 
regulation was applied to EMA’s three input policies (Chapter II). Making clear distinctions 
was essential for examining the effectiveness of each input policy and hence answering the 
research question. For example, examining how effective EMA’s clinical trial register (sub-
unit 1) has been in achieving the regulators’ policy objectives requires understanding: what 
data and information EMA’s register seeks to make more transparent (i.e. the target objects of 
the policy) and how (i.e. the expected mechanisms of the policy); what the regulators seek to 
achieve with its clinical trial register (i.e. the intended goals of the policy); and who the register 
is intended to be used by or benefit (i.e. the target audiences of the policy). Although all three 
policies can broadly be defined as ‘input’ transparency policies, they each have slightly 
different characteristics and purposes.  
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The next stage of the explanatory case study was to collect data and evidence on the 
effectiveness of EMA’s input policies. As explained in the introductory chapter (Section 1.2), 
measuring effectiveness requires measuring whether the audiences of EMA’s policies can 
receive, process, digest and use the information made publicly available online (Heald, 2006). 
This means that, in order to answer the research question, case study evidence needed to be 
collected on the experiences of the audiences of EMA’s policies (i.e. those that are expected to 
receive, process, digest and use the information uploaded online). These audiences of EMA’s 
policies were usefully categorised into six main groups (Table 4.1). 
 
Table 4.1: EMA’s transparency policy audiences categorised into six main groups 
 
One notable challenge with collecting evidence from EMA’s transparency audiences was that 
there are millions of individuals, groups and institutions across the world that are either directly 
(i.e. accessing EMA’s web-portals) or indirectly (i.e. through intermediaries) expected to 
receive, process, digest, and use the data made publicly available. This meant that it was not 
possible to collect in-depth case study evidence on EMA’s policies directly from all audiences 
(i.e. directly from those millions of individuals, groups, and institutions). Doing so would have 
                                                
18 European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations 
19 Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry 
 Audiences of EMA’s policies Examples 
Group 1 External ‘independent’ 
scientists  
Clinical trialists, data miners and systematic reviewers (e.g. the 
Cochrane Collaboration or University academics) 
Group 2 Industry Trade bodies (e.g. EFPIA18 or ABPI19), pharmaceutical 
companies (e.g. GlaxoSmithKline, Merck, Pfizer) 
Group 3 Non-EMA regulators Regulators from NCA (e.g. MHRA or AEMPS) and non-EU 
regulatory authorities (e.g. FDA, Swissmedic, Health Canada) 
Group 4 Policy and healthcare 
decision-makers 
Government committee members and health technology 
assessors (e.g. the UK National Institute for Healthcare 
Excellence [NICE] or the Germany Agency for Health 
Technology Assessment [DAHTA]) 
Group 5 Medical doctors Doctor advocacy groups, general practitioners, specialist 
doctors. 
Group 6 Patients Patient and consumer advocacy groups, individuals with medical 
conditions, the general public. 
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been an enormous resource-intensive undertaking that would, for example, necessarily involve 
collecting intensive and extensive qualitative and quantitative data on a substantial 
international scale. In order to overcome this challenge, the investigator adopted two main 
approaches.  
 
The first approach was to collect substantial case study evidence from the perspectives of the 
most knowledgeable elite experts that represent the main audiences of EMA’s transparency 
policies (Table 4.1). This was primarily achieved using three research methods: documentation, 
observations, and interviews (see sections 4.5 and 4.6). To be clear, these elite experts represent 
the millions of individuals, institutions, and groups that are expected to use the data made 
publicly available by EMA either directly or indirectly. They have a sophisticated and 
knowledgeable understanding of the perspectives and experiences of the audiences of EMA’s 
policies. For example, senior representatives from the European Federation of Pharmaceutical 
Industries and Associations (EFPIA), a Brussels-based trade association representing industry, 
have extensive in-depth knowledge about the perspectives of pharmaceutical companies 
(Group 2 in Table 4.1). In comparison, senior regulators from national competent authorities 
(NCAs) (e.g. the UK Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Authority [MHRA]) and 
non-EU regulatory authorities (e.g. the US FDA or Health Canada) have extensive knowledge 
on the perspectives of non-EMA regulators (Group 3 in Table 4.1). Elite expert representatives 
were therefore considered highly appropriate and useful sources for gathering evidence on the 
experiences and perspectives of the six main audiences of EMA’s policies.  
 
The second approach was to collect further evidence on the effectiveness of EMA’s policies 
directly from (1) patients and (2) medical doctors (i.e. Groups 5 and 6 in Table 4.1). Put another 
way the investigator chose to commit resources to collecting further evidence on these two 
groups directly and hence to complement evidence collected using the first approach. There 
were two main reasons why further evidence was collected from these two groups, that is, over 
any other transparency audience (Table 4.1). First, patients and doctors are one of the most 
important audiences of EMA’s transparency policies. They are at the coal-face of decision-
making over medicines. Therefore the effectiveness of EMA’s transparency policies is highly 
dependent on these two groups. Second, only limited evidence could be collected on the 
perspectives of patients and doctors using the first approach. In contrast, substantial quantities 
of evidence could be collected on other audiences of EMA’s policies through the first approach. 
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For example, most documentation evidencing the effectiveness of EMA’s transparency 
policies – such as scientific journal articles, interview transcripts, public consultations (section 
4.5) – has focused on the perspectives of external researchers that intend to re-use data made 
publicly available (e.g. Doshi and Jefferson, 2013a, 2013b, 2016). Therefore there was limited 
case study evidence that could be collected on the perspectives of two of the most important 
audiences of EMA’s transparency policies and so further data was necessarily collected.  
 
The main method adopted for obtaining further evidence on the perspectives of patients and 
doctors was surveys (see section 4.7), which was complemented with documentation, 
observations, and interviews (e.g. through patient advocacy group representatives) (sections 
4.5-4.6). Surveys are not typically included in case study designs and so it is important to clarify 
how they were used in this study (Gable, 1994; Robson and McCartan, 2016). The survey 
research method seeks to make statistical generalisations whereby an “inference is made about 
a population (or universe) on the basis of empirical data collected about a sample from that 
universe” (Yin, 2009: 38). In this study, surveys were used to make such inferences from two 
representative samples of patients and doctors (see section 4.6.1). One goal of conducting these 
surveys was therefore to make statistical generalisations about the opinions and perspectives 
of patients and doctors, two under-represented audiences of EMA’s policies (Table 4.1).  
 
In turn, the overriding purpose of conducting surveys was to generate data on patients and 
doctors that could contribute towards the pool of evidence on the main EMA case. This means 
that although statistical generalisations were, indeed, made about patients and doctors, the 
survey method did not seek to create statistical generalisations about the overall EMA case. 
Rather, this case study sought to create analytic generalisations (Gomm et al. 2000; Yin, 2009). 
This is important because, as Yin (2009) explains: “a fatal flaw in doing case studies is to 
conceive of statistical generalisation as the method of generalising your case study results”. 
Thus the surveys were primarily considered as a fourth research method adopted in this mixed 
multi-methods case study that could be used to generate and collect data on the perspectives of 
patients and doctors.  
 
Furthermore, the surveys specifically generated data on the perspectives of patients and doctors 
receiving benefit-risk and other regulatory information made available by EMA through its 
transparency policies. In particular, the investigator collected evidence on where patients and 
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medical doctors obtain medicines information and which ones they trust; how familiar they are 
with the regulators; how they might react to receiving safety-related information; and other 
evidence. These questions are important because information is hypothesised to play a central 
“mediating role” (see Grimmelikhuijsen, 2010: 16) in achieving EMA’s transparency policy 
objectives for patients and doctors (EMA, 2014a, 2014b). For example, by making input data 
publicly available patients and doctors are expected to (directly or indirectly) receive, process, 
digest, and use such information in order to complement fully-informed decision-making. 
Indeed, the central policy mechanism for achieving transparency is the provision of more 
information about a whole range of scientific and non-scientific agency activities. Hence 
questions such as where patients obtain medicines information, what sources they trust, how 
they typically react to receiving information that points to safety issues and how well they 
understand the scientific medicines evaluation system were all considered important in 




The first main data collection method can be categorised as documentation, which, according 
to Yin (2009), should be included in almost every case study design. A comprehensive range 
of documents was collected and analysed in order to minimise bias and corroborate evidence 
from multiple sources in-depth (Yin, 2009). All documents related either directly or indirectly 
to EMA’s transparency policies (and their audiences) that were introduced between January 
1995 and December 2016. This includes some documents that date as far back as the mid-
1960s that indirectly relate to the evolution of transparency in pharmaceutical regulation and 
hence provide essential background for the agency’s contemporary policies (e.g. Directive 
65/65/EEC). A wide variety of official and non-official documents were collected that provide 
evidence on EMA’s policies from the perspectives of EMA’s transparency audiences (Table 
4.1). While some documents were collected during the initial exploratory phase of the research, 
others were continually collected as and when they became available in what Wood (2016) 
categorises as “following the policy materials”. Therefore many important sources of evidence 
were used for understanding the agency’s policies before the case study commenced (1995-
2012) and for following the development of those policies thereafter (2012-2016).  
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One particularly important source was EMA’s official annual reports spanning from 1995 to 
2016 (e.g. EMA, 2004). Similar to other decentralised EU agencies, EMA is required to submit 
informative and official reports on its activities to the European Commission annually (EMA, 
2017e). Amongst other activities, they contain perspective pieces on the agency’s yearly 
developments from the two most senior regulators, the Chair of the Management Board and 
the Executive Director, which for 1995-2016 almost always included reflections on 
transparency. They also provided a clear annual update on the main changes to the agency’s 
transparency policies. Notably, in every single report and without exception the regulators 
discussed EMA’s progress on transparency and often with dedicated sections.  
 
Policy documents were a second particularly important source of documentation. Such 
documents, published by EMA, detailed the purpose, scope and objectives of every EMA 
policy. Draft versions were also used (e.g. EMA, 2009; EMA, 2013a). For example, EMA’s 
October 2014 clinical study reports transparency policy (EMA, 2014b) was initially released 
in draft form for public consultation in June 2013 (EMA, 2013a). By comparing the 2013 draft 
version with the final 2014 policy, significant changes to EMA’s transparency strategy could 
be identified and evidenced. Policy documents published by other organisations were also used. 
This includes the EFPIA and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America’s 
(PhRMA) joint policy document ‘Principles for Responsible Clinical Trial Data Sharing’ 
(EFPIA-PhRMA, 2014), as well as numerous transparency policy documents published by 
national pharmaceutical authorities. 
 
One source of evidence, closely related to EMA’s policy documents, were comments from 
public consultations. Similar to all other decentralised EU agencies, EMA frequently consults 
its many stakeholders on new policies. Public consultations can produce substantial quantities 
of evidence on EMA’s policies from the perspective of different audiences. For example, in 
three months alone EMA received over 1,000 comments from over 160 individuals and 
organisations on its 2013 draft clinical trial data transparency policy (i.e. evidence relating to 
sub-units 3 and 4) (EMA, 2014c). Detailed comments were given by many audiences including 
representatives from pharmaceutical companies and trade bodies, NCAs, patient and doctor 
advocacy groups, medical journal editors, campaign groups and the wider medical community. 
Indeed, all three input polices, that make up the case study sub-units of analysis, received 
extensive comments.  
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Furthermore, many other types of documentation produced by EMA was used as case study 
evidence. This includes management board meeting minutes and agendas (EMA, 2017f), letters 
and correspondence (Pott, 2015), workshop reports (EMA, 1997a, 2012a), and a multiplicity 
of documents published on EMA’s website (ema.europa.eu). For example, the European 
ombudsman and EMA management board publicly exchanged several lengthy and highly 
informative letters on EMA’s transparency policies during the study period (O’Reilly, 2013; 
Pott, 2015). 
 
Another highly important source of documentation was scientific journals (including journal 
archives). These official information channels have been one of the main forums for discussing 
EMA’s transparency policies in the pharmaceutical policy domain. This ranges from scientific 
medical journals (e.g. the Lancet, New England Journal of Medicine, British Medical Journal, 
Annals of Internal Medicine, Journal of the American Medical Associations), to more 
generalised scientific journals (e.g. Nature, Science). Journal articles have included detailed 
perspectives and opinion pieces on EMA’s policies from a remarkable array of senior and 
influential actors, as well as the wider medical community (e.g. journal editors, patient and 
doctor advocacy groups, influential opinion leaders, systematic reviewers, etc.). While the 
majority of articles on EMA’s policies were published after 2010 (and after the agency 
significantly changed its transparency strategy), many were also published before 2010 
including commentaries on EMA’s earliest pioneering policies (e.g. Abbasi and Herxheimer, 
1998). Some medical journal editors have also actively campaigned and lobbied the EMA in 
seeking to influence the agency’s policy decisions and, in so doing, produced numerous 
documents. For example, one of the British Medical Journal’s ongoing campaigns has been to 
pressurise EMA into publishing clinical trial data (see BMJ, 2017).  
 
Since 2007, EMA regulators have increasingly communicated their policy opinions and 
perspectives on transparency in medical journals (e.g. Eichler et al. 2012, 2013; Bonini et al. 
2014), which some regulators view as a highly useful communication channel (personal 
communication, 2015). For example, in December 2014 Sergio Bonini and other senior EMA 
regulators provided an agency perspective article on the sharing of clinical trial data (i.e. 
evidence relating to sub-units 1-4) (Bonini et al. 2014). The regulators have also given 
informative interviews that have been reported in full in several scientific journals. For 
example, Nature Reviews Drug Discovery interviewed EMA’s 2nd Executive Director, Thomas 
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Lönngren , in 2010 (Mullard, 2010) and Nature Medicine interviewed EMA’s 3rd Executive 
Director, Guido Rasi, in 2012 (Looney, 2012). 
 
Beyond scientific journals, many perspectives on EMA’s policies have been documented in 
books. Some of the most highly influential were detailed in pop science books such as Ben 
Goldacre’s (2008) ‘Bad Pharma: How Medicine is Broken and How We Can Fix It’. Other 
notable books were also written by senior medical journal editors such as the past editor-in-
chief of the New England Journal of Medicine (Angell, 2004) and the past editor of the British 
Medical Journal (Smith, 2010). Other books were written by academics, which provide a range 
of views and evidence on EMA’s policies (e.g. Abraham and Lewis, 2000; Permanand, 2006; 
Avorn, 2008; Demortain, 2011). Several organisations have also published books or lengthy 
reports on transparency in the pharmaceutical domain. This included the House of Commons 
Science and Technology Committee’s ‘Clinical Trials’ report (Science and technology 
Committee, 2013) and the Institute of Medicine’s ‘Sharing Clinical Trial Data: Maximising 
Benefits, Minimizing Risk’ report (Institute of Medicine, 2015).  
 
Many journalists have also reported extensively on EMA’s transparency policies. The 
investigator followed numerous online news outlets during the study period including 
MedScape, Regulatory Focus, BioCentury, Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology News, 
Drug Store News, InPharma.com, FierceBiotech, FDA news, and others. These outlets 
provided a rich source of information on EMA’s evolving policies and enabled the investigator 
to stay up-to-date with important policy developments. Some news articles also included 
interviews with notable policy actors such as ChemistryWorld or PharmaBoardRoom 
interviewing Guido Rasi about the agency’s evolving transparency policies. Several online 
pharmaceutical magazines also provided further sources of evidence. This includes the 
Economist, the Drug Information Association’s magazine, ‘Global Forum’, and PharmaTimes 
(the UK’s leading pharmaceutical magazine). Furthermore, news clippings from several 
broadsheet newspapers were continually collected throughout the research period. For 
example, clippings from prominent Financial Times journalists, Andrew Jack and Andrew 
Ward, were collected frequently. 
 
Some documents were harder to retrieve, yet, provided important case study evidence. First, 
some materials were obtained by proactively requesting them directly from EMA or NCA 
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regulators (e.g. Egger, 2011). Second, some materials were only found after searching deep 
into library archives (e.g. Sauer, 1997). Third, EMA’s 1st Executive Director, Fernand Sauer, 
has many unpublished manuscripts that are only available on his website such as 
‘Institutionalising European Agencies: An Insider Perspective’ (Sauer, 2009). Fourth, some 
publications were harder to retrieve because they are out of print. For example, it took several 
months to obtain a copy of EMA’s ‘Celebrating 10 Years: Portrait of the European Medicines 
Agency’ book (EMA, 2005a) that includes detailed information on the views of different actors 
from EMA’s establishment up until 2005. Furthermore, some documents were only made 
available at policy events attended by the investigator in person. 
 
(4.6) Observations and interviews 
 
In order to conduct the next two data collection methods, observations and interviews, the 
investigator attended a total of 18 elite policy meetings in person between November 2012 and 
December 201620. The meetings provided numerous opportunities to collect highly relevant 
evidence from many transparency audiences over a total of 23 days (Table 4.1). This included 
opportunities to conduct observations and interviews with all elite actors representing all seven 
audiences of EMA’s transparency policies. In particular, the meetings were attended by some 
of the most senior European pharmaceutical policy actors and experts, representing almost all 
transparency audiences, ranging from NCA regulators and patient advocacy groups, to trade 
bodies and industry, as well as the wider medical community (e.g. journal editors, data miners, 
influential opinion leaders). Notably, attending a variety of meetings was an important strategy 
as it provided multiple and differing opportunities to collect data. The meetings also enabled 
the investigator to examine the evolution of the regulators’ policies by, as Wood (2016) puts 
it, “following the policy people and meetings” throughout the case study period.  
 
The 18 elite policy meetings, attended in person by the investigator, can be categorised into 
four types. First, seven meetings were public events attended by the investigator either on 
request or by invitation from regulators at EMA or NCAs (hereafter, ‘Type 1’ meetings). The 
meetings were attended by 40 to over 100 delegates who collectively represented all policy 
                                                
20 In addition to the 18 meetings attended in person, numerous meetings were also observed on live web-streams. 
Although this additional approach was helpful when the investigator was unable to attend in person (e.g. due to 
budget restraints or timing issues), it had limitations such as the investigator being unable to gather evidence from 
attendees in person. Therefore these meeting are not discussed in detail. Rather, they contributed to the extensive 
documentation collected.   
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actors and most audiences of EMA’s policies. They were held at EMA’s headquarters, NCAs, 
or independent venues and lasted between one and two days (Table 4.2).  
 
Table 4.2: Dates, locations and attendees of Type 1 meetings. 
Date Location Attendees 
Nov 2012 EMA headquarters (London, UK) Over 100 of the most elite actors representing all 
audiences of transparency (EMA, 2012a). 
Feb 2013 Conway Hall Ethical Society 
(London, UK) 
Over 100 delegates representing all audiences of 
transparency, the general public. 
July 2014  MHRA (London, UK) Over 45 senior and junior MHRA regulators  
Sept 2014 DKMA21 (Copenhagen, 
Denmark) 
Over 40 senior and junior DKMA regulators   
Dec 2015 Royal College of Physicians 
(Edinburgh, Scotland) 
Over 40 of the most elite representatives from NCAs 
and EMA including many heads of departments 
Mar 2016 EMA headquarters (London, UK) Over 100 of the most senior patient and doctor 
representatives and EMA regulators  
Dec 2016 EMA headquarters (London, UK) Over 100 of the most elite actors representing all 
audiences of transparency and EMA regulators 
 
During the meetings, over 40 of the most elite policy actors gave presentations on EMA’s 
transparency policies or transparency in the European pharmaceutical domain more generally. 
The presentations lasted between 15 minutes and 1 hour. All presenters were senior actors 
representing either the EMA, the European Commission, industry, patient and doctor advocacy 
groups, or the medical community more broadly (e.g. data miners, opinion leaders, journal 
editors) (Table 4.3). They included executive directors, heads of departments, committee 
chairs, board members, vice presidents, founders of companies and medical journals, as well 
as actors with many other senior positions. All Type 1 events also included extended debate 
and discussion on EMA’s transparency policies from attendees, whilst providing the 






                                                
21 Danish Medicines Agency 
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Table 4.3: Examples of positions held by elite speakers at Type 1 meetings 
 Positions of the most elite speakers 
EMA Chair of the Healthcare Professionals’ Working Party 
Chair of the Patient and Consumers’ Working Party 
Chief Legal Counsel 
Deputy Executive Director 
Executive Director 
Head of Communications 
Head of Public Information and Stakeholder Networking 
Head of Safety and Efficacy 
Principal Scientific Administrator 
Senior Medical Officer 
European 
Commission 
Assistant Data Protection supervisor at DG-SANTE22 
Legal officer at DG-SANTE 
Senior representatives from the European Ombudsman’s office 
Industry Chair at EFPIA  
Chair of the Innovation Board at the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry 
(ABPI) 
Director of ABPI. 
Pharmaceutical company SVP of External Scientific Relations and Patents at Lundbeck A/S  
Patient and 
doctor groups 
Board member of the European AIDS Treatment Group 
Chair of the European Association for Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics (EACPT)  




Co-founder of the Cochrane Collaboration  
Director of the Wellcome Trust; 
Executive Director of the Australasian Open Access Strategy Group  
Founder of AllTrials.net  
Founding editor of PLoS Medicine  
Head of Pharmacoepidemiology and Pharmacovigilance at AEMPS 
Representative of the International Society of Drug Bulletins (ISDB) 
 
Second, four meetings can be categorised as workshops co-organised by the investigator and 
two colleagues (hereafter, ‘Type 2’ meetings) (Table 4.4). The meetings were held annually in 
June for every case study year, took place in four EU countries (Sweden, Spain, Denmark and 
Ireland), and lasted two days each. The meetings had between 17 and 20 elite delegates. The 
investigator took extensive notes and wrote anonymised summaries of 4-5 A4 pages after all 
four meetings.   
                                                
22 Director General for Health and Food Safety 
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Table 4.4: Dates, locations, and no. of attendees at each Type 2 meeting 
Date Location No. of Attendees 
June 2013 Uppsala (Sweden) 20 
June 2014 Madrid (Spain) 19 
June 2015 Copenhagen (Denmark) 19 
June 2016 Cork (Ireland) 17 
 
Attendees had a variety of the most senior positions in the pharmaceutical policy domain and 
represented EMA, NCAs, patient advocacy groups, industry, and academia (Table 4.5). At 
every meeting all delegates (including the investigator) either gave formal presentations (15-
30 minutes) or extended commentaries (10-15 minutes) on EMA’s transparency policies, 
which were followed by extended debate and discussion. All four meetings were held under 
Chatham House Rule23 and therefore encouraged open and honest discussion on the 
effectiveness of EMA’s transparency policies from multiple (and potentially conflicting) 
audiences. This meant that delegates’ identities were necessarily anonymised (Table 4.5).  
 
Table 4.5: Anonymised information on all attendees at Type 2 meetings (excluding academia).  
 Attendees (anonymised) 
EMA 4 management board level representatives  
Industry 2 board level EFPIA representatives 




18 senior representatives from either Britain, Denmark, the Netherlands, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Norway, Spain, Sweden or Switzerland. Positions of representatives 
ranged from Director Generals and Heads of Department to Chief Medical Officers and 
national representatives of EMA’s scientific committees (e.g. the Pharmacoviglance Risk 
Assessment Committee). 
Patient groups 2 senior supranational patient advocacy group representatives  
 
Third, three meetings can be categorised as private meetings or EMA policy consultation 
events that for which the investigator was invited to by EMA regulators (hereafter, ‘Type 3’ 
meetings). All three meetings were held at EMA’s headquarters and included discussions 
between EMA regulators, the investigator, and other academics. The first meeting was held in 
December 2013 and was attended by three EMA regulators, two NCA regulators, the 
investigator, and one colleague from academia. The second meeting was held in May 2014 and 
                                                
23 see https://www.chathamhouse.org/about/chatham-house-rule  
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was attended by 34 influential medical community academics (e.g. data miners from the 
Cochrane Collaboration) and at least ten senior EMA regulators (e.g. EMA’s Chief Policy 
Advisor and Senior Medical Officer). The third meeting was held in September 2016 with nine 
EMA regulators, the investigator, and one colleague from academia. The meetings provided 
the opportunity to discuss EMA’s transparency policies in-depth. At all three meetings the 
investigator recorded meetings with detailed notes. 
 
Fourth, four meetings can be categorised as events with regulatory authorities operating outside 
the EU (hereafter, ‘Type 4’ meetings). Two meetings were held at the US FDA’s Centre for 
Drug Evaluation and Research (Maryland, USA). They took place in December 2013 and April 
2015 and were each attended by over 40 FDA regulators. A third meeting was held at Health 
Canada’s headquarters (Ottawa, Canada). The meeting took place in April 2015 and was 
attended by over 150 Health Canada regulators. A fourth meeting was hosted by Swissmedic, 
the Swiss pharmaceutical regulatory authority, in Montreux, Switzerland, in September 2015. 
The meeting was attended by over 100 delegates including patient and doctor advocacy groups, 
industry representatives, EMA regulators, academia, and most board-level Swissmedic 
regulators. Meetings at regulatory authorities operating in other jurisdictions – such as the 
Japanese Pharmaceutical and Medical Devices Agency or the Australian Therapeutic Good 
Administration – could not be organised or attended due to resource constraints. All four 
meetings included presentations by the investigator and extended debate and discussion on 
EMA’s transparency policies with attendees. The four meetings collectively provided 
Canadian, American, and Swiss perspectives on EMA’s input transparency policies, which was 
essential for understanding the effectiveness of EMA’s three main input policies as they all 
involve publishing data online and hence have global consequences (and global audiences). 
 
The 18 elite meetings enabled the investigator to conduct two main methods for collecting 
evidence on the effectiveness of EMA’s policies over 23 days. The first method adopted was 
direct observation. While formal direct observation might involve using specific instruments 
(e.g. tallying the occurrence of certain types of behaviour), this study adopted a more informal 
and detached approach or what some categorise as “nonstructured observations” (McKechnie 
2008: 575). Such observations were considered as highly appropriate for this study as they are 
well suited for collecting data on an under-explored phenomenon and are well suited for 
studying phenomena over time (McKechnie, 2008). The investigator observed presentations 
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given by elite policy actors and debates between attendees throughout the meetings in what 
Gilham (2010) describes as the ‘fly on the wall’ approach.  The investigator observed, for 
example, what presenters and attendees said, the words they used including their accounts, and 
their experiences of EMA’s transparency policies. 
 
Each type of meeting provided different opportunities for understanding the effectiveness of 
EMA’s policies for multiple transparency audiences. For example, while more reserved 
statements on EMA’s policies were observed at larger public events, the smaller scale Chatham 
House Rule and private meetings produced more candid and honest discussions. At all 
meetings the investigator paid careful attention to the reactions of all attendees and 
observations were made on presentations, questions and comments, and discussions made 
during breaks. Relevant case study evidence was recorded by hand, which produced a total of 
three field notebooks with 192 A5 pages each. At the end of each meeting the investigator also 
created summaries of the most important comments. 
 
The second data collection technique adopted at all 18 meetings was to conduct unstructured 
informal interviews (see Robson and McCartan, 2016: 293) or what some methodologists 
categorise as “conversational interviewing” (Roulston, 2008: 128-129). This approach can be 
used “to generate verbal data through talking about specified topics with research participants 
in an informal and conversational way” (Roulston, 2008: 128). It enabled the investigator to 
discuss the regulators’ transparency policies with meeting attendees in a friendly and informal 
atmosphere and to receive authentic reflections. This would have been much more difficult at 
policy meetings by, for example, conducting formal semi-structured or structured interviews 
(Roulston, 2008).  
 
All informal interviews were conducted after elite speakers had presented on EMA’s 
transparency policies. This enabled the investigator to frame discussions casually around the 
case study topic and research question. Interviews ranged from short chats to long in-depth 
discussions and took place during coffee breaks, lunches, dinners, meeting receptions, and 
dedicated ‘networking’ sessions. The investigator was able to collect evidence by discussing 
the effectiveness of EMA’s policies with a multiplicity of attendees and elite presenters. The 
investigator was able to clarify the meaning and significance of presenters’ comments, 
corroborate evidence with other actors, and collect and compare the perspectives of meeting 
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attendees (and hence different audiences of transparency). It was not feasible or appropriate to 
tape record such unstructured and informal interviews. Doing so would have significantly 
affected their spontaneity and informality (Robson and McCartan, 2016). Rather, key 
comments and points of clarification were written down when it became possible and 
summaries of key evidence were made after all 18 meetings and while the investigator’s 




Two online surveys were conducted in order to collect data on the perspectives of patients and 
(medical) doctors24. Both surveys were launched simultaneously on 10th November 2014. The 
patient survey was completed on 23rd February 2015. The doctor survey was completed three 
months earlier on 28th November 2014. They were both hosted on an invitation-only online 
web-portal by Ipsos, an international polling agency headquartered in the UK. The raw survey 
data was analysed independently by the investigator. 
 
(4.7.1) Patient and doctor samples 
 
The patient sample had 1010 adult respondents that were each diagnosed with one of five long-
term medical conditions. These were HIV/AIDS (N=177); idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis25 
(IPF) (N=146); multiple sclerosis (N=127); rheumatoid arthritis (N=252); and osteoporosis 
(N=218). All patient respondents were from one of four EU countries: France (N=224); 
Germany, (N=227); Spain (242); and the UK (N=317). Further demographic information was 
collected on respondents’ sex, age, membership of patient organisations, length of time 
diagnosed with their medical condition, working status, household income, education, and race 
(Table 4.6), as well as their geographic region (Appendix A). All respondents had to answer 
two screener questions before agreeing to participate. This was to exclude respondents under 
18 years old and those that had not been diagnosed with one of the five medical conditions. 
Ipsos’s standard operating procedures also ensured that these two eligibility criteria were met.  
 
                                                
24 Summary results are also reported in two special issue articles in the Journal of Risk Research (Way et al. 2016; 
Löfstedt, et al. 2016). 
25 Idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis (IPF) is the most common, yet still rare, interstitial lung disease and there is 
currently no known cure. According to the British Lung Foundation (2015), almost 50% of individuals with IPF 
do not live longer than 3 years after diagnosis. 
    
91 
 
Table 4.6: Demographic data for the patient sample 
 HIV/AIDS Idiopathic 





Male 81% 60% 38% 22% 49% 
Age (average in 
years) 42.7 45.4 43.1 56.6 55 
% in patient 




3.7 2.7 3.8 3.2 3.3 
% working full 
time 45% 40% 37% 26% 43% 
Household income 
(% less than 
£30,000) 




44% 52% 39% 35% 36% 
Race (% white) 83% 86% 91% 94% 94% 
 
The doctor sample contained a total of 1005 medical doctor respondents that have all been in 
clinical practice for >3 and <35 years and currently work for 20+ hours per week. All 
respondents were from one of four EU countries: France (N = 254); Germany (N = 250); Spain 
(N = 251); and the UK (N = 250). In each sample country, approximately 50% were general 
practitioners (N = 483) and approximately 50% were specialists (N= 522) in treating 
HIV/AIDS (N = 124); IPF (N = 128); multiple sclerosis (N = 126); or rheumatoid arthritis/ 
osteoporosis (N = 144). In other words, doctor sample respondents were from the same four 
EU countries as patient sample respondents and were either general practitioners or specialists 
in treating the five patient sample medical conditions. Further demographic information was 
collected on doctor respondents’ sex, years in clinical practice post-residency, weekly hours in 
clinical practice, type and size of practice, monthly number of patients treated, and whether 
they treated children/adolescents or adults over 18 years old (Table 4.7), as well as their 
geographic region (Appendix A). 
 
Table 4.7: Demographic data for the doctor sample 
  France Germany Spain UK All 
Average number of years in clinical 
practice post-residency (years) 19 16 17 17 17 
 
Average hours per week in clinical practice 
(hours) 49 48 40 44 45 
 
Type of practice 
(%) 
Group 22 46 26 48 35 
Solo 30 30 7 1 17 
Clinic 1 14 6 2 6 
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Hospital 48 10 59 48 41 





in last month (%) 
100 or fewer 7 2 5 11 6 
101-200 21 12 18 25 19 
201-300 17 16 24 19 19 
301-400 18 24 15 14 18 
401-500 19 23 11 14 17 
501-600 10 10 10 9 10 
601-700 4 5 4 3 4 
701+ 5 8 12 5 8 
 
Size of hospital or 
surgical centre 
(No. of beds) (%) 
Fewer than 100 beds 4 4 4 4 4 
100-299 beds 11 13 20 5 12 
300-499 beds 17 9 19 16 16 
500 or more beds 32 14 34 36 29 
Not applicable 35 60 23 38 39 
 
Average % of 
patients that 
are… 
Children/adolescents 15 10 9 14 12 




Male 68 72 70 78 72 
Female 32 28 30 22 28 
 
The five medical conditions were chosen because they are all life-long chronic disabling 
diseases with no known cure. Although every human being could be categorised as a ‘patient’, 
individuals suffering from long-term disabling diseases differ in that they frequently have to 
make complicated decisions on medicines that have clear benefits but where the risks are not 
negligible (Mayer, 2011; also see Edwards and Elwyn, 2009). The samples also contained a 
variety of long term medical conditions including a rare disease (i.e. IPF). This was important 
because patients (1) have to make different (and difficult) benefit-risk decisions on medicines 
authorised to treat their conditions (e.g. different treatment options); (2) experience different 
levels of impairment and disability (e.g. those diagnosed with HIV/AIDS compared to multiple 
sclerosis); and (3) have different information sources available to them (e.g. patients with rare 
conditions have small patient group communities) (see Garcia-Retamero and Galesic, 2013 for 
further discussion; Baggot and Forster, 2009, Mayer, 2011).  
 
The four sample countries were primarily chosen because they are all in the EU and so within 
EMA’s jurisdiction. They were also all included in a general public survey conducted in 2012 
by the investigator (and colleagues) (see Bouder, Way, Löfstedt et al. 2015). Therefore 
comparisons between the general public in 2012 and the results of this study could be made 
directly. Four rather than the full six countries surveyed in 2012 were chosen due to resource 
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constraints of recruiting individuals with medical conditions compared to members of the 
general public.  
 
(4.7.2) Recruitment and representativeness 
 
Two approaches were adopted for recruiting patients and doctors. The first targeted patients 
exclusively. The author and a colleague contacted over 25 patient groups including several EU 
umbrella organisations such as the European Patients Forum, the European AIDS Treatment 
Group, and the International Osteoporosis Foundation, as well as many other national-level 
organisations specialising in different target conditions26. Elite representatives from these 
groups were met at elite policy meetings (see section 4.5), through colleagues, or, in a few 
cases, through unsolicited e-mails.  
 
Patient groups were all generous in providing advice on further revising the questionnaire and, 
in addition, sent email invitations to members through patient group email lists. A small 
donation of €10 was offered to each patient organisation for every completed questionnaire. 
However, although essential for adjusting the questionnaire itself, this approach resulted in a 
low response with only 79 respondents completing the questionnaire (8% of the final sample). 
One reason for such a low response was that patient group members are surveyed frequently 
(e.g. by other researchers or patient organisations). For instance, one patient group that agreed 
to participate had only recently finished surveying members in its biannual survey.  
 
The second recruitment approach targeted both patients and doctors and was carried out in 
collaboration with Ipsos27. The remaining patients and all doctors were obtained through this 
second approach using online panels and quota sampling. Specifically, 931 patient respondents 
(92% of the final sample) and 1,005 medical doctors (100% of the final sample) were recruited. 
Ipsos have notably strict procedures and industry standard checks to preserve recruitment 
quality such as mechanisms to discourage professional responders and continually refresh 
respondents between surveys (Twyman, 2008; Ipsos, 2015). The agency also fully complies 
with the British Polling Council’s requirements (British Polling Council, 2017). 
                                                
26 The investigator would like to particularly thank the following national-level organisations: Liga Reumatológica 
Española (LIRE); Esclerosis Multiple Espana (EME); Asociación De Familiares Y Enfermos De Fibrosis 
Pulmonar Idiopática (AFEFPI); Association Fibrose Pulmonaire Idiopathique (AFSEP); Pulmonary Fibrosis 
Trust; British Lung Foundation; and the Multiple Sclerosis Society.  
27 See Ipsos (2015) for a thorough explanation of the organisation’s recruitment procedures. 
    
94 
 
Patient and doctors were recruited in slightly different ways. Patient respondents were recruited 
onto large and varied panels using email lists, banners, websites, text ads, search engine 
methods, and other techniques. They were offered incentive points – a common form of 
incentive for participants in online panel surveys – which helped reduce potential for response 
bias (Dillman, 2014). In contrast, doctor panellists were recruited by using an in-house call 
centre where potential respondents were contacted at their place of work. They could also sign 
up to the panel via the agency’s website and refer colleagues by contacting the agency directly. 
Doctor respondents received an additional incentive of between £36 and £60 depending on 
their speciality area and country.  
 
Once the panels had been created, patients and doctors meeting the study’s requirements were 
sent e-mail invitations. Both response and completion rates were calculated (see Dillman, 2007 
for a discussion).  
 
Table 4.8: Number of quits, completes, invitations sent for each sample country, as well as the response and 
competition rates 
  UK France Spain Germany 
Patients 
Invitations to participate 5200 5000 4900 6000 
Quits once started 36 42 23 9 
Completions 274 215 228 214 
Response rate 5% 4% 5% 4% 
Completion rate 88.39% 83.66% 90.98% 95.96% 
Doctors 
Invitations to participate 4246 4215 4334 6489 
Quits once started 122 41 41 42 
Completions 250 254 251 250 
Response rate 6% 4% 6% 6% 
Completion rate 67.2% 86.1% 85.96% 85.62% 
 
The response rates reported are extremely conservative estimates primarily due to the nature 
of Ipsos’s recruitment procedures. The agency sent out a large number of invitations, but then 
established quotas for the number of respondents it accepted in each survey sub-sample (e.g. 
each medical condition for which patients were recruited). This meant that up to 100% of 
invitees could have tried to respond, but once the quota was met, all future respondents were 
ineligible to participate. Both surveys contained screener questions in order to ensure that 
respondents met eligibility criteria, which eliminated a substantial portion of the original 
    
95 
 
invitees from the response rate figures. The quit rate reported also only includes those 
individuals who quit the survey after being admitted to the survey, thus not accounting for 
individuals who were invited but who were ineligible. 
 
Moreover, the ‘representativeness’ of the sample was considered far more important than the 
response rate itself (see Krosnick, 1999 for a discussion; AAPOR 2015; Cook, Heath, and 
Thompson 2000; Krosnick and Presser 2010). Survey methodologists emphasise that high 
response rates are often, optimistically, taken to denote low response bias, but this extrapolation 
does not necessarily follow, and response rate is only a proxy, at best, for (lack of) response 
bias (Krosnick, 1999; Krosnick and Presser 2010). The extent to which response bias exists 
amongst non-respondents is the most important issue rather than the percentage of invited 
participants who respond. This meant that another important advantage of using Ipsos was that 
they were able to ensure that the surveys had a robust sampling procedure. The polling agency 
drew respondents from large and varied sets of panel participants and has industry standard 
checks to preserve panel quality. Ipsos also offers competitive and appropriate incentives (such 
as incentive points), which helped to reduce potential for response bias (Dillman et al. 2014). 
Indeed, Ipsos is well-known as one of the most respected online surveying firms in the 
academic community and operates across 47 nations (Twyman, 2008; British Polling Council, 
2017). Therefore in terms of systematic sampling the two surveys have much to recommend 
them. 
 
(4.7.3) Questionnaire design 
 
The patient and doctor questionnaires were created simultaneously over a two-month period in 
mid-2014 and were guided by the latest theoretical and empirical research on survey designs 
(see Marsden and Wright 2010). The questionnaires were first modelled on past questionnaires 
– originally designed by the investigator and colleagues – that were used to compare the views 
of US doctors (N=433) and US adults in 2011 (N=1,000) (Löfstedt et al. 2011), as well as 
European adults in 2012 (N=5,648) (Bouder et al. 2015). This enabled the investigator to make 
direct comparisons between this study’s results and previous surveys. The questionnaires were 
also informed by two experimental studies conducted by the author and colleagues on a sample 
of general public respondents living in London (the UK) and Limburg (the Netherlands) 
(N=200) (Löfstedt and Way, 2016a), and Munich (Germany), and Madrid, (Spain) (N=200) 
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(Löfstedt and Way, 2016b). Several medically qualified NCA regulators also provided informal 
advice as well as 4 Ipsos employees who, for example, explained what design features the 
agency’s systems could support (e.g. progress bars and response option ordering 
randomisation). 
 
The first stage was to design the initial questionnaire. Necessary adjustments were made to the 
previous questionnaires first so that they were relevant and appropriate for patients and doctors. 
For example, respondents in the present study were asked to indicate the extent to which they 
‘agree’ or ‘disagree’ (strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly 
disagree, don’t know) with the following statement: 
 
I have good knowledge of how the European Medicines Agency (EMA) assesses the 
safety of [relevant medical condition] medicines. [Bold added for emphasis] 
 
This question was also posed to respondents in the general public survey (Bouder et al. 2015). 
However, each relevant medical condition in the present study (e.g. multiple sclerosis or 
rheumatoid arthritis) was inserted in order to make the question relevant to different patient 
respondents or doctors. New and original questions were also developed that built on previous 
findings (e.g. follow-up questions), addressed new policy developments (e.g. EMA’s clinical 
trial data policies), and investigated important issues that could not be posed to members of the 
general public (e.g. questions about specific medical conditions). 
 
Both questionnaires were thoroughly pre-tested. Doing so was an essential part of the design 
process and helped to identify and correct weaknesses and errors (van Teijlingen and Hundley, 
2002). Many of the questions had previously been rigorously tested in the US (Löfstedt et al. 
2013) and Europe (2013) (Bouder et al. 2015)28. Although this strengthened the design, 
additional piloting was required after making numerous changes to the questionnaire. The 
patient questionnaire was pre-tested on a pilot sample of eight members of the European AIDS 
Treatment group (EATG) and received informal input from patient group representatives from 
EATG, the European Brain Council, and the British Lung Foundation. Concurrently, the doctor 
questionnaire was pre-tested on 6 medical doctors working for a pharmaceutical company 
                                                
28 To be clear, this included extensively piloting and conducting three studies on 433 American physicians, 1,000 
American adults, and 5,648 European citizens (Löfstedt et al. 2013; Bouder et al. 2015). 
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(Biogen Idec.), several patient group representatives (e.g. working at EATG), and two 
randomly selected and anonymous UK doctors (via anonymous online interviews). After minor 
adjustments had been made, the English questionnaires were professionally translated by Ipsos 
into French, German, and Spanish. Each translated questionnaire was subsequently double 
checked by native speaking colleagues from relevant NCAs that were met at elite policy 
meetings (section 4.5). This resulted in each questionnaire receiving minor accuracy edits 
based on their recommendations.  
 
The final patient questionnaire contained 23 closed and seven open-ended questions and lasted 
for an average of 14.17 minutes (Appendix B). The final doctor questionnaire contained 27 
closed- and nine open-ended questions and lasted for an average of 19.14 minutes (Appendix 
C). They were each structured into 4/5 broad sections (Appendix A):  
 
1. Screener questions 
2. General communication of medicines information 
3. Pharmaceutical regulatory authorities 
4. [doctors only] Questions on specific documents; and  
5. Background questions. 
 
Screener questions. All respondents were asked screener questions to ensure they were eligible 
to participate. Patient respondents were excluded from the study if they were under 18 years 
old (i.e. those born in 1996 or more recently), were not diagnosed with one of the five targeted 
medical conditions (i.e. HIV/AIDS, IPF, MS, osteoporosis or rheumatoid arthritis) or had been 
diagnosed for less than one year. Ipsos’s standard operating procedures also ensured that 
respondents were, indeed, over 18 years old and were diagnosed with one of the medical 
conditions reported. Doctor respondents were excluded if they had been in practice post-
residency for  less than 3 and more than 35 years, were not a general practitioner or specialist 
in treating at least one of the five targeted medical conditions (i.e. HIV/AIDS, IPF, MS, 
osteoporosis, or rheumatoid arthritis), and currently worked in clinical practice for less than 20 
hours a week. Screener questions were followed by a consent form that included essential and 
important practical and ethics-related information about the study such as informing 
respondents their answers were anonymous and that they can withdraw at any point.  
 
    
98 
 
General communication of medicines information. All respondents were asked various 
questions on the general communication of medicines information. This includes questions on 
the availability and quality of information, trust in different sources of advice, effectiveness of 
government, and their confidence in taking medicines. For example, respondents were asked: 
“Would you say that the amount of information about medicines currently available is too 
much, the appropriate amount, or too little?” (Too much, Appropriate amount, Too little). 
Questions ranged from very general questions about the quantity and quality of information 
available to more specific questions on the ease of obtaining information and trustworthiness 
of specific sources of medicines advice (e.g. from doctors, patient advocacy groups, medical 
journals).  
 
Pharmaceutical regulatory authorities. All respondents were asked about the EMA and their 
relevant NCAs. National authorities varied between sample countries and are all recognised by 
EMA as the main organisation responsible for pharmaceutical regulation in each sample 
country (i.e. the National Competent Authority [NCA]) (Table 4.9). Respondents were first 
asked whether they had heard of their relevant NCA and, if so, whether they had positive or 
negative impressions of them. All respondents then read a short paragraph explaining who their 
NCA was and its responsibilities. For example, UK respondents were asked to read: 
 
“The MHRA (Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency) is the medicines 
regulator for the United Kingdom. They are responsible for regulating all medicines 
and medical devices in the UK by ensuring they work and are acceptably safe. We are 
now going to ask you a few questions on your perceptions of how medicines are 
regulated in the UK.”  
 
This sought to ensure that respondents who had mistakenly identified their NCA in the previous 
question were corrected and that those who said they had not heard of them were now aware 
of them (that is, in order to understand subsequent questions). Respondents were then asked a 
series of questions examining their awareness and knowledge of their relevant NCA. This was 
followed by several questions that their trust in pharmaceutical regulatory authorities, which 
were adapted from a comprehensive review of the trust literature (Earle, 2010) and a follow-
up commentary on trust-related research designs (Siegrist, 2010). These questions and the 
descriptive paragraph were then repeated for the EMA. Each NCA and EMA paragraph was 
written by the investigator and then checked by regulators at a relevant NCA in all sample 
countries. 
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Acronym Full English Language Name 
France ANSM National Agency for the Safety of Medicine and Health Products 
Spain AEMPS Spanish Agency for Medicines and Health Products 
Germany BfArM Federal Institute for Drugs and Medical Devices 
United Kingdom MHRA UK Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency 
 
Questions on specific documents. Medical doctor respondents were asked several questions 
about various regulatory documents that EMA have or are proposing to make publicly 
available. This includes clinical study reports and periodic safety update reports (PSURs). 
Respondents were asked to indicate their knowledge and familiarity with regulatory 
documents, opinions on making more safety-related information publicly available, and 
confidence in explaining safety information contained in regulatory reports to patients.  
 
Background questions (Tables 4.6-4.7). All respondents were asked general background/ 
demographic questions on their age and sex. Patient respondents were also asked about their 
employment status, geographic region where they live, household income, educational 
qualifications, and ethnicity, as well as how long they have been a member of a patient 
advocacy group (if at all). Doctor respondents were also asked about the geographic region 
where they work, the size of the hospital or surgical centre where they work, approximately 
how many patients they treat a month and the percentage of adults versus adolescents/ children 
they treat. 
 
These survey questions are explained further in Chapter VII (i.e. before presenting the results) 
as the specific choice of questions are directly linked to emerging case study findings. 
 
(4.8) Analysing the evidence 
 
The evidence collected from the four research methods – documentation, observations, 
interviews, and surveys – was analysed over four empirical chapters (Chapters V-VIII).  
 
Chapter V. The first empirical chapter provides a detailed exploration and overview of the 
EMA’s transparency policies in historical perspective spanning from its establishment in 
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January 1995 to December 2016. While much of the analysis draws on documentation 
(including archival analysis), observations and interviews were also used from 2012 - 2016. 
The chapter first provides a background on the establishment of EMA in 1995 as an 
independent and transparent decentralised EU regulatory authority. It then goes on to explain 
the evolution of the agency’s policies including key milestones. A draft version of the chapter 
was also reviewed by two senior EMA regulators to check for accuracy. Extracts from the 
chapter were then peer-reviewed at the European Journal of Risk Regulation and subsequently 
revised as part of a historical comparison of transparency at EMA and EFSA (Way and 
Löfstedt, forthcoming). 
 
Chapter VI. The second empirical chapter focuses on the three sub-units of analysis. A detailed 
explanation of clinical trial data is first provided. Using extensive documentation, observations 
and interviews, each policy is then examined in turn. The goals and audiences of each policy 
are given systematic attention and the main purpose of the chapter is to present the case study 
results. 
 
Chapter VII. The third empirical chapter presents the results of the patient and doctor surveys. 
Descriptive statistics were used as well as statistical significance tests where appropriate. For 
each individual question reported in the results, the question specific design (e.g. ratings scales, 
ordering of response options) as well as statistical tests are explained. IBM SPSS Statistics 
Version 22 and Microsoft Excel were used in analysing the results and creating graphs. For the 
open-ended data, the UK sample was first coded, analysed, and categorised by the investigator. 
The same process was then conducted independently by a colleague. All codes were discussed 
and new categories created when there was disagreement. Once the UK results had been coded 
and analysed researchers from relevant sample countries were recruited (i.e. native French, 
German and Spanish speakers) to code and categorise relevant open-ended data.  
 
Chapter VIII. The fourth empirical chapter addresses the research question directly and 
evaluates how effective EMA’s transparency policies have been in achieving its public policy 
objectives. In particular, it brings together the three previous chapters in order to critically 
examine the effectiveness of EMA’s transparency policies using data from perspectives of six 
main audiences holistically (Table 4.1). Further supportive evidence is also used from the four 
case study research methods where appropriate. After examining the three sub-units of 
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analysis, the evaluation returns to the main EMA case study unit of analysis. This is important 
because, as Baxer and Jack (2008) explain, a major pitfall “occurs when the case study focuses 
on the subunit level and fails the return to the larger unit of analysis”. Therefore the final 
empirical chapter returns to the larger unit of analysis on the effectiveness of EMA’s input 




One main limitation of this study was that a single case rather than a multi-case design was 
necessarily chosen (section 4.4). By focusing on EMA’s transparency policies and the 
European pharmaceutical domain, other risk regulation authorities and policy domains were 
excluded from the analysis. Inasmuch as multiple experiments can verify findings from a single 
experiment, multiple case studies can verify findings from singe case studies (Yin, 2009). 
However, a multiple case study could not be conducted primarily due to resource constraints. 
A single case design also provided other advantages including enabling multiple sub-units of 
analysis to be examined in great depth, which would not have been possible with multiple 
cases. This was particularly important because there has historically been little empirical 
research on transparency in risk regulation and so this study needed to be both exploratory (i.e. 
to test the original typology) and explanatory (i.e. to test EMA’s policies) (Chapter II) (Etzioni, 
2010; Cucciniello et al. 2017). This means that additional case studies on other regulatory 
bodies should be conducted in the future – such as on other decentralised EU agencies – in 
order to compare the results from the EMA case (including analytic generalisations) (see 
Chapter XI for a discussion).  
 
Another main limitation of this study was that some audiences of EMA’s transparency were 
not included at all. For example, journalists (and other intermediaries) interpreting data and 
communicating data. Rather, this study targeted the main audiences of EMA’s transparency 
policies that are the main targets of the regulators’ transparency policies (Table 4.1). This 
means that the full net effects of EMA’s transparency policies for all audiences could was not 
addressed.  
A third main limitation of this study was the main audiences of EMA’s transparency policies 
(Table 4.1) were also not examined directly (except for patients and doctors). In other words, 
the study did not collect evidence from the perspectives of the actual individuals that are 
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expected to directly or indirectly use data made publicly available by EMA. For example, the 
study does not include surveys of the clinical trialists or systematic reviewers that are expected 
to re-use EMA’s scientific data. Rather, it collects information from the perspective of the most 
elite actors and it follows the policy process. This was a strategy that was necessarily adopted 
(section 4.4).  
 
The main method for collecting evidence from patients and doctors, the two audiences that 
evidence was collected, also had its own limitations. First, the survey results do not seek to 
bring together the full range of perspectives on EMA’s transparency policies. This would 
require examining the perspectives of all different actors including external researchers wishing 
to reuse medicines data (e.g. clinical trial reports) (Doshi and Jefferson 2013a). Rather, this 
study contributes empirical evidence from the perspective of an understudied groups of actors 
that has received a distinct lack of attention in the debate about EMA’s policies (i.e. patients).  
 
Second, the study did not examine the positive benefits for patients from other actors reusing 
medicines information. A main goal of the regulators’ transparency policies is to enable 
‘outsiders’ to reuse its data enabling high-quality analyses to improve the pharmaceutical 
evaluation system (EMA 2014a, 2014b, 2016a). Examining the full net effects of EMA’s 
transparency policies from the perspective of patients would therefore require including 
empirical evidence on the positive, negative and/ or limited effects of enabling outsiders to 
reuse medicines information that is expected to, in turn, benefit patients (e.g. by receiving 
safety and more intensively and extensively investigated medicines). What will be needed is 
further qualitative and quantitative empirical research examining the full net effects of EMA’s 
transparency policies from the perspective of all actors. 
 
Third, the study does not directly examine whether EMA’s transparency policies have or have 
not resulted in fully informing patients about its scientific and non-scientific activities. It did 
not, for example, examine whether patients have a better or worse understanding of the 
agency’s activities (e.g. through testing their knowledge before and after the policies were 
introduced) or whether patients would be able to understand the information contained in the 
documents released by the agency (e.g. comprehension tests). Rather, the study examined some 
of the complexities of communicating about scientific and non-scientific regulatory activities 
and, in turn, identified how these are likely to impact on the success of EMA’s transparency 
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policies and its goals. Furthermore, surveys were generalised and not on specific policies (see 
Way et al. 2016). Rather than examining EMA’s specific policies and their effectiveness, the 
surveys examined the perspectives of EMA’s policies based on the regulators’ logic. It does 
not measure and evaluate the actual data and information that is released but rather seeks to 
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Chapter V: TRANSPARENCY AT EMA IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
This chapter provides a historical analysis examining how EMA’s transparency polices have 
evolved over time spanning from its inception in 1995 to December 31st 201629. The 
decentralised EU agency provides an excellent case of a European regulator that has been 
criticized for “not being transparent enough” despite consistently demonstrating a firm 
commitment to the concept (e.g. by meeting and going beyond legal requirements) (EMA, 
2009, 2016). EMA is responsible for pharmaceuticals and specifically “the protection and 
promotion of public and animal health through the evaluation and supervision of medicines for 
human and veterinary use” (EMA, 2017a). This chapter and thesis is, however, limited to the 
agency’s evaluation of medicines for human use and will therefore exclude activities relating 
to veterinary medicines (Chapter V). It also pays particular attention to EMA’s transparency 
policies regarding its scientific evaluation of medicines (e.g. in the Committee for Medicinal 
Products for Human Use [CHMP] and the Pharmacovigilance Risk Assessment Committee 
[PRAC]). Therefore other core regulatory activities such as inspections are beyond the scope 
of this chapter and thesis. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows. First, a contextual background explaining what EMA is 
and why it was created is provided. This includes an understanding of why the agency 
committed so strongly to transparency from day one. Second, three distinct phases in the 
evolution of transparency at EMA are identified and discussed in turn. Each phase includes a 
description and explanation of the types of transparency policies introduced by the agency as 
well as how outsiders have viewed its approach along the way. 
 
(5.1) Background and formation 
 
In January 1995, EMA (originally the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal 
Products [EMEA]) opened its doors (EMA, 1995). EMA was not created “from scratch” but 
was the culmination of 30 years of pharmaceutical legislation (Sauer, 1995; Demortain, 2011; 
Groenleer, 2009). Following the Thalidomide birth defect tragedy (Stephenson and Brynner, 
2001; Botting, 2002; Permanand, 2004), the first EU pharmaceutical legislation was adopted 
                                                
29 The end of 2016 provides a good cut-off date as this PhD thesis was finalised in January 2017. The Chapter is 
also under review at the European Journal of Risk Regulation (Way and Löfstedt, 2016). Hence much of the text 
included in this paper is repeated here. 
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in 1965 (Directive 65/65/EEC). Member states were required to create and thereafter manage 
a formal evidence-based marketing procedure based on the principles of “quality, safety and 
efficacy” (Demortain, 2008). To be clear, prior to the 1960s only rudimentary forms of 
governmental and regulatory control existed in Europe (see Orzack et al., 1992; Vogel, 1998). 
A second milestone came in 1975 when the Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products 
(CPMP) (later renamed the Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use [CHMP]), a 
scientific committee comprised of representatives from all member state regulatory authorities, 
was established (Permanand, 2004; Groenleer, 2009). The new committee’s role was advisory 
(Vogel, 1998), which (crucially) meant that member states “maintained the right to deny 
approval” of a medicine regardless of the committee’s decision (Vogel, 1998: 3; Orzack et al., 
1992). For instance, CPMP could provide advice to a member state “in case they were reluctant 
or unwilling” to recognise marketing approvals authorised in other nations and frequently did 
so (Groenleer, 2009: 144). Seventeen years later in 1987 it became mandatory for member 
states to consult the CPMP before authorising biotechnology products (e.g. recombinant DNA, 
hybridomes/monoclonal antibodies and cell cultures) but not for all medicines (COM, 1988: 
16). An increasing number of measures and legislative requirements were therefore introduced 
between 1965 and 1995 in seeking to improve and incrementally ‘Europeanise’ pharmaceutical 
regulation. 
 
The European Commission went further in its 1985 White Paper on ‘Completing the Internal 
Market’ (COM, 1985). Amongst many other measures needed to complete the single European 
market (for goods, persons, services and capital) (Cecchini, 1988; Orzack, 1992), the 
Commission made clear that “obstacles to the free circulation of pharmaceutical products and 
high technology medicines” needed to be eliminated (Orzack, 1992: 856). However, concerns 
quickly surfaced that it would not meet the strict December 1992 internal market deadline for 
pharmaceutical products (Callingaert, 1988; Cecchini, 1988). In particular, a 1988 review 
(COM, 1988) detailed the experiences and shortcomings of CPMP and the European 
pharmaceutical authorisation system (see Orzack et al., 1992 or Vogel, 1998 for discussions).  
 
One of the most important barriers to integration was that European pharmaceutical regulation 
was fragmented. Pharmaceutical companies were required to obtain marketing authorisations 
from individual member states that had lengthy and varying procedures, or as Currie (1989: 
770), from Merck’s regulatory affairs department, put it: there were barriers due to “differences 
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in procedures, standards, data requirements and the time required to reach a decision on the 
application” between member states. Writing in 1989, Kaufer (1989 In: Vogel, 1998: 2-3) 
explains further: 
 
“The free movement of drugs in the European Community is not only hindered by the 
fact that the national competent authorities render different value judgements on the 
merits of therapeutic approaches and on issues of relative benefits and risk of drugs. 
On top of these drug specific differences come health-policy specific differences in the 
control of the social-security system, and industry specific differences in the control of 
drug industry’s prices and profit, and differences in the extent to which national 
governments assist their national drug industry”. 
 
These issues and others collectively showed that the traditional decentralised authorisation 
system had failed (Deomartain, 2006; Gehring and Kraphol, 2007; Groenleer, 2009).  
 
Establishing a new centralised procedure – coordinated by a new decentralised EU agency – 
was subsequently viewed as a way of meeting the strict internal market deadline (Groenleer, 
2009). Unlike EFSA, for example, transparency was therefore not a central reason for 
establishing EMA (Way and Löfstedt, forthcoming). With that said, there is strong evidence 
that the Commission was concerned about the independence and fairness of member state 
regulatory decision-making at the time and viewed transparency as an effective measure in 
tackling this issue. In particular, the Commission was concerned that member states were 
favouring domestic pharmaceutical companies (Sauer and Hankin, 1987; Cecchini, 1988; 
Vogel, 1998). For instance, according to the 1988 Cecchini report on the ‘Benefits of a Single 
Market’, contemporary research showed that member state pricing systems “may operate with 
discriminatory bias [...] [that] clearly operate in favour of the domestic manufacturer” 
(Cecchini, 1988: 68). Therefore enhancing transparency in the control of drug pricing was 
viewed by the Commission as an important measure for reducing member state bias (COM 
(86)765 of 12/23/1986). However, its implementation was considered to be heavily constrained 
by the traditional member state regulatory system (see Sauer and Hankin, 1987: 643).  
 
Before the agency opened its doors in January 1995 there were clear signs of its future 
commitment to transparency and openness. In the agency’s very design, transparency was 
viewed as essential for maintaining independence from the agency’s many stakeholders 
including industry but also member states and the Commission. In particular, EMA’s first 
Executive Director, Fernand Sauer, was acutely aware of the need for close collaboration with 
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these stakeholders in order to function effectively yet remain independent and accountable 
(Sauer, 1995, 1997; Demortain, 2008; Gehring and Kraphol, 2007). The agency would have to 
receive its funding from industry (through licensing fees), which is incidentally the same for 
most other pharmaceutical regulatory bodies (e.g. MHRA, FDA and Health Canada) 
(Breckenridge et al. 2005), but also the Commission. Unlike the US FDA but similarly to 
EFSA, EMA would not have its own ‘in-house’ expertise (Kingham et al., 1994). Rather, EMA 
was designed to be a coordinator and “hub of multi-levels actors” (Sauer, 1995; Groenleer, 
2009). The highly technical nature of pharmaceutical scientific expertise, required for 
evaluating marketing applications that can amount to over 250,000 pages of highly technical 
data (Gehring and Kraphol, 2007), meant that most experts on EMA’s scientific committees 
would necessarily have ‘links’ with industry (Sauer, 1995, 1997). Patients and doctors would 
also have to rely on expert judgement and evaluation of medicines as they will (usually) be 
unable to do so themselves (Feick, 2002) or as Gehring and Kraphol (2007: 211) put it: 
information is “typically asymmetrically distributed between producers and consumers” in 
pharmaceutical evaluation. Furthermore, the agency’s scientific committees (e.g. 
CPMP/CHMP) were made up of representatives of the NCAs (i.e. member state regulatory 
bodies) and so even its core activity (medicines evaluation) involved possibility for bias. 
Transparency and openness were thus viewed as key to ensuring independence (Sauer, 1995).  
 
These delicate independence challenges (and others) along with the need to have close 
collaboration with various stakeholders were viewed as important reasons for Sauer (1995) and 
others (e.g. the first Chairman of the Management Board, Strachan Heppell [1995]) to commit 
to transparency right from the start. Transparency was seen as an essential tool or principle for 
ensuring the agency could carry out its scientific activities independently. Doing so would 
allow anyone to scrutinise its opinions and decision-making and, in turn, promote 
accountability. In other words, ‘outsiders’ could ‘see for themselves’ that the agency and its 
committees were independent of industry, member states and the Commission, all three of 
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(5.2) Establishing an independent agency (1995-2000) 
 
After nominating Fernand Sauer, former Head of Unit for the Commission’s Pharmaceutical 
and Veterinary Medicines Division, as EMA’s first Executive Director in 1994, the newly 
established agency began operating in January 1995. As shown in all of EMA’s first six annual 
reports (EMA, 1995, 1996, 1997b, 1998a, 1999, 2000a), the Executive Director and Chairman 
of the Management Board strongly advocated transparency and openness during the agency’s 
formative years (Sauer, 1995; 2000; Heppell, 1999). For instance, in EMA’s 1999 report, 
Strachan Heppell made clear that: 
 
"The board has from its early days placed a great emphasis on accountability and 
transparency. Its policy has been that the Agency should explain what it is doing, why 
it is doing it and whether it has succeeded in meeting its performance targets. The 
Board has consistently believed that if this is done, the Agency will perform well and 
secure the confidence of the public” (Heppell, 1999: 7). 
 
The agency’s first transparency policy was to introduce European Public Assessment Reports 
(EPARs) (Sauer, 1997), which was legally based in the agency’s founding legislation (see 
Article 12 of Regulation (EEC) No. 2309/93) (Lekkerkerker, 2005: 35). The purpose of EPARs 
was to provide quality information to healthcare professionals and patients (Sauer, 1998b) and 
was promoted as “a useful means of ensuring transparency and subjecting EMA’s activities to 
effective public auditing” (EMA, 1996: 23-34). Specifically, an EPAR was published for every 
medicine and “set out the scientific assessment carried out by the agency, together with the 
summary of product characteristics30 and the patient leaflet31” (Sauer, 1998b: 1078). The first 
EPAR was published in the agency’s very first year of operation for Gonal-F, a medicine 
developed by the then small pharmaceutical company, Serono (Sauer, 2009). Sauer (1995: 6) 
made clear that “better information for consumers is an absolute must for a more rational use 
of medicines, which will lead to improvements in public health and benefit health care 
budgets”.  
 
During its first six years of operation, EMA went on to introduce many other transparency 
initiatives. Three standout policies included publishing a list of scientific committee experts in 
                                                
30 “A document describing the properties and the officially approved conditions of use of a medicine. Summaries 
of product characteristics form the basis of information for healthcare professionals on how to use the medicine 
safely and effectively” (EMA, 2015). 
31 “The leaflet in every pack of medicine that contains information on the medicine for end-users” (EMA, 2015). 
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1996 (EMA, 1996) and subsequently posting it online in 2000 (EMA, 2000a), the early 
publication of scientific committee opinions (EMA, 2000a) and publishing summaries of 
opinions on marketing applications whether they are negative or positive (EMA, 2000a). 
Another main activity was to continually develop EPARs such as through conducting a 
technical workshop in 1998 followed by improving the scientific and linguistic quality of the 
summary of product characteristics, package insert leaflets, and product labelling (EMA, 
1999).  
 
During the early years, other perhaps more mundane yet essential activities included setting-
up a dedicated service for dealing with disseminating information (EMA, 1996) and creating 
and updating an Internet homepage (Sauer, 1995; EMA, 1998a, 2000a). Indeed, in the mid-
1990s, creating a website was viewed as an important transparency measure (that could enable 
further transparency mechanisms) (Sauer, 1997: 97) and exemplifies how the Internet itself 
was a key contributing factor in the rise of so-called ‘internet-mediated’ transparency policies 
during the late 20th Century (Meijer, 2009). Furthermore, EMA created rules on access to 
documents (EMA, 1997a), a code of conduct for committee members (EMA, 1999), a code of 
good administrative behaviour (recommended by the ombudsman) (EMA, 1999) and launched 
a public document catalogue (EMA, 2000), amongst other procedural based transparency 
activities. 
 
Beyond improving the amount and especially the quality of information available to ‘outsiders’ 
(including patients and healthcare professionals), a central pillar of EMA’s transparency 
strategy was to communicate effectively with interested parties and stakeholders (Sauer, 
1998a). In so doing, EMA interacted frequently with representatives from consumer groups 
(e.g. the European Consumers Organisation), industry (e.g. EFPIA), healthcare professionals 
and patient groups (e.g. EATG) such as during regular quarterly meetings (EMA, 1998), info-
days (EMA, 1997b, 1998), ad hoc meetings (Sauer, 1998, 2009) and even, as Sauer (2005: 8) 
notes, “football matches”. These efforts to ensure interaction with interested parties and 
stakeholders is perhaps not surprising considering there “were real worries” about whether 
EMA would succeed (Heppell, 2005: 9) because of the aforementioned challenges concerning 
independence and ensuring the agency maintained scientific rigour that was free from conflicts 
of interest. Indeed, many of EMA’s early transparency initiatives were preceded by public 
consultation periods to help ensure its transparency goals were achieved. 
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The agency also conducted two workshops on transparency in 1997 and 2000 (EMA, 1997a, 
2000b). When summarising the outcomes of EMA’s first transparency workshop (EMA, 
1997a), Strachan Heppell and Dietrich Henschler, a European Parliament representative on 
EMA’s management board, prominently emphasised the relationship between transparency, 
information and communication: 
 
“One of the primary concerns of the EMEA must now be the proper communication of 
information on medicines to patients [and] health care professionals […]. The EMEA, 
with the help of national authorities, will continue to work on how best to improve user 
information – including better involvement of consumer, patient and relevant groups” 
(EMA, 1997a). 
 
High quality dialogue and communication with all agency stakeholders (including patients and 
healthcare professionals) was thus viewed very highly by the regulators.  
 
Despite introducing many transparency initiatives (including public workshops and 
consultations), the regulators, as Sauer (1998b: 8) put it, “inevitably” came under closer 
scrutiny. One of the most public criticisms came from the International Society of Drug 
Bulletins (ISDB), a society involved with disseminating medicines information to doctors 
(ISDB, 1998; Abbasi and Herxheimer, 1998). In particular, ISDB presented the results of an 
analysis of nine EPARs and expressed concerns over their quality (e.g. lack of clarity, 
variability of presentation styles, and inclusion of data solely from industry) (ISDB, 1998; 
Abbasi and Herxheimer, 1998). In response, EMA established continuing dialogue with ISDB 
including a detailed response to the society’s initial EPAR analysis (EMA, 1998b). Another 
early criticism of EMA’s transparency policies came from Abraham and Lewis (1999: 1666), 
two academics, who strongly argued in 1999: 
 
“Despite the rhetoric of the European Commission and of the EMA supporting greater 
freedom of information, the European procedures of medicines regulation remain 
opaque to public scrutiny”.  
 
The authors, in turn, demanded that EMA enhance transparency further to enable external 
public scrutiny and that, without doing so, ‘outsiders’ would have to assume regulatory capture 
by industry (Abraham and Lewis, 1999, 2000). According to Keleman (2002: 102), the agency 
also received criticism from a few MEPs (Members of European Parliament) who were 
concerned member states would become too dominant in the agency’s activities, which could 
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lead to unscientific opinions based on national interests. However, in many cases it was actually 
industry that was the most vocal advocate of EMA enhancing transparency. For instance, one 
of EMA’s early transparency initiatives, of publishing a summary of both positive and negative 
CPMP scientific opinions on the day of adoption by scientific committees, was initially 
proposed by EFPIA (a Brussels-based trade association representing industry) (EMA, 2000c: 
1).  
 
In addition, EMA had several teething problems with implementing and developing some of 
its early transparency policies. While EPARs were, according to Sauer (1998: 1078), “bound 
to be difficult to implement”, the 1997 transparency workshop highlighted other difficulties. 
This includes issues of commercial confidentiality with releasing information on medicines 
developed by pharmaceutical companies and, as an FDA representative commented, 
transparency will have “significant resource implications” for EMA (EMA, 1997a). In 1998, 
the agency commented in its annual report that “as a matter of principle, details of applications 
submitted to EMA remain confidential” (EMA, 1998a: 16). In addition, despite freezes in 
agency recruitment (Sauer, 1998a: 8), CPMP reported that it had an increasingly demanding 
workload from publishing EPARs (e.g. in order to make sure they were accurate and readable 
for different needs) (e.g. EMA, 1999: 30).  
 
Despite these early challenges, EMA’s commitment to transparency and openness as well as 
including interested parties was viewed extremely positively by the majority of its many 
stakeholders (Groenleer, 2009). In particular, although there were some criticisms of EPARs 
(e.g. ISDB), they were viewed as an innovative and progressive transparency policy by many 
(Abbasi and Herxheimer, 1998; EMA, 2005a) or as Frits Lekkerkerker (2005), Chair of the 
Dutch Medicines Evaluation Board (MEB), commented in 2005: “The publication of the first 
EPAR was a major step forward in the transparency of regulatory agencies”.  Writing in the 
British Medical Journal in 1998, Kamran Abbasi, BMJ Assistant Editor, and Andrew 
Herxheimer, emeritus fellow UK Cochrane Centre, echoed these words when commenting that 
“in publishing public assessment reports, the European Medicines Evaluation Agency is far 
ahead of most national licensing authorities-which are still notoriously secretive” and that the 
agency has demonstrated that it is “open to criticism” (Abbasi and Herxheimer, 1998: 898).  
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In its ‘Celebrating 10-years’ anniversary book (EMA, 2005a), contributions from a variety of 
stakeholders also made clear that the agency was successful in promoting transparency and 
inclusive decision-making in its early years including with patient groups (Le Cam, 2005: 80; 
Baker, 2005: 84). For instance, Rodney Elgie, President of the European Patient’s Forum, 
commented: 
 
“The contribution from patients is both visible and meaningful: all too often in other 
areas patient involvement has proved illusory or tokenistic. For this the EMA should 
be congratulated” (Elgie, 2005: 78). 
 
Or as Alastair Kent, President of the European Genetic Alliances Network, said: 
 
“Those setting up the Agency […] were sensitive to patients’ refusal to be patronized, 
and brave enough to see this as an opportunity for the new institution to commit itself 
to openness and transparency. […] Trust in the regulatory system and confidence that 
medicines are safe and effective can only benefit from this continued commitment”. 
(Kent, 2005: 82). 
 
Furthermore, in 2001 the Commission completed a large formal review and analysis of the 
agency (see Cameron McKenna and Anderson Consulting, 2001). The detailed report found, 
amongst many other findings, that both industry and member states supported the new 
centralised procedure and appreciated the work of EMA (ibid, 2001). Gehring and Kraphol 
(2007: 209) highlight one of the reports main findings:  
 
“Over 90 per cent of the applying companies and all regulatory authorities of the then 
fifteen member states expressed their satisfaction with the [centralised] procedure, 
while the two principal consumer groups – physicians and patients – were only slightly 
less positive”. 
 
Therefore the early transparency years were evaluated very positively by the large majority of 
EMA’s stakeholders and interested parties. 
 
(5.3) Maintaining and strengthening transparency (2001-2009) 
 
On 3rd January 2001, Thomas Lönngren, former Deputy Director-General of the Medical 
Products Agency in Sweden, replaced Sauer as Executive Director of EMA. Lönngren built on 
the transparency legacy of his predecessor and guided the agency through a period of 
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“consolidation” (Sauer, 2005, 2009; EMA, 2003a, 2007). During the initial four year period, 
EMA maintained and strengthened its commitment to transparency. The agency created new 
ways of engaging with stakeholders such as holding its first patient organisation workshop in 
2002, which was viewed as “an additional initiative to improve transparency” and a “unique 
forum” that would complement other patient engagement activities (Lönngren [2002] In: EMA, 
2002a: 1), creating working groups to discuss transparency issues (e.g. the organisation matters 
working group) as well as additional info-days and meetings with stakeholders (EMA, 2002b, 
2003b).  
 
However, the main trend was the development of an increasingly sophisticated and strategic 
approach to transparency. The agency was aware that it would have to prepare for new 
responsibilities from the Commission (EMA, 2001), accommodate the EU’s enlargement in 
2004 (including the introduction of ten new national regulatory authorities) and make 
substantial legally binding changes based on the EU’s upcoming 2004 pharmaceutical 
legislation (EMA, 2002b, 2003a, 2004a). This meant that some of the main activities between 
2001 and 2004 included introducing a “phased implementation” of the outcomes of its 2000 
transparency workshop (EMA, 2001a), hiring a press officer (EMA, 2001a), creating a new 
risk communication unit (2001a), creating a working party dedicated to transparency, 
developing a risk management and communication strategy (2002b) and creating a good 
corporate governance strategy (EMA, 2003a). Indeed, these strategic activities would enable 
the agency to prepare for the major new developments ahead and its eventual expansion from 
a “very small agency with 150 staff” to one with more than 850 in December 2010 when 
Lönngren stepped down (Lönngren, 2010).  
 
Furthermore, EMA had to deal with several other challenges such as coming into financial 
difficulties in 2002 resulting in curtailing non-essential core activities (due to receiving fewer 
than expected marketing applications) (Lönngren, 2002, 2003) as well as safety concerns 
associated with, for instance Baycol, Vioxx and COX-2 inhibitors (Lönngren, 2010; Löfstedt, 
2007, 2010). Nevertheless, the agency pushed ahead with several new policies including 
holding a public consultation on transparency in 2003, which proposed eleven new initiatives 
relating to, for instance its website, EPARs, interaction with stakeholders, introducing a 
question and answer document for patients, and others (EMA, 2003a). 
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EMA’s reflection book on its first ten years (EMA, 2005a) highlighted that up until 2005 (at 
least), the majority of stakeholders and interested parties continued to be impressed and happy 
with the agency’s commitment to transparency and independence (also see Louet, 2004). With 
that said, between 2001 and 2004 (i.e. during Lönngren’s first few years) there were some 
strong criticisms of the agency’s work and approach to transparency. Most notably, Silvio 
Garattini, from the Mario Negri Institute for Pharmacological Research, was particularly 
critical of the agency’s scientific work. Garattini (2005: 88), a former CPMP/CHMP member, 
argued that EMA had not moved quickly enough on transparency and lacked sufficient 
independence from industry:  
 
“Transparency is still far from being achieved. Too many promises have been made in 
these years, with very little change actually implemented”.  
 
Concerns were also expressed about the independence of the scientific committee including a 
distinct lack of scientific debate (e.g. suggestions of members favouring national interests), the 
undue influence and positon of the pharmaceutical industry on scientific decision-making, and 
the lack of transparency at the agency with arguments that EMA is secretive and that there is 
“no reason to hide data” essential for outsiders (e.g. to understand why a new drug has been 
approved) (Garattini and Bertele, 2007: 335; Garattini, 2005; Groenleer, 2009). Thus one main 
criticism was that the agency had moved too slowly on transparency and was not independent 
enough. 
 
In 2004 the new pharmaceutical regulation was passed into law (Regulation (EC) 726/2004, 
Directive 2004/27/EC, Directive 2004/28/EC). Along with providing the agency with wider 
responsibilities and strengthening its post marketing surveillance, the EU legislation placed a 
new emphasis on transparency and patient information with several legally binding 
requirements. These included: 
 
“…improve[ing] product related information [such as] publication of summary of the 
European public assessment report (EPAR) in a manner that is easily understandable 
to the public, the publication of withdrawals of marketing authorisation applications 
prior to an opinion, and the publication of marketing authorisations” (EMA, 2005b). 
 
In light of the new legislation, EMA’s management board agreed on a new strategic ‘Road Map 
to 2010’, which included a continued emphasis on transparency and communication (Louet, 
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2004; EMA, 2005c). The road map committed EMA to a step-wise increase in its transparency 
efforts and set-out how it would achieve its goals (EMA, 2005b, 2009). One particularly 
notable action was for the agency to: 
 
“Follow-up initiatives to improve the Agency’s transparency and communication, with 
special emphasis on the provision of useful, clear and comprehensive information to 
patients/users of medicines and health care professionals” (EMA, 2005b). 
 
Indeed, the 2010 document clearly emphasised that effective communication of information 
was central to its transparency policies.  
 
In the following four to five years, and in-line with its ‘Road Map to 2010’, the agency both 
met and went beyond its legal transparency requirements in both its scientific and non-scientific 
operations (EMA, 2009). Some of the most notable initiatives included publishing information 
on medicines that had been given ‘orphan’ (rare) drug status including the drug’s name and 
condition it treats (EMA, 2004), creating an EU public medicines database (EMA, 2005c), 
launching EudraPharm (which contains information on EU medicines) (EMA, 2006), 
publishing summaries of EPARs, question and answer documents, and information on 
withdrawn applications (EMA, 2006), as well as publishing peer-review articles with agency 
opinions and perspectives (EMA, 2008). The agency also created new policies on handling 
conflicts of interest and began publishing declarations of interest online (EMA, 2004). 
Furthermore, the agency’s commitment to interacting with stakeholders was further maintained 
and strengthened such as through introducing doctor and patient representatives onto the 
management board (EMA, 2006) and establishing two patient/consumer and healthcare 
professionals representatives working parties (the EMA Human Scientific Committees’ 
Working Party with Patients’ and Consumers’ Organisations and EMA/CHMP Working Group 
with Healthcare Professionals’ Organisations’) (EMA, 2006). 
 
However, along the way EMA met several important challenges with implementing its new 
initiatives (e.g. wider responsibilities, confidentiality issues). Indeed, the difficulties of 
enhancing transparency, as well as the delays in introducing new policies, contributed to 
Lönngren's 2010 reflections in Nature Reviews Drug Discovery on how transparency had 
developed at EMA during his leadership. When asked about his biggest regret Lönngren 
replied: 
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“We could have moved quicker on transparency, but it has not been easy to do so. There 
are conflicting legislations, and we also need to protect personal data as well as 
commercially confidential information. If we had been more proactive on this, I would 
have been happier.” (Mullard, 2010: 912).  
 
While some of these issues concerned confidentiality requirements, others included the 
challenges of consolidating the agency (EMA, 2007), the consequences of EU enlargement 
(EMA, 2004, 2007), and the new pharmaceutical legislation, as well as the substantial impacts 
of bird flu (EMA, 2007) and swine flu (EMA, 2009) on agency operations and especially 
resource consumption. In other words, although transparency was central to the agency’s work, 
other activities and difficulties slowed down EMA’s “step-wise” measures towards greater 
transparency detailed in its ‘Road Map to 2010’.  
 
Nevertheless, by the end of 2009 EMA released its long-awaited (draft) transparency policy 
for public consultation (EMA, 2009). This document elaborated on the agency’s transparency 
work and sought to bring together or “reconcile” its previous and future transparency activities 
into a single coherent policy document (EMA, 2009: 2). This includes clarifying the 
understanding that transparency is “pivotal” in building trust and confidence in agency 
operations while fulfilling “the right of EMA stakeholders for impartial and comprehensible 
information about medicines” (EMA, 2009: 1).  
 
(5.4) EMA comes under fire (2010) 
 
In 2010 the European pharmaceutical transparency landscape changed dramatically. In 
particular, two main issues emerged. One issue centred on two separate cases brought to the 
European ombudsman regarding public access to the data that underpins decision-making in 
EMA’s scientific committees. The first case concerns public access to scientific reports on 
clinical trials, “studies performed to investigate the safety and efficacy of a medicine” (EMA, 
2017g)32. On 29th June 2007, the Nordic Cochrane Centre applied for access to the full reports 
(and corresponding protocols) held by EMA for 15 clinical trials relating to two anti-obesity 
drugs (rimonabant and orlistat) (Gøtzsche and Jørgensen, 2011). The researchers request for 
                                                
32 To be clear, clinical trials are scientific studies performed to investigate the safety and efficacy of a medicine 
in human volunteers (EMA, 2017g). Pharmaceutical companies are required to submit detailed clinical study 
reports (typically hundreds of pages long) when seeking approval to market a medicine in Europe. Therefore they 
provide essential information for EMA’s scientific committees when coming to an opinion. 
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documents was first refused by EMA and then by Lönngren himself with both citing 
commercial confidentiality issues. In a strongly worded letter to Lönngren, the Danish 
researchers made clear that: 
 
“We believe the current lack of openness and transparency in EMA violates basic 
principles in the EU Treaty and must be changed, as it is also unethical. It is evident 
that this attitude leads to suboptimal treatment of the patients - and sometimes even to 
lethal harms - that could have been avoided.” (Jørgensen and Gøtzsche, 2007) 
 
After being refused access, they went on to lodge a complaint with the European ombudsman, 
which led to a three year and very public dispute between Cochrane and EMA with the 
ombudsman acting as an independent arbiter (Hampton, 2011). The ombudsman inspected the 
documents and disagreed with EMA by concluding they did not contain any overriding 
commercially confidential information (Ombudsman, 2010). On 19th May 2010, the 
ombudsman provided recommendations in favour of Cochrane: 
 
“…the agency gave insufficient reasons for its refusal to grant access […]. Patients’ 
welfare should be given priority over concerns for the commercial interests of the drug 
industry” (Diamandouros, 2010 In: Bouder et al., 2015). 
 
On 31st August 2010 (and after being accused of maladministration), EMA informed the 
ombudsman it would provide the researchers with the requested documents, which were later 
received in February 2011 (Gøtzsche and Jørgensen, 2011).  
 
The second case concerned public access to data on suspected adverse drug reactions33. In April 
2008, an Irish citizen requested access to various EMA ‘documents’ relating to a medicine used 
to treat severe forms of acne (Roaccutane). The documents contained details of all suspected 
adverse reactions made known to the agency since 1982 including so-called serious34 adverse 
reactions. Similar to the Cochrane clinical trial case, EMA refused access leading the citizen 
to complain to the ombudsman via an Irish law firm. EMA argued that (1) EU rules on 
transparency did not apply to suspected adverse reactions as they are not “documents” per se, 
                                                
33 An adverse reaction is “a response to a medicinal product which is noxious and unintended and which occurs 
at doses normally used in man for the prophylaxis, diagnosis or therapy of disease or for the restoration, correction 
or modification of physiological function” (Directive 2001/83/EC). 
34 A serious adverse reaction is “an adverse reaction which results in death, is life-threatening, requires inpatient 
hospitalization or prolongation of existing hospitalization, results in persistent or significant disability or 
incapacity, or is a congenital anomaly/birth defect” (Directive 2001/83/EC). 
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(2) providing access “would not benefit citizens because it could result in the circulation of 
data that could prove to be misleading or unreliable”, and (3) making such documents available 
would result in a “disproportionate” time and administrative resource burden for EMA (ibid, 
2010). However, the ombudsman again disagreed with EMA arguing that EU regulations 
should “apply to requests for all documents held by the agency” (albeit with some exceptions) 
and that this included suspected serious adverse reaction data (Ombudsman, 2010). In turn, 
EMA released the documents as requested.  
 
The second event that significantly impacted on EMA occurred when both Lönngren and 
Vincenzo Salvatore, EMA’s chief legal counsel, left the agency with accusations of a 
‘revolving door’ policy at the agency (Makhasvilli and Stephenson, 2013). Although there is 
debate about the concept, it is generally understood to mean that “agencies tasked with 
protecting the public come to identify with the regulated industry and protect its interests 
against that of the public” (Carpenter and Moss, 2013). Shortly after completing his ten years 
at the helm, Lönngren become an advisor at NDA, a consultancy that advises pharmaceutical 
companies (Jack, 2011). In June 2012, Vincenzo Salvatore also left the agency and, only a 
week later, became senior counsel at the Brussels offices of the US-based law firm, Sidley-
Austin (Jack, 2012). EMA was accused of not having a sufficient cooling off period for such 
senior officials. For instance, the Corporate European Observatory (CEO), a corporate 
lobbying campaign group, stated with regards to Lönngren:  
 
"This case is very shocking because of the seniority of the official concerned and the 
high risk of conflicts of interest. Initially EMA entirely failed to take Lönngren's new 
consultancy work seriously and to properly consider potential conflicts of interest, until 
the media raised concerns. Even then, EMA failed to impose a cooling off period or 
ban on Lönngren undertaking work for consultancy companies, and instead came up 
with a set of limited conditions (CEO, 2011).  
 
These two “revolving door” events subsequently had a significant impact on the agency’s 
credibility that should not be underestimated (Makhasvilli and Stephenson, 2013). In particular, 
they opened the doors to public criticism and demands for more transparency and access to 
documents at a time when EMA was already under close scrutiny from the ombudsman (see 
Lancet, 2010; Hampton, 2011). 
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(5.5) The new transparency era (2010-) 
 
In the wake of the ombudsman’s recommendations and criticisms of a ‘revolving-door’ policy, 
EMA’s first reaction was to create a new access to documents policy (EMA, 2010a). The new 
policy sought to give “wider access than ever before to documents held by the Agency, while 
ensur[ing] that personal data and commercially confidential information remain[ed] adequately 
protected” (EMA, 2010b: 17). Notably, the new policy was described as a ‘reactive’ approach 
to transparency as it enabled outsiders to obtain documents held by the agency on request35. 
The new reactive policy symbolised a major change of direction as outsiders could now view 
much greater quantities of information than ever before (Wieseler et al. 2012; Koenig et al. 
2014) or as Doshi et al. (2013: 1) put it: EMA’s 2010 access to documents policies 
“revolutionised the public’s ability to access trial data”. For example, in 2011 EMA reported 
that within its first year the new policy increased information requests by 92% and resulted in 
the release of more than 143 times more pages than in 2010 (EMA, 2011a). Furthermore, while 
in 2014 alone EMA reactively released 1,816 documents with 167,309 pages (Pott, 2015), in 
2015 the agency received 701 requests for access to documents and released 2,972 documents 
with 333,999 pages.  
 
The second main reaction came in October 2011 when EMA’s management board appointed 
Guido Rasi to replace Thomas Lönngren as its 3rd Executive Director. Rasi had previously dealt 
with difficult conflict of interest issues and was considered highly suitable for re-building trust 
in the European agency (Looney, 2012). In particular, he had been a strong advocate of 
transparency in his previous positon as head of the Italian Medicines Agency (AIFA) after his 
predecessor, Nello Maritini, along with five drug company lobbyists, had been fired following 
a six-week suspension in an apparent “drug licenses for cash scandal” (Day, 2008a).  
 
Rasi was immediately faced with several difficult issues. First, the ombudsman’s 
recommendations (on access to documents) and criticisms of a revolving door policy put great 
pressure on the agency and significantly impacted on its credibility as an independent drug 
regulator (Makhasvilli and Stephenson, 2013; Bouder et al. 2015). Notably, although the 
ombudsman’s recommendations were not legally binding, the rate of compliance among EU 
                                                
35 This can be contrasted with a ‘proactive’ transparency policy that might involve uploading data onto a publicly 
accessible web portal (i.e. without needing to request access). 
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decentralised agencies is consistently high, if not, absolute (Ombudsman, 2010). Second, two 
safety scandals, involving Mediator and PIP breast implants, had only recently occurred 
(Looney, 2012). Although member states were the primary targets of blame, the incidents 
resulted in serious questions about the European public health system and, in turn, increased 
responsibilities for EMA (especially concerning pharmacovigilance) (Looney, 2012). Third, in 
May 2011 the European Parliament “refused – by a decision of 637-to-4 to sign off the agency’s 
accounts” (Makhasvilli and Stephenson, 2013: 5). The European Parliament Budget 
Committee went on to conduct an investigation into EMA’s finances as well as its 
independence from the pharmaceutical industry and demanded that as Looney (2012) put it: 
“[EMA] self-initiate changes to advance trust through transparency, or it will be imposed”. Fourth, 
shortly after EMA launched its reactive access to documents policy, the pharmaceutical 
portfolio moved from DG Industry and Enterprise to the Health and Consumer Policy 
Directorate (DGSANCO), which, according to Löfstedt and Bouder (2014), “is known to 
favour the interests of patients and consumers over industry”. These scandals, incidents, and 
changes collectively put Rasi in a difficult position early on with outside observers making 
clear that transparency and trust were “in short supply” (Looney, 2015).  
 
Over the following five years, Rasi made at least three major changes to EMA’s transparency 
strategy. First, the agency began strongly emphasising how it was open to making as much 
information as possible publicly available. For instance, in Rasi’s first annual report he 
emphasised the sheer quantity of information being made public: 
 
“[In 2011,] nowhere was the impact of the agency's much more proactive approach to 
transparency experienced more dramatically than in relation to the agency's handling 
of requests for access to documents. During the course of the first full year of operation 
of the new access-to-documents policy, the agency released more than 1,000,000 pages 
in response to requests.” (EMA, 2011a). 
 
Rasi also consistently made statements such as “wider public access than ever before” (EMA, 
2010b) or “unprecedented levels of access” (EMA, 2014a).  
 
The second major change was the introduction of a remarkable wave of new transparency 
policies. Many of these expanded the agency’s traditional approach such as by further engaging 
stakeholders and interested parties. For example, workshops were conducted on transparency 
in 2012 and conflicts of interest in 2013 and five transparency advisory groups were set up in 
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2013, specifically focused on moving from reactive to more proactive policies (EMA, 2012b, 
2013b). The agency also introduced a new database of European experts (EMA, 2011a) and 
began publishing a list of all new medicines under evaluation by CHMP (EMA, 2012b). 
Moreover, EMA for the first time began providing much greater operational process 
transparency of its scientific committees. In particular, scientific committees began publishing 
its agendas and meeting minutes starting with the Paediatric Committee (PDCO) in 2012 and 
ending with CHMP by January 2014 (EMA, 2012b, 2014d). In 2013, the regulators made clear: 
 
“The starting point for publication of agendas (listing the agenda topics for discussion 
at the plenary meeting) and minutes of all EMA scientific committees is that everything 
is transparent” (EMA, 2013c). 
 
EMA also introduced patient and healthcare professional group representatives into its 
scientific decision-making for the first time and started discussing the idea of introducing 
public hearings, a forum where the public are invited to express their views on issues related 
to the safety of a medicine and guided by a pre-defined set of questions (EMA, 2016c: 2).  
 
Furthermore, in December 2010, the European Parliament and Council adopted new 
pharmacovigilance legislation that included new transparency requirements (Directive 
2010/84/EU; Regulation (EU) No 1235/2010)36. In turn, the agency established a new safety 
assessment and monitoring committee called the Pharmacovigilance Risk Assessment 
Committee (PRAC), which was viewed as a vehicle for enhancing transparency in itself37 
(EMA, 2012b). It was also required to “operate at a high level of transparency” with meeting 
minutes being systematically uploaded to EMA’s website (ema.europa.eu) starting with its 
very first meeting in September 2012 (EMA, 2012b).  
 
The third approach, however, received the most attention from outsiders and represented a 
major change of direction for the agency (Eichler et al. 2012, 2013; Bouder et al. 2015; Way 
et al. 2016). In particular, EMA introduced several new policies on proactively (rather than 
                                                
36 EMA (2015a) make clear that the implementation of the 2010 pharmacovigilance legislation in 2012 was 
strongly influenced by the ombudsman’s 2010 recommendations on providing access to suspected adverse 
reaction data for an Irish citizen (2493/2008/(BB)TS). 
37 Some authors include the creation of institutions and committees in themselves as a way of creating transparency 
such as by bringing together opaque and fragmented regulatory activities (e.g. Mitchell, 2011: 1882). For example, 
the European Food Safety Authority was established in 2002 in the wake of the BSE crisis as a way of building 
public trust by means of enhancing transparency in the previously fragmented food safety system (Way and 
Löfstedt, forthcoming). 
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reactively) publishing suspected adverse drug reaction and clinical trial data online (i.e. 
information the ombudsman had recommended EMA make more transparent in 2010) (Way et 
al. 2016). These two policy developments can be addressed in turn.  
 
Following the ombudsman’s 2010 recommendations (section 5.4), EMA began providing, for 
the first time, public access to a sub-set of data on suspected adverse drug reactions proactively 
from EudraVigilance, “[EMA’s] system for managing and analysing information on suspected 
adverse reactions to medicines which have been authorised in the EEA” (EMA, 2017h). In 
particular, in May 2012 EMA established a publicly accessible and searchable web-portal for 
viewing such data (adrreports.eu) and, over the following years, incrementally increased the 
level of access for all stakeholders including patients and healthcare professionals (EMA, 
2013b). Appendix D show four example screenshots of adrreports.eu for Deltyba (delamanid), 
a tuberculosis medicine authorised in 2014. To be clear, EudraVigilance was established in 
2001 for the use of pharmaceutical companies, the Commission, EMA and NCAs (e.g. to 
support the exchange and storage of suspected ADR reports) (Arlett et al. 2014; Fouretier et 
al. 2016). EMA began making different levels of information available to various groups in 
May 2012 and extended this access in September 2014 and December 2015 (EMA, 2017c).  
 
The second and, arguably, most significant change to EMA’s policies centred on four distinct 
levels of clinical trial data transparency (UK House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee, 2013) (Table 5.1). The first two are clinical trial registries (level 1) and summary-
level clinical trial results (level 2). Clinical trials are (ideally) registered on an online database, 
which provides a repository of all trials conducted and which includes basic information (level 
1). They often contain summary level clinical trial results (e.g. key trial conclusions) (level 2), 
which are also reported in medical journals (Smith, 2006).  
 
Table 5.1: Table showing four levels of clinical trial transparency. (Source: UK House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee, 2013: 34). 
Transparency Level Description 
Level 1: Clinical trial 
registration 
A record that the trial has been conducted, from a clinical trial register 
detailing basic trial information 
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Level 2: Summary-level 
clinical trial results 
A brief summary of the trial’s results, 
together with key conclusions, most commonly in an academic journal or trial 
register 
 
Level 3: Clinical study 
report (CSR) 
A detailed report, usually prepared for regulatory purposes, of the method, 
conduct and outcome of a trial, often running to several hundreds or 
thousands of pages in length 
 
Level 4: Individual patient 
data 
The raw patient data generated over the course of a trial, from which 
aggregate results and other conclusions are drawn. 
 
EMA had already established an electronic database called EudraCT, which contains 
information on clinical trials conducted for medicines authorised in the EU, Iceland, 
Lichtenstein, and Norway (Clinical Trials Directive [2001/20/EC]) (EMA, 2004). The database 
was not initially intended to provide clinical trial information to the public and healthcare 
professionals (Egger et al. 2013). Rather, it was established as a way of providing national 
authorities and the Commission with summary and administrative information (Egger, 2013: 
458). However, two subsequent EU regulations approved in 200438 and 200639 stipulated that 
information and results from the database should be made available to the public (i.e. beyond 
national regulators and the Commission) (Egger et al. 2013). Consequently, in March 2011 
EMA launched an online clinical trials register (clinicaltrialsregister.eu), which, for the first 
time, provided public access to a subset of summary clinical trial information from EudraCT 
(EMA, 2011a; Egger et al. 2013). This includes searchable summary results such as the 
objectives and design of the clinical trial study as well as the main results and conclusions 
(EMA, 2017g). Furthermore, in July 2014 EMA made it mandatory for trial sponsors to post 
clinical trial results in EMA’s EudraCT database. Hence EMA’s clinical trial register seeks to 
provide the public with summary level information on all clinical trials that have been or are 
being conducted. 
 
The second two levels of clinical trial transparency are clinical study reports (CSRs) (level 3) 
and individual patient data (IPD) (level 4) (Table 6.1). They both provide much more 
granulated levels of data about a clinical trial than registries and summary level trial results. 
                                                
38 Article 57(2) of Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 
39 Article 41 of the Paediatric Regulation (EC) No 1901/2006 
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While full CSRs contain “substantially more information and detail” on a medicine (e.g. the 
method, conduct and outcome of a trial) and can amount to hundreds or often thousands of 
pages (level 3) (Doshi et al. 2012: 1; Doshi and Jefferson, 2013b)40, individual patient level 
data goes further and includes the raw “individual data recorded for each participant in a 
clinical study” (Riley et al. 2010; Koenig et al. 2014). 
 
In contrast to levels 1 and 2, EMA’s approach to sharing CSRs and patient-level data received 
the lion’s share of attention and criticism from outsiders (see Chapter VI for a full discussion). 
In particular, many different groups took an interest in the agency’s policies including those 
vocally and publicly demanding that EMA enhance transparency. For example, EMA received 
substantial and continued interest from external researchers (e.g. the Cochrane Collaboration), 
campaign groups (e.g. AllTrials.net and Sense about Science), a succession of ombudsmen 
(e.g. Nikiforos Diamandouros and Emily O’Reilly), opinion leaders (e.g. Ben Goldacre), 
government committees (e.g. the UK House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee), scientific committees (e.g. the Institute of Medicine), medical journal editors (e.g. 
Fiona Godlee and the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors), pharmaceutical 
companies (e.g. GlaxoSmithKline, Johnson and Johnson, and Pfizer), trade bodies (e.g. 
PhRMA and EFPIA) and politicians (e.g. Glenis Willmott MEP). Collectively these actors put 
significant pressure on EMA and its approach to clinical trial transparency41. 
  
In this heated political context, at least four main milestones in EMA’s approach to sharing 
CSRs and individual patient-level data can be identified. The first major milestone came in 
April 2012 and notably in the wake of the ombudsman’s 2010 decision on clinical trial data. 
Researchers at the Cochrane Collaboration published an article in PLoS Medicine demanding 
that regulators and industry make full CSRs on the antiviral Tamiflu publicly available: 
 
“We challenge industry to either provide open access to clinical study reports or 
publicly defend their current position on RCT [randomised control trial] secrecy” 
(Doshi et al. 2012: 2) 
 
The researchers argued that full public access would enable a full independent re-analysis as 
they contain more detailed information than what is available in published journal articles. In 
                                                
40 Specifically EMA (2014b) make clear that clinical reports mean the clinical overviews and clinical summaries 
and the actual clinical study reports together with appendices to the CSRs. 
41 The arguments for and against different levels of clinical trial transparency are discussed in Chapter VI. 
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response, EMA regulators agreed that there were clear benefits from making clinical trial data 
“open to all” (e.g. benefits for public health) but also that there are important challenges and 
issues that need to be resolved such as patient confidentiality, conflicts of interest with 
‘independent’ re-analyses and misleading results causing public health scares (Eichler et al. 
2012). The regulators concluded by outlining a “way forward” that included developing 
standards for personal data protection, ensuring quality standards for re-analyses, and 
establishing rules of engagement (e.g. requiring researchers to submit a full data analysis plan) 
(Eichler et al. 2012).  
 
The second milestone came in November 2012 when EMA held a workshop on transparency 
and made clear that it would work towards developing a proactive clinical trial transparency 
policy (EMA, 2012a; Koenig et al. 2014). Although EMA would continue to manage a reactive 
approach on access to documents (i.e. through written requests), the new proactive approach 
involves uploading data onto a publicly accessible web portal (i.e. without needing to request 
access). As Rasi announced at the start of the workshop: 
 
"Today represents the first step in delivering our vision. We are not here to decide if 
we will publish clinical-trial data, only how. We need to do this in order to rebuild trust 
and confidence in the whole system." (Rasi, 2012). 
 
Workshop delegates went on to discuss issues such as commercial confidentiality, outsiders 
conducting poor analyses on large datasets and the potential benefits that could be gained from 
(re)analysing the data (EMA, 2012a; Way et al. 2016). In the following year, the agency 
established five advisory groups on topics of concern coming from the workshop and 
conducted a three month public consultation on its proactive policy that generated over 1,000 
comments from over 150 individuals and organisations.  
 
The third milestone came in October 2013 when EMA regulators published a perspective 
article in the New England Journal of Medicine, titled “Access to Patient-Level Trial Data – A 
Boon to Drug Developers” (Eichler et al. 2013). Whereas previously the agency was clear to 
emphasise concerns over proactively publishing CSRs (e.g. patient confidentiality and the 
misuse of data), the regulators set out detailed arguments explaining the expected benefits for 
the biopharmaceutical industry: 
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“It is ironic that the organizations that most resist wider access to data are the ones 
that stand to benefit so much from greater transparency” (Eichler et al. 2013: 1579). 
 
One contributory reason for the regulators’ article centred on their frustration over being sued 
by two pharmaceutical companies, AbbVie and InterMune, over reactively releasing several 
CSRs. Although the regulators ended up settling outside of court, a clear legal definition of 
commercial confidentiality was not agreed upon, which kept the door wide open for future 
cases. 
 
The fourth major milestone came on 2nd October 2014. After four years and a long consultation 
period (Koenig et al. 2014), EMA announced its final proactive CSRs policy (EMA, 2014a, 
2014b). The “landmark” policy would mean that, starting in January 2015, all clinical reports 
submitted to the agency by pharmaceutical companies would be published on an online 
database (EMA, 2014b; Löfstedt et al. 2015). In other words, ‘outsiders’ would be provided 
with unprecedented levels of access to the data and information that underpins decision-making 
in it scientific committees. On Christmas Day 2014, EMA regulators went on to explain the 
rationale behind its policy in the New England Journal of Medicine (Bonini et al. 2014) and 
subsequently published a question and answer document in 2015. The final policy also made a 
clear distinction between the sharing of CSRs and individual patient level data. In particular, 
the agency specified that further debate on the sharing of individual patient level data would 
be undertaken after an extended public consultation period (mainly due to patient 
anonymisation and de-identification challenges) (see Koenig et al. 2014). Overall, this fourth 
milestone symbolised a major change of direction from 2009 when EMA argued that 
information could not be made publicly available for commercial confidentiality reasons and 
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Chapter VI: EMA’s INPUT TRANSPARENCY POLICIES 
 
The historical analysis showed that between 2010 and 2016 EMA’s transparency strategy 
changed significantly (Chapter V). After introducing a new reactive access to documents policy 
in 2010, the agency went on to develop several new policies that centred on the proactive 
publication of the data and information that underpins decision-making in its scientific 
committees online. This was a major change of direction for EMA partly because the regulators 
began focusing on enhancing the transparency of scientific committee inputs, a transparency 
object largely omitted from its previous strategy.  
 
However, what the chapter did not provide was an explicit discussion of the goals and 
connected audiences of EMA’s most recent proactive input policies (Chapter II). For example, 
a discussion was not provided on the goals of enabling external researchers to re-use scientific 
committee data or empowering patients to make more informed medical decisions. Chapter V 
also did not place each of EMA’s proactive transparency policies within its broader context. 
For example, many other organisations have sought to enhance the transparency of scientific 
data used to inform decision-making such as the US FDA or World Health Organisation 
(WHO). What is needed now is an in-depth examination of the goals and audiences of EMA’s 
proactive transparency policies contextualised around wider efforts to enhance transparency in 
the pharmaceutical policy domain.  
 
This chapter examines the three main informational input transparency policies in-depth (i.e. 
the three embedded sub-units of analysis): 
 
1. Establishing an online clinical trials register called EU-CTR (clinicaltrialsregister.eu); 
2. Publishing summary-level clinical trial results on EU-CTR; 
3. Publishing clinical study reports online (clinicaldata.ema.europa.eu); 
 
To be clear the main purpose of the chapter is to display the case study evidence on each of 
these policies. A full evaluation of EMA’s input transparency is provided in Chapter VIII. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows. Clinical trials are first explained. All three policies are 
then discussed in turn contextualised around the broader pharmaceutical transparency context 
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(i.e. placing EMA’s policies among other related developments). In each section the goals and 
related audiences of each policy are examined. An understanding and analysis of the most 
significant developments and issues of each policy are then provided. Overall, the chapter 
shows that, although much discussion has focused on the impacts on external researchers and 
industry, there is little to no understanding of the perspectives of patients and medical doctors. 
The chapter will thus provide a point of departure for the third empirical chapter of this thesis 
(Chapter VII). 
 
(6.1) Clinical trial data 
 
Since 2010, EMA has focused on enhancing the transparency of data on clinical trials, “studies 
performed to investigate the safety or efficacy of a medicine” (EMA, 2017g). Clinical trials are 
essential for the drug licensing process as they provide detailed information on the safety and 
efficacy of a medicine pre-authorisation. In particular, randomised clinical trials, studies where 
“the subjects are randomly distributed into groups which are either subjected to the 
experimental procedure (as use of a drug) or which serve as controls” (Merriam-Webster, 
2016), are often considered the most rigorous way of testing the cause-effect relation between 
a medicine and its outcome (Sibbald and Roland, 1998; Hulley et al. 2013). Clinical trials can 
also be conducted post-authorisation in what EMA describe as post-authorisation safety 
studies. These studies are conducted to obtain further information on a medicine’s safety or to 
measure the effectiveness of various risk-management measures (e.g. preventing incorrect use) 
(EMA, 2017g). Crucially, EMA’s scientific committees – including CHMP and PRAC – rely 
on clinical trial data to inform evidence-based medical decision-making. For example, while 
CHMP analyse clinical trial data submitted by pharmaceutical companies applying for a 
marketing authorisation, PRAC are responsible for assessing the results of post-authorisation 
safety studies including post-authorisation clinical trials. 
 
(6.2) Clinical trial registration 
 
The first level of clinical trial transparency is registration (Chapter V) (Science and Technology 
Committee, 2013: 34). Clinical trial registers provide a record of authorised, on-going and 
completed trials. They typically include basic scientific and administrative information such as 
the medical condition being studied, a unique identifier number and contact details for 
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obtaining additional information (Dickersin and Rennie, 2003; Ghershi and Pang, 2009). In 
March 2011, EMA launched its own publicly accessible online register called EU-CTR 
(clinicaltrialsregister.eu) (EMA, 2011b). The register provides public access to a sub-set of 
information from EudraCT, EMA’s clinical trial database, on trials conducted in the EEA and 
EU member states (Egger et al. 2013), as well as certain trials conducted outside the EU/EEA 
(EMA, 2011b). Each record includes information on the design of the trial, the name of the 
sponsor, the investigational medicine, the therapeutic area, and its status (e.g. authorised, on-
going or complete) (EMA, 2017i). Figure 6.1 provides a screenshot of one such record in EU-
CTR, which examined “the effect of Thalidomide on sputum biomarkers in idiopathic 
pulmonary fibrosis cough”. To be clear, EMA’s register also contains summary-level results 
(level 2) but this is addressed separately in section 6.3. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Screenshot providing an example of a clinical trial record in EMA’s register (clinicaltrialsregister.eu). 
27/07/2016. Note: the trial protocol can be accessed (on the website) by clicking the blue ‘GB’ symbol. Source 
EMA (2017i) 
 
Clinical trial registration is neither new nor limited to EMA’s EU-CTR. One of the first 
searchable and computerised international registers, developed by the US National Institute of 
Mental Health, and which focused on psychopharmalogical agents, was launched in 1967 
(Disckersin and Rennie, 2003). A multiplicity of registers has since been created across the 
world including in the United States (ClinicalTrials.gov), Japan (Japan Primary Registries 
Network), China (Chinese Clinical Trials Registry), Thailand (Thai Clinical Trials Registry), 
South Korea (Clinical Research Information Service), Cuba (Cuban Public Registry of Clinical 
Trials), and many others (Zarin et al. 2015; WHO, 2017). Several speciality and regional 
registers have also been created (Dickersin and Rennie, 2003). For example, TrialsCentral 
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seeks to bring together all US registers onto one searchable web portal (Dickersin and Rennie, 
2003). As of 3rd August 2016, the FDA had the largest international register in the world 
(ClinicalTrials.gov) with over 221,602 studies registered from all 50 states and 192 countries42. 
In comparison, EMA’s register contained 47,090 trials43 (EMA, 2017i). EMA’s register 
therefore contributes to a global network of trial registers that have sought to increase clinical 
trial registration transparency since at least the 1960s (Dickersin and Rennie, 2003; Egger et 
al. 2013).  
 
EMA’s EU-CTR is also recognised as one of the WHO’s fourteen primary registries. Records 
in these primary registries are uploaded weekly onto the WHO’s International Clinical Trials 
Registry Platform (ICTRP), which seeks to bring together trial registration data onto a single 
point of access (Viergever and Li, 2015). All fourteen of these registries have to meet specific 
requirements (e.g. on content, quality, validity, and accessibility), which were agreed upon by 
the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE) (Angelis et al. 2004). WHO’s 
platform now contains one of the largest repositories of clinical trial records in the world. 
Therefore EMA plays a significant part in clinical trial registration especially considering EU-
CTR is also one of the largest contributors to WHO’s register (Viergever and Li, 2015),  
 
(6.2.1) Goals and audiences for level 1 
 
Trial registration is almost universally regarded as highly beneficial (Antes and Chalmers, 
2003; Angelis et al. 2004). For example, witnesses contributing to a prominent Science and 
Technology Committee report (2013) representing various groups (e.g. industry, regulation, 
the medical community and NGOs), unanimously gave support for trial registration 
transparency. The report went on to recommend that the UK government takes steps “to ensure 
that […] all clinical trials conducted in the UK, and all trials related to treatments used by the 
NHS are registered in a WHO-listed primary registry” (Science and Technology Committee, 
2013). Although there is disagreement over what can ultimately be achieved with registers, at 
least four main goals have been prominently discussed in the medical literature, which can each 
be connected to specific audiences (Table 6.1). To be sure, although many different groups 
                                                
42 See https://clinicaltrials.gov/ for updated figures. 
43 See https://www.clinicaltrialsregister.eu/ctr-search/search for updated figures 
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might benefit from trial registration, the audiences of transparency are those individuals, 
groups, and institutions that are expected to actually use a clinical trial register (Chapter II).  
 
Table 6.1: Four main goals and audiences of clinical trial registration  
Goals Target Audiences  
To better connect trialists with patients and hence speed up 
recruitment and drug discovery 
 
Patients and their doctors 
To provide a way of finding out what trials have been 
conducted, where, and by whom 
 
Trialists and medical 
researchers 
 
To minimise scientific issues with a trial before (e.g. its 
design) and after (e.g. post hoc hypothesis testing) it has 
been conducted  
 
Medical reviewers and 
researchers 
To help medical researchers obtain trial results (e.g. by 
contacting trialists) 
Medical researchers (e.g. 
systematic reviewers) 
 
One goal of registration is to provide patients wishing to participate in a clinical trial, and their 
doctors, with a way of finding out about recruitment opportunities (Table 6.1) (Dickersin and 
Rennie, 2001). For example, they can search an online register to identify trials that are 
recruiting patients with relevant medical conditions. In turn, connecting patients with trial 
recruiters seeks to speed up drug discovery and improve the clinical trial process through 
efficiency improvements (Antes and Chalmers, 2003; Ionnadis et al. 2014). For example, 
Dickersin and Rennie (2003) comment that one early argument for trial registration was to 
speed up a “cure for cancer” by making it easier for doctors and patients to find out which trials 
are recruiting (Hubbard and DeVita, 1987). Registers have great potential for providing 
recruitment information (Hudson and Collins, 2015) with the FDA’s register receiving an 
average of 207 million page views per month and 65,000 unique visitors daily as of October 
201544. Indeed, encouraging patients to participate in clinical trials and making it easier for 
them to enrol is a highly desirable and on-going goal for the progression of medical research 
(Heywood et al. 2015).  
 
                                                
44 Comparative data on EU-CTR were not available. 
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A second goal is to provide people who are intimately involved in a trial (hereafter ‘trialists’) 
as well as medical reviewers (e.g. individuals on ethical review boards or health technology 
assessors) with a way of knowing about authorised, on-going, and completed trials (Table 6.1). 
As Viergever and Li (2015: 8) put it, they can find out “what clinical trial research is being 
conducted, where it is being conducted, by whom and how”. Vice versa, if trials are not 
registered then it can be difficult, if not impossible, to reliably identify all trials by other means 
such as by searching medical journals or conference abstracts (Institute of Medicine, 2015; 
Dickersin and Rennie, 2003). For trialists, studies found in registers can inform future designs 
and hence increase the value of research. This is also expected to help prevent the unnecessary 
duplication of research effort and thus enable trial sponsors to put resources into other study 
designs or activities (Siontis et al. 2013; Moher et al. 2014; Chan et al. 2014). For reviewers, 
registers can inform decision-making (e.g. whether a trial should be approved or not) by 
providing an understanding of what similar work relevant to a proposed new trial exists (Laine 
et al. 2007). Registers are therefore expected to provide many benefits for the scientific clinical 
trial process and drug discovery (Chan et al. 2014; Moher et al. 2014; Institute of Medicine, 
2015).  
 
A third goal is to enable medical reviewers and researchers to identify issues with trials both 
before and after they have been performed (Table 6.1) (Rottingen et al. 2013; Viergever et al. 
2013). Crucially, many registers require the prospective inclusion of study protocols, “a 
detailed account of the hypothesis, rationale and methodology” of a clinical trial (Godlee, 
2001). Before trials are conducted, protocols can enable reviewers and researchers to identify 
issues early in the process and offer suggestions for improvement (e.g. how to improve study 
designs) (Godlee, 2001). After trial completion, prospectively recorded protocols can be 
compared with the results reported by investigators (e.g. in medical journals). Medical 
reviewers and researchers can therefore identify discrepancies between what trialists planned 
to do and what was actually done and reportedly found. This is expected to help minimise 
issues such as selective reporting, unreported outcomes, and post hoc amendments, three issues 
that are known to create biases in the published medical literature (Lumey, 2001, Ioannidis, 
2005; Song et al. 2010; Ross et al. 2012). For example, ‘data dredging’ occurs when trialists 
mine through data to find statistically significant trends rather than test a hypothesis detailed 
in the original protocol (Lumey, 2001; Ioannidis, 2005; Ross et al. 2012). Others have also 
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argued that trialists would be deterred from activities such as selective reporting if protocols 
are recorded in trial registers prospectively (Chan et al. 2004; Jones et al. 2013).  
 
A fourth goal is to enable medical researchers (e.g. systematic reviewers) with a way of 
identifying and obtaining unreported trial results (e.g. by using contact details found in 
registers) (Table 6.1). Past studies have shown that many trials are never published in medical 
journals with some estimates of around 50% of completed trials having unreported results 
(Turner et al. 2008; Vedula et al. 2009; Chan et al. 2014; Ioannidis et al. 2014). If trials are 
prospectively registered then medical researchers can monitor whether the results have been 
published and chase up trialists that have not done so (Chalmers, 2006; McGee et al. 2011; 
Chalmers et al. 2013). For example, one of the first studies examining trial registration (Simes, 
1986) used a registry of cancer trials – the International Cancer Research Data Bank – to obtain 
unreported trial results from the original investigators via letter. Trial registration and summary 
level results reporting can therefore have a complementary relationship or, as Jones et al. 
(2013: 2) put it:  
 
“…trial registration can increase awareness of possible publication bias within the 
medical literature by allowing the public to compare the subset of trials with published 
results to the total number of trials that were registered and conducted”.  
 
Therefore trial registration seeks to contribute towards mitigating the selective reporting of trial 
results in the medical literature, an issue discussed in more detail in section 6.3. 
 
(6.2.2) Tackling non-compliance 
 
Despite almost universal agreement that trial registration has important benefits, there are 
several issues that limit their effectiveness. All of these issues are relevant to EMA’s register. 
Some concern registers themselves such as issues with their searchability and the need to bring 
all databases together (Glanville et al. 2014; Viergever and Li, 2015). However, two of the 
most significant issues centre on non-compliance. The first non-compliance issue is that many 
studies have collectively shown that around 40% of published trials – such as those found in 
medical journals and conference abstracts – have never been registered (Song et al. 2010; 
McGee et al. 2011; de Wetering et al. 2012; Freshwater et al. 2013; Vivergener and Li, 2015; 
Miller et al. 2015). For example, van de Wetering et al. (2012) examined a sample of 
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publications on MEDLINE, one of the largest databases of abstracts and citations in the medical 
field, and found that 39% of published randomised clinical trials had not been registered45. 
There is therefore clear evidence that registers do not provide a full record of all trials 
conducted. 
 
The second non-compliance issue is that many trials that have been registered are recorded 
poorly. In particular, several studies have shown that records can be inaccurate (e.g. incorrect 
information), incomplete (e.g. missing protocols), not up-to-date, or contain trials that were 
registered retrospectively (rather than prospectively) (Viergever et al. 2014; Viergever and 
Ghershi, 2011; Piffner et al. 2014). For example, Viergever and Li (2015) found that 48% of 
trials registered in 2012 had been done so retrospectively. These data quality issues present a 
significant problem as most of the aforementioned goals cannot be achieved without accurate, 
complete and prospective registration (Simes, 1986). For example, the goals of connecting 
patients with recruiters, enabling reviewers to search for trials (e.g. to inform decision-making), 
minimising selective reporting, and enabling researchers to chase up study results require high 
quality and accurate records.  
 
In seeking to address non-compliance issues in particular, several major developments have 
occurred since the late 1990s (Chalmers, 2006). Many of these have been influential including 
self-regulation at universities, requiring registration as a condition of ethical approval, and 
enforcement of registration by funders (see Viergever and Li, 2015 for a discussion; Bian and 
Wu, 2010; Chalmers, 2013). However, three frequently cited milestones have been particularly 
significant in improving registration rates. First, legislation has been passed in both the US and 
EU to make trial registration a legal obligation for most trials (Weber et al. 2015). In the US, 
the FDA Modernisation Act of 1997 introduced the requirement that all trials “for serious or 
life threatening conditions” must be registered on ClinicalTrials.gov (Zarin et al. 2005, 2011, 
2015). More recently, and following the passing of the FDA Amendments Act of 2007, more 
types of trials were required to be recorded on FDA’s register. The agency also gained the 
power to give monetary penalties of up to $10,000 a day for non-compliance (Zarin et al. 2005, 
2011, 2015). This led, in the following year, to annual registration rates in North America rising 
to its highest level (Viergever and Li, 2015).  
                                                
45 Indeed, this figure does not include clinical trials that were never published in medical journals or not indexed 
on MEDLINE. 




Second, many medical journal editors have made it mandatory for trials to be prospectively 
registered in order even to be considered for publication. Most notably, in 2005 the ICMJE 
introduced the requirement that “all clinical trials must be registered at a clinical trial registry 
to be eligible for publication” (Viergever and Li, 2015: 2; Angelis et al. 2004; Zarin et al. 2005; 
Laine et al. 2007; van de Wetering et al. 2012). This is important as the ICMJE have eleven 
major biomedical journal members including the ‘big five’46 and a large number of non-
member journals that follow their requirements (ICJME, 2017). Indeed, several authors have 
argued that ICMJE’s requirements have been one of the most successful ways of improving 
registration rates (Song et al. 2010; Zarin et al. 2015; Vivegever and Li, 2015). 
 
Third, several international organisations have made strong declarations to encourage trial 
registration. In particular, in 2008 the World Medical Association amended the declaration of 
Helsinki, a set of ethical principles regarding human experimentation, to include two new 
principles, which made clinical trial registration an ethical obligation (Zarin et al. 2015). The 
most relevant paragraph, modified in 2013, states:  
 
“Every research study involving human subjects must be registered in a publicly 
accessible database before recruitment of the first subject” (World Medical 
Association, 2013).  
 
Elevating clinical trial registration to an ethical obligation is significant considering the 
Helsinki declaration is widely considered in the medical community to be the “cornerstone 
document for human research ethics” (Shrestha, 2012: 256). 
 
Several studies have shown that these developments and others have significantly increased at 
least the number or quantity of trials registered (Figure 6.1) (Reveiz et al. 2007; van de 
Wetering et al. 2012; Zarin et al. 2015; Viergever and Li, 2015). For example, Viergever and 
Li (2015) analysed clinical trial registration rates in WHO’s registry network platform (ICTRP) 
since the ICMJE’s journal publication criteria were announced in 2004 (Angelis et al. 2004). 
The study found that registration greatly increased in the ICTRP from 3,294 annual trials 
registered in 2004 to 23,385 in 2013. The sharpest rise was also between 2004 and 2005 when 
                                                
46 These are the Lancet, Annals of Internal Medicine, the British Medical Journal (BMJ), the New England Journal 
of Medicine (NEJM) and the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA). 
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ICMJE introduced its new requirements (Angelis et al. 2004; Viergever and Li, 2015). 
Similarly, Zarin et al. (2015) chart a significant cumulative increase in the number of registered 
trials in ClinicalTrials.gov since its creation in February 2000 until September 2014. The 
analysis also found that the most substantial increase in registration rates came after the 
ICMJE’s new requirements were announced in 2004. In other words, both studies show that 
the ICMJE’s requirement of making registration a criteria of publication significantly and 
notably increased registration rates. 
 
Despite these improvements, there remain significant issues with non-compliance. Although 
Viergever and Li (2015) found that registration rates increased five-fold globally between 2004 
and 2013, the study also found that these improvements did not occur equally in all parts of the 
world. For example, improvements in registration rates have been more gradual in Asia. The 
study also found that many studies were registered retrospectively during this period, which 
strongly impacts on the usefulness of trial registers to achieve any of the four main goals. For 
example, issues with selective reporting and post hoc hypothesis testing cannot be addressed. 
Another recent study (Miller et al. 2015) provided a cross-sectional analysis of all clinical trials 
submitted to the FDA for approval in 2012 that were sponsored by pharmaceutical companies. 
The study found that out of 15 drugs sponsored by industry that had a total of 318 relevant 
trials, a median of 57% of trials were registered per drug (i.e. 43% of trials were not registered) 
(Miller et al. 2015). Thus these studies provide further evidence that non-compliance with trial 
registration remains a significant issue.  
 
Considering trial registration has become a legal and ethical obligation in many countries 
across the world, it would seem perhaps surprising that registration rates are not significantly 
higher. One issue has centred on legal requirements. Some authors have pointed out that there 
has been a lack of enforcement. For example, although FDA have the power to fine up to 
$10,000 a day they have never done so and their powers only reach to US-based trials. Others 
have argued that there has been a lack of applicability in the law across different jurisdictions. 
For example, although new laws have been introduced across the world such as in Europe, the 
US, Canada, Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel and South Africa, the majority of low and middle 
income countries have not introduced legislation on clinical trial registration.  
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A second issue is that there has been a lack of widespread implementation of some of the most 
successful initiatives (Bian and Wu, 2010). The ICJME’s requirements have been one of the 
most successful initiatives to date to improve trial registration. However, only 30% of English 
language journals actually require registration and many of those that do require registration 
do not check for compliance (Wager and Williams, 2013). Other successful initiatives such as 
mandating registration as a condition for ethical approval has also lacked widespread 
implementation (Bian and Wu, 2010).  
 
A third issue is that there have been technical and resource-based difficulties for trialists. For 
example, editors at the BMJ have asked why some trialists seeking publication have not 
registered trials prospectively (Weber et al. 2015). Responses from researchers include unclear 
responsibilities among trialists (e.g. principal investigators assuming others will register a trial) 
or that registration is overly burdensome (e.g. lack of resources for non-industry sponsored 
studies) (Weber et al. 2015). For example, one large foundation was asked why they did not 
register their trial and responded: 
 
“[The reason to require registration is] mainly to stop drug companies. [The principal 
investigator] is a developing country scientist doing this important study alongside a 
very busy job. Drug companies have whole departments devoted to compliance with 
regulations and processes like this” (Weber et al. 2015). 
 
There are also many other local and regional issues that have led to reducing the impact of legal 
and ethical obligations to enhance clinical trial transparency (Bian and Wu, 2010; Vivergener 
and Li, 2015; Miller et al. 2015; Weber et al. 2015). 
 
(6.3) Summary-level trial results 
 
The second level of clinical trial transparency is the reporting of summary-level results (level 
2). Summary results refer to the “relatively basic information needed to understand the outcome 
and potential implications of a clinical trial” (Science and Technology Committee, 2013: 36). 
They typically include an explanation of its aims, methods, results, and statistical findings (ibid, 
2013). In other words, they go beyond the basic administration information prospectively 
recorded in a register to include information on the outcomes of a completed trial. Although 
summary results can also be found in conference abstracts, working papers, dissertations, and 
reports (Song et al. 2010), they are more formally reported in medical journals (e.g. one of the 
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big five) and, more recently, registers (e.g. EU-CTR or ClinicalTrials.gov) (EMA, 2013d, Zarin 
et al. 2015). Appendix E provides an example of one such summary-level record for a vaccine 
trial that ended in 2007 and was first reported in EU-CTR in 2014. The record is 16 pages long 
and includes an identification number as well as details on subject dispositions, baseline 
characteristics, end points, adverse events, and others.  
 
Medical journals have historically been the primary mode of disseminating summary-level trial 
results and are used by various audiences (Hagdrup et al. 1998; Craig et al. 2001; Dickersin 
and Rennie, 2003; Turner et al. 2008; Chan et al. 2014). This includes medical researchers, 
policy and healthcare decision-makers, and medical doctors as well as trial participants and 
some patients. However, over the past few decades trial registers have increasingly been used 
as a mode of disseminating summary results. In particular, EMA and FDA have mandated that 
the results of certain trials are reported in EU-CTR or ClinicalTrials.gov, respectively (FDA 
Amendments Act, 2007; EMA, 2014d).  
 
After establishing a publicly accessible online register in 2011 (see section 6.2), EMA 
subsequently began encouraging trial sponsors to voluntarily upload summary results onto 
EudraCT in 2013. In so doing, outsiders could access the results of trials voluntarily recorded 
on EU-CTR via the EU-CTR web-portal (clinicaltrialsregister.eu). In July 2014, EMA made it 
mandatory for sponsors to post results in EudraCT either six months or one year after trial 
completion or premature termination (Clinical Trial Directive 2001/20/EC; EMA, 2014d). 
Recent EU clinical trial regulations go further by requiring that trial sponsors upload a results 
summary for medical experts within one year of trial completion and an additional summary 
written in ‘plain language’ for ‘laypersons’ (Clinical Trial Regulation EU no. 536/2014) 
(Abou-El-Enein and Schneider, 2016). Therefore the new regulation as well as other initiatives 
introduced by EMA (and the Commission) seek to enhance the transparency of summary level 
results for both expert and lay audiences, although ‘layperson’ summaries were still under 
consultation when this thesis was being finalised (see Health Research Authority, 2016).  
 
(6.3.1) Goals and audiences for level 2 
 
The overriding reason for mandating that results are reported in registers centres on several 
issues with medical journals as a mode of dissemination. In particular, registers primarily seek 
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to overcome important limitations associated with medical journals that have resulted in the 
‘invisibility’ of trial findings in the published literature (Song et al. 2010). There are at least 
five main goals of reporting results in registers, including EMA’s EU-CTR, that seek to 
overcome these issues (Table 6.2).  
  
Table 6.2: Five main goals and connected audiences of summary-level results reporting 
Goals Target Audiences 
Nonpublication: To improve issues of publication bias 
 
Medical researchers 
Nonpublication: To improve the timeliness of trial reporting Medical researchers 
Nonpublication: To improve outcome reporting Medical researchers 
To provide a structured and standardised format for 
reporting results 
All users of trial results 
To inform participants, medicine-users, and healthcare 
professionals about the results of clinical trials 
Trial participants, 
patients, and healthcare 
professionals 
 
The overriding goal of register reporting is to improve the issue of nonpublication in medical 
journals (Table 6.2) (Chan et al. 2014; Zarin et al. 2015). A key advantage of trial registers, as 
a mode of results dissemination, is that they enable regulators to mandate publication (e.g. 
through legal requirements and powers to fine trialists) (EMA, 2014d; Zarin et al. 2015). This 
is important because, since at least the 1970s (e.g. Rosenthal, 1979), numerous studies have 
shown that the results of many trials are never reported in medical journals even many years 
after study completion (Turner et al. 2008; Song et al. 2000, 2010; Dwan et al. 2008, 2013; 
Schmucker et al. 2014; Chan et al. 2014). This includes a range of trial types including adult 
and paediatric populations, with under-reporting rates predominately ranging between 25% and 
45% (Pica and Bourgeois, 2016). For example, Jones et al. (2013) found that out of 585 
completed trials, prospectively registered on ClinicalTrials.gov and all of which included at 
least 500 participants, 171 (29%) had not been published in any medical journal surveyed. 
Medical journals therefore suffer from under-reporting and, as Hudson and Collins (2015: 355) 
put it:  
 
“Other means to share [trial] data are necessary because of both real and potential 
harm can result from failure to fully disclose the results of clinical trials”. 
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This means that EMA and FDA seek to improve the dissemination of trial results through 
mandating results reporting in EU-CTR or ClinicalTrials.gov, respectively.  
 
Following this nonpublication issue, the first main goal of reporting summary results in trial 
registers is to increase the reporting of both negative and positive trial results (Table 6.2) 
(Dickersin, 1997; Song et al. 2010). Along with improving reporting in general, a key 
advantage of trial registers is that (1) it is free to upload results and (2) decisions to report are 
expected note to be significantly influenced by the nature or direction of the trial’s results (e.g. 
whether results support the investigated medicine or not). This is viewed as a key advantage of 
registers as many studies examining reporting rates have shown that medical journal non-
publication is strongly linked to publication bias, “the publication or non-publication of 
research findings, depending on the nature and direction of the results” (Sterne et al. 2011: 2). 
There is strong evidence – both direct (e.g. cohort studies of proposals submitted to review 
boards) and indirect (e.g. surveys of published results) – that trials with statistically significant 
or positive results are more likely to be published in medical journals than those with 
statistically insignificant or negative results (Dwan et al. 2008, 2013; Song et al. 2000, 2010; 
Chan et al. 2014; Dickersin, 1997; Turner et al. 2008; Manzoli et al. 2014). An updated 2012 
systematic review, for example, found that positive results were more likely to be published in 
medical journals than negative results in all fifteen recent studies examined (Dwan et al. 2008, 
2013). There is also evidence that industry are more likely to publish positive rather than 
negative results leading to questions of conflicts of interest in the medical literature (Naci and 
Ioannidis, 2015). EMA’s register therefore seeks to improve the dissemination of both positive 
and negative results through mandating register reporting regardless of the results.  
 
A second main goal of registers is to improve the timeliness of trial reporting (Table 6.2). 
Register reporting seeks to ensure that trial results are published without delay regardless of 
whether they are positive or negative. An important advantage is that the regulators (or medical 
researchers) can monitor how quickly or slowly a trial sponsor or principal investigator 
publishes results after study completion. This is because, in Europe and the US, trials are 
required to be registered prospectively (that is, before recruiting the first participant) and with 
a stated date of completion. This is particularly important because many studies have shown 
that medical journals suffer from time-lag bias, “the rapid or delayed publication of research 
findings, depending on the nature and direction of the results” (Sterne et al. 2011: 2). Since 
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Ioannadis (1998) first raised the issue, a strong evidence base has shown that trials with positive 
results are likely to be published more rapidly than those with negative results (Ioannidis, 2001; 
Trikalinos et al. 2004; Decullier et al. 2005; Scherer et al. 2007; Hopewell et al. 2007; Manzoli 
et al. 2014; Chen et al. 2016). For example, Hopewell (2007) found that on average positive 
results are published approximately 2-3 years earlier than trials with negative results. This time-
lag bias can significantly affect medical decision-making. For example, Manzoli et al. (2014) 
argue that delays in reporting vaccine trial results during an epidemic can distort the evidence 
needed for recommendations, allocation of resources, stockpiling of medicines, and other 
public health action. Therefore EMA seeks to mitigate time-lag bias through mandating that 
results are reported in trial registers within pre-defined time frames, which is typically 6 months 
to 1 year after study completion but varies between trials. 
 
A third main goal of register reporting is to ensure that all trial outcomes are published 
regardless of whether they have positive or negative results (Table 6.2). A key advantage of 
reporting results, at the place a trial was registered (i.e. with the original registration 
information), is that the regulators are able to request that trialists include information on all 
outcomes included in the trial protocol (assuming the protocol was prospectively registered). 
This is important because many studies have found that medical journals suffer from outcome-
reporting bias, “the selective reporting of some outcomes but not others, depending on the 
nature and direction of the results” (Sterne et al. 2011: 2; Chan et al. 2004; Dwan et al. 2008, 
2013). There is strong evidence that positive outcomes are more likely to be exaggerated and 
negative outcomes are less likely to be reported altogether (Saquib et al. 2013; Jones et al. 
2013; Roasti et al. 2016; Ioannidis et al. 2017). For example, while one review found that 
statistically significant outcomes were more likely to be completely reported than non-
significant outcomes (Dwan et al. 2013), another found that there is large diversity “on whether 
and how analyses of primary outcomes are adjusted in randomised control trials” (Saquib et al. 
2013). Furthermore, when results are reported at the place of registration there is a 
complementary relationship between registering trials prospectively and mitigating outcome 
reporting bias (section 6.2). For example, medical researchers can identify when trials were 
originally registered, what outcomes were supposed to be reported, and what outcomes were 
actually reported. Therefore EMA seeks to mitigate outcome-reporting bias such as by 
requesting further information from trialists relating to unreported outcomes.  
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By mandating that results are reported in registers, whether they are positive or negative, the 
regulators, in turn, seek to achieve several secondary goals. First, register reporting seeks to 
reduce the wastage of scientific resources (Chan et al. 2014). If results, and especially negative 
results, are not reported then trialists may unnecessarily repeat a trial that is doomed to fail 
(Chalmers et al. 2014). Others have argued that there would be better resource allocation for 
clinical trials, less redundant research conducted (e.g. duplicating trial results), less research 
that is ‘misguided’ and better prioritisation of research questions and study designs (Chan et 
al. 2014). Rottingen et al. (2013) estimate that 240 billion US dollars are wasted annually due 
to non-publication. Chalmers and Glasiou (2009) argue that around 85% of research investment 
is wasted for various reasons and better summary level results transparency is expected to 
contribute towards solving this issue. Trial register reporting is therefore expected to help 
tackle non-publication and associated biases, which can significantly waste scientific resources 
(Chalmers et al. 2014; Ioannadis et al. 2014). 
 
Second, register reporting seeks to reduce unnecessary harm to participants (Zarin and Tse, 
2008; Gabler et al. 2012; Chan et al. 2014; Farrar et al. 2014; Ventetuolo et al. 2014; Institute 
of Medicine, 2015). Many authors have argued that if terminated trials or negative results are 
not published then participants can be harmed (see Hwang et al. 2016 for a discussion). For 
example, numerous actors point to a failed phase 1 trial conducted in 2006 at Northwick Park 
Hospital in London (Zarin and Tse, 2008). The trial was on a super-monoclonal antibody called 
TGN1412 and caused “catastrophic multisystem failure” for eight healthy volunteers 
(Goodyear, 2006). Arguably the incident could have been avoided if the results of a similar 
study, taking place over a decade earlier, were made available to the investigators (Goodyear, 
2006). Some have gone further arguing that this also applies to failed phase 3 clinical trials, 
which can inform “clinical practice, regulatory decisions and future research” including study 
designs that are less likely to harm future participants (Hwang et al. 2016).  
 
Third, register reporting seeks to facilitate and improve systematic reviews and other analyses 
of the literature. A key issue with non-publication is that systematic literature reviews, that 
many consider as the ‘gold standard’ for scientific research on the safety and efficacy of 
medicines (Dickersin and Rennie, 2003; Doshi et al. 2012), rely on analysing both positive and 
negative results. If trials with negative results are less likely to be disseminated in medical 
journals, then researchers can identify spurious beneficial effects of a medicine or miss 
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important adverse events (Sterne et al. 2011). In turn, decision-makers that rely on systematic 
reviews – such as medical doctors and health technology assessors – may make ill-informed 
decisions (Whittington et al. 2004; Kyzas et al. 2005; Sterne et al. 2011). As Turner et al. 
(2008: 253) put it: non-publication can “result in unrealistic estimates of drug effectiveness and 
alter the apparent benefit-risk balance”. 
 
Beyond issues with non-publication and associated biases, a fourth main goal of register 
reporting is to provide a standardised and structured format for reporting trial results (Table 
6.2) (Altman, 2015). Indeed, EMA’s register provides such a standardised and structured 
format (see Appendix E) (EMA, 2017i). This is expected to provide benefits such as trialists 
avoiding missing important information through standardisation and medical researchers being 
able to find key methodological details (Altman, 2015): 
 
“...using templates and mandatory reporting of some elements may facilitate the work 
of researchers by reminding them what they need to report and by standardising their 
reporting” (Riveros et al. 2013) 
 
This is important as there is evidence that trials can be reported poorly in medical journals and 
that key information can be excluded unintentionally and left unidentified by peer-reviewers 
(Wharton, 2015; Weissgerber et al. 2016). Standardisation in trial registers is expected to better 
aid researchers in interpreting results and designing future studies. For example, some have 
argued that results reported in trial registers are more complete than in journal articles (Riveros 
et al. 2013; Hartung et al. 2014), although this has been strongly contested (Manzoli et al. 
2014: 5). Nevertheless, EMA’s register has the ability to standardise results reporting in a more 
structured format than is provided in medical journal articles. 
 
A fourth main goal of register reporting is to better inform trial participants, patients, and 
healthcare professionals about trial results (Table 6.2) (International Alliance of Patients’ 
Organisations, 2013; Chan et al. 2014; Institute of Medicine, 2015). At least some participants 
want access to trial results (e.g. to see how they contributed) and many consider this an ethical 
imperative (Fernandez et al. 2003), although there is disagreement (e.g. over what should be 
shared and how) (see Miller et al. 2008 for a discussion; Bredenoord et al. 2015). For example, 
as the European Public Health Alliance (EPHA), a public health NGO with 92 member 
organisations based in 21 countries, strongly argue: 




“Given that participants in clinical trials act out of solidarity by offering their time and 
bodies for the benefit of society at large, it is an ethical obligation to make clinical 
trials results available” (EPHA, 2013). 
 
There is also evidence that some patients, and especially those with statistical or medical 
backgrounds, need access to results to inform decision-making (Liberati, 2004; Fischhoff et al. 
2011; Woloshin and Schwartz, 2013). As Ben Goldacre, a doctor and influential opinion leader, 
argued when giving evidence to the UK House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee (2013): 
 
“Healthcare professionals and patients need the results of clinical trials to make 
informed choices about which treatment is best”. 
 
Medical journals can, however; be a poor way of disseminating results to participants, patients 
and healthcare professionals. One issue is that nonpublication and associated biases means that 
none of them will be able to access unpublished results. This is especially the case for trials 
with negative results or that were discontinued (Pica and Bourgeois, 2016). For example, 
Turner et al. (2008) found that among 74 studies examined 34% were not published, which 
means that for 3,449 participants trial results were inaccessible through medical journals. 
Participants, patients, and healthcare professionals can also find results difficult to access even 
when they are published in medical journals. For example, many medical journals are 
unaffordable because they have expensive subscription fees and pay walls (Van Noorden, 
2013). The University of Alberta library recently released data on its annual journal 
subscriptions, which showed that the University spent over 15 million Canadian dollars on 
annual journal subscriptions in 2016 with $2,393,657.19 spent on ScienceDirect alone 
(University of Alberta, 2016). Trial participants and patients, in particular, are also unlikely to 
be equipped to understand medical journal articles especially if they are unfamiliar with them 
and do not have statistical or medical training. Therefore EMA seeks to use freely and publicly 
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(6.3.2) Quantity and quality issues 
 
There has been strong and growing support for reporting trial results in registers over the past 
two decades (Zarin et al. 2015). This has been accompanied by legislative and regulatory 
changes in Europe and the US (FDA Amendments Act, 2007; EMA, 2014d). Reporting 
summary levels results has also been discussed as an ethical issue (Zarin and Tse, 2008). 
Perhaps most notably, the World Medical Association revised the Declaration of Helsinki in 
2013 to elevate summary-level results reporting, regardless of whether results are positive or 
negative, to an ethical obligation: 
 
“Authors have a duty to make publicly available the results of their research on human 
subjects and are accountable for the completeness and accuracy of their reports” 
(World Medical Association, 2013). 
 
Concerted efforts have also been made to mitigate under-reporting and associated 
dissemination biases in medical journals (Wager and Williams, 2013; Brice and Chalmers, 
2013; Dal Ré, 2016). In particular, similar to trial registration several influential organisations 
have strongly encouraged summary-level results reporting (Dal Ré, 2016). For example, while 
the influential ICMJE stated in 2004 that publishing all clinical trials is an ethical obligation, 
new journals have been created solely for reporting negative results such as the Journal of 
Negative Results in Biomedicine (see Olsen and Pfeffer, 2002). Despite these efforts, however; 
there are several important issues with EMA’s and FDA’s trial registers as a mode of 
dissemination that have significantly limited their effectiveness. 
 
The first significant issue is that, similar to registration, there remains a significant lack of 
compliance (Prayle et al. 2012; Miller et al. 2015; Chen et al, 2016). Many trialists still do not 
report the results of clinical trials in registers (Chen et al. 2016; Pranic and Marusic, 2016). For 
example, one recent study (Chen et al. 2016) of ClinicalTrials.gov found poor performance 
and noticeable variation in the dissemination of clinical trial results across leading US academic 
medical centres, with a range of 16.2–55.3 % of results from clinical trials being disseminated 
within 24 months of study completion. There has also been variation in register results 
reporting rates. For example, while vaccine trials have been found to have the highest levels of 
results reporting (albeit with some time lag) (Manzoli, 2014), non-industry sponsored trials 
have been found to have very low reporting rates (Chen et al. 2016). This is despite EMA and 
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FDA regulators making it mandatory to publish summary level results in trial registers (Zarin 
et al. 2011; Law et al. 2011; EMA, 2014d).  
 
These quantity and nonpublication issues have a priori reduced the effectiveness of trial 
registers in achieving its main goals (Table 6.2). First, publishing all trial results on registers 
and hence minimising associated biases requires that all summary level results are reported. 
Second, providing medical researchers with a standardised and structured format of trials will 
be much less effective if so many trials are not reported in registers. Third, participants, 
patients, and healthcare professionals wishing to view summary level results and free of charge 
will not be able to do so if trials are not reported in registers. 
 
Several reasons have been identified for the lack of trial register reporting (i.e. non-
compliance). Some have argued that many institutions may be unaware of mandatory reporting 
requirements (Law et al. 2011) or why reporting is important (Smyth et al. 2011). Trialists may 
also have difficulty conducting the necessary data analyses in the time frame given by the 
regulators (Law et al. 2011). For example, some studies have shown that industry is much more 
likely to report summary level results in both EMA’s (Deane and Rawal, 2016) and FDA’s 
(Law et al. 2011) registers, which may reflect additional resources and incentives for doing so. 
There are also arguments that trialists may be concerned about jeopardising their chances of 
publishing in medical journals (Law et al. 2011). For example, journal editors have historically 
required that, in order to be considered for publication, trial results are not published anywhere 
else. Going further, a systematic review (Scherer et al. 2015) found that the main reasons why 
authors did not publish summary level results was due to an array of factors that trial registers 
would not necessarily be able to solve. This includes a lack of time, a lack of resources, trouble 
with co-authors, trialists considering register reporting as a low priority, authors being 
relocated, or publication not being the aim of the study (ibid, 2015). Therefore there are 
significant issues with the quantity of trials reported in registers and numerous reasons why 
trialists may not report results.  
 
An equally significant issue with results reported in registers centres on their quality. In 
particular, many actors argue that trial registers do not provide the same peer review process 
as medical journals and hence can be of low quality (Goodman et al. 1994; Cobo et al. 2007; 
Science and Technology Committee, 2013; Manzoli et al. 2014; Hopewell et al. 2014;). This 
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is important because peer-review is crucial to “the reputation and reliability of scientific 
research”, and can provide quality control, post-publication commentary, and the possibility 
for correcting errors or retracting studies (Science and Technology Committee, 2011, 2013: 
36-37). Indeed, there is clear evidence that many register entries are incomplete or poorly 
reported (Manzoli et al. 2014: 5; Bourgeois et al. 2010). Medical journals also have other 
benefits that are not possible with register reporting including thorough ethical review 
procedures (De Silva and Vance, 2017). Going further, several actors have long argued that 
participants and patients may not be able to understand the complicated clinical trial 
information reported in registers or will have a difficult time assessing the quality of multiple 
analyses in context (Wager, 2006; Zarin and Tse, 2008). For example, recent studies have made 
clear that even the proposed ‘layperson’ summary documents, regardless of the original trial 
entries originally intended for medical researchers, may be difficult to understand (e.g. without 
understanding the clinical trial process) (Sroka-Saidi et al. 2015; Chamberlain-James, 2015; 
Nottbohm et al. 2016).  
 
These data quality issues have led many actors to argue that, although posting in registers can 
help to limit issues of reporting biases (Riveros et al. 2013), publishing in medical journals still 
needs to be done (Manzoli et al. 2014). The UK House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee (2013: 1) “favoured publication of summary level data in peer-reviewed journals” 
as the best mode of results dissemination. The UK Academy of Medical Sciences and the 
Cochrane Collaboration’s meta-analysis methods group also recommend the use of medical 
journals as the most appropriate and most preferable mode of summary level results 
transparency (Science and Technology Committee, 2013). Director of ClinicalTrials.gov 
Deborah Zarin made clear that FDA’ register is intended to “complement not replace” medical 
journal publication (Zarin et al. 2011). Therefore reporting summary levels results in trial 
registers such as EU-CTR is not considered the ‘holy grail’ of results reporting and important 
information quality issues need to be addressed beyond ensuring that all trials are reported. 
Taken together, these two factors, the quantity and quality of transparency, has significantly 
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 (6.4) Clinical study reports 
 
The third level of clinical trial transparency is clinical study reports (CSRs) (level 3). CSRs are 
documents written by pharmaceutical companies and used by EMA for licensing approvals and 
other scientific evaluations such as post-authorisation safety studies. They provide much more 
granulated and detailed information on a clinical trial than can be found in the published 
literature. They also differ from trial registration and summary results transparency because 
CSRs must be submitted to the regulators in order for a medicine to be approved (Science and 
Technology Committee, 2013) As Doshi et al. (2012) concisely put it: 
 
“When regulators decide whether to register a new drug in a manufacturer’s 
application, they review the trial’s clinical study report”. 
 
This means that, compared to trial registration and summary-level results reporting, the 
regulators have complete control over the quantity of CSRs made public. Although CSRs do 
not provide as much detail as participant-level data (Koenig et al. 2014), they can still amount 
to hundreds, if not thousands, of pages on a clinical trial, which includes overviews, summaries, 
appendices, protocols and protocol amendments, sample case reports, forms, and 
documentation of statistical methods. For example, Doshi and Jefferson (2013b) reported that 
a total of 144,610 pages of scientific and medical affairs data and information was contained 
in a sample of 78 CSRs, or a mean average of just over 1,850 pages each. 
 
CSRs submitted to EMA have historically not been accessible to those outside the regulatory 
network (including the pharmaceutical company that created them). Since December 2010, 
EMA as provided access to CSRs through its reactive access to documents policy (i.e. written 
requests for documents) (Chapter V). On 2nd October 2014, and after much debate, EMA 
announced a new proactive transparency policy on CSRs (EMA, 2014a, 2014b). While the 
agency continued to provide access through written requests, the new policy meant that most 
CSRs, submitted under the centrally authorised procedure after January 1st 2015, would be 
published on an online web-portal (clinicaldata.ema.europa.eu) (i.e. proactive transparency). 
The policy excluded CSRs submitted before January 2015 and information considered 
confidential. It also did not apply to non-centrally authorised medicines.  
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On 20th October 2016, EMA uploaded CSRs for two newly approved medicines under its new 
policy. This resulted in the online publication of approximately 260,000 pages of data and 
information for over 100 CSRs relating to (1) a medicine used to treat multiple myeloma (a 
cancer of the bone marrow) called Kyprolis (carfilzomib), and (2) a medicine used in adults 
with gout to reduce high levels of uric acid in the blood called Zurampic (lesinurad) (EMA, 
2016). This made EMA the first and, up until at least the end of the case study period 
(December 2016), the only authority in the world to provide public online access to CSRs 
(Hunter, 2015). As EMA’s 3rd Executive Director, Guido Rasi (2016) stated: 
 
“We have a pioneering approach to transparency. We are the first regulator in the 
world to allow researchers and academics, and the public as a whole, access to the 
clinical data on which marketing authorisations are based”.  
 
(6.4.1) Goals and audiences for level 3 
 
In contrast to the first two levels of clinical trial data transparency, the proactive publication of 
CSRs has received the lion’s share of attention from a multiplicity of actors (Chapter V). This 
attention has included strong demands that EMA publishes all CSRs immediately (e.g. 
arguments that full disclosure is an ethical obligation), substantial criticisms of EMA’s policy 
itself (e.g. arguments that full disclosure will have serious negative and irreversible 
consequences), and significant external pressure on the regulators from all actors (Chapter V) 
(Bouder et al. 2015; Way et al. 2016). Indeed, one of the main reasons why EMA’s CSRs 
policy has received so much attention, especially when compared to registration and trial 
register results reporting, is that EMA has substantial control over the transparency of CSRs.  
 
The overriding goal of EMA’s 2014 CSRs policy is to enable outsiders to freely re-analyse the 
data and information that underpins decision-making in EMA’s scientific committees (Table 
6.3). In turn, this is expected to achieve at least six secondary goals for different actors. This 
includes goals for external medical researchers (e.g. University Academics) and health 
technology assessors (e.g. assessors at the UK National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence [NICE]), industry and clinical trialists, as well as patients (i.e. medicine-users), the 
public, and healthcare professionals (e.g. doctors, pharmacists, and nurses). These goals and 
their connected audiences are addressed in turn. 
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Table 6.3: Seven goals and connected audiences of EMA’s 2014 CSRs policy 
Overriding goal Secondary goals Target Audiences 
Enable secondary re-analysis 
of input data 




Overcome the failure of registration and 
results reporting to mitigate reporting 
biases 
 
Medical researchers  
Scrutinise regulatory decisions 
 
Medical researchers 
Enable fully-informed decision-making 
for non-EMA decision-makers 
 
Health technology assessors 
Improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of drug development and 
the clinical trial process 
 
Industry and clinical trialists 
Better inform patients, the public, and 
doctors about the benefits and risks of 
medicines 




The first goal of enabling secondary re-analysis of CSRs is to improve the scientific knowledge 
base on pharmaceuticals (Table 6.3) (Bonini et al. 2014; Eichler et al. 2013). Considering 
companies are legally required to submit all scientific data to EMA when seeking regulatory 
approval, medical researchers, in particular, can gain a full picture of the safety and efficacy of 
every medicine authorised by the agency. High quality scientific (re)analyses of CSRs can 
provide opportunities for exploratory research that may lead to “new hypotheses about the 
mechanisms of diseases, more effective therapies, or alternative uses of existing abandoned 
therapies” (Institute of Medicine, 2015: 28). CSRs can also be combined with other datasets, 
or analyses could be made that industry and other “traditional institutions would not normally 
conduct” (e.g. analyses that may not be their priority) (Eichler et al. 2012). As four senior EMA 
regulators explained in the New England Journal of Medicine: 
 
The EMA encourages reanalysis of data to expand our body of knowledge and improve 
drug research. Data recipients should be granted complete freedom to engage in 
exploratory re-analyses aimed, for example, at optimising future study designs with 
regard to population selection and sample size, choice of outcomes, definitions of 
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clinically relevant differences for various end points, or identification of biomarkers 
for better disease phenotyping (Bonini et al. 2014).  
 
If successful this can provide patients with safer and more extensively and intensively 
investigated medicines. Independent expert re-analyses can also support the regulators by 
providing added expert capacity and hence aid scientific committees in decision-making (Feys, 
2013). As EMA regulators stated in 2016: 
 
“[EMA’s CSRs policy will] facilitate the independent re-analysis of data by academics 
and researchers after a medicine has been approved. This will increase scientific 
knowledge, and potentially further inform regulatory decision making in the future” 
(EMA, 2016a). 
 
Outsiders, especially external medical researchers who publicly demanded EMA enhance 
transparency (e.g. Doshi et al. 2012) (Chapter V), are therefore expected to conduct rigorous 
scientific studies by (re)using publicly available data and information published online. 
 
The second goal of enabling secondary re-analysis of CSRs is to overcome some of the issues 
of nonpublication and associated biases that haven’t been achieved through reporting results in 
medical journals or trial registers (Section 6.2). This argument has been put forward 
predominately by systematic reviewers and data-miners (e.g. Gøtzsche, 2011). For example, in 
seeking to re-analyse all evidence on neuraminidase inhibitors (a class of drugs that are 
commonly used as influenza antivirals), several Cochrane Collaboration researchers stated: 
 
“We have become convinced that the answer [to conducting complete systematic 
analyses] lies in analysing clinical study reports rather than the traditional trials 
appearing in biomedical journals” (Doshi et al. 2012) 
 
By overcoming issues of nonpublication and associated biases, these actors argue that many of 
the goals already discussed can be achieved (Walport and Brest, 2011; Jefferson et al. 2011; 
Doshi et al. 2013, 2013b; Chalmers et al. 2014; Institute of Medicine, 2015). This includes 
reducing scientific resources wastage, reducing unnecessary harm to participants, and 
facilitating systematic reviews and other analyses of the literature (see section 6.2). 
 
One argument is that medical researchers can obtain all ‘invisible’ trial results because they 
have to be reported in CSRs in order for a medicine to be approved (Wieseler et al. 2012; Doshi 
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et al. 2013; Doshi and Jefferson, 2013b; Maund et al. 2014). For example, Wieseler et al. 
(2013) compared the published literature – including medical journals and trial registers – with 
101 CSRs received by the German health technology agency, the Institute for Quality and 
Efficiency in Healthcare (IQWiG). The study found that, in sharp contrast to CSRs, publicly 
available sources provided insufficient information on patient-relevant outcomes (Wieseler et 
al. 2013). This means that publishing CSRs could potentially minimise publication bias 
(Science and Technology Committee, 2013). For example, medical researchers could identify 
what trials have been published or not and, in turn, update/conduct systematic analyses that 
include both negative and positive results (Doshi et al. 2013).  
 
A second argument is that outcome reporting bias can be minimised with full CSRs 
transparency (Vedula et al. 2013; Maund et al. 2014; Hodkinson et al. 2016). CSRs provide 
information on all trial outcomes, whether they are positive or negative, as well as full protocol 
information and amendments (EMA, 2014b). External researchers could use this information 
to see what outcomes were reported in the published literature and compare these to the original 
protocols reported in CSRs (Vedula et al. 2013). For example, Maund et al. (2014) analysed 
CSRs with 13,729 pages that were obtained from EMA in May 2011 on request (i.e. through 
its reactive policy). The authors found inconsistencies between protocols and outcomes in one 
trial that would not have been identified otherwise (Maund et al. 2014). Therefore two of the 
most significant reporting biases could therefore arguably be minimised with EMA’s CSRs 
policy.  
 
The third goal of enabling secondary re-analyses of CSRs is to enable medical researchers and 
other interested outsiders to scrutinise industry data and regulatory decisions (Goldacre, 2012; 
Doshi et al. 2013; Chan et al. 2014). This goal has been underpinned by strong criticisms of 
pharmaceutical companies and the regulators themselves with some claiming that the system 
is “broken” and needs “fixing” (e.g. Goldacre, 2012). These criticisms have been accompanied 
by numerous books, commentaries, and public attacks on industry and the regulators (Abraham 
and Lewis 1999, 2000; Angell, 2004; Smith, 2005; Garattini, 2005; Garattini and Bertele, 2007; 
Goldacre, 2012; LaMattina, 2013), as well as an influential activist group (AllTrials.com, 
2014). As Tom McKillop, ex-Astra Zeneca chief executive officer, commented several years 
earlier: 
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“Our reputation has never been as low. We are now rated broadly in line with the 
tobacco industry. [...] The industry’s reputation is so low that it makes it very difficult 
for us to argue our case with politicians and society in general” (Löfstedt, 2007: 471). 
 
Along with other criticisms (e.g. industry spending too much money on marketing rather than 
research and development), the sector has been plagued by high profile drug withdrawals (e.g. 
Baycol and Vioxx) and post-marketing safety concerns (e.g. Avandia and Zelnorm) (Angell, 
2004; Avorn, 2004; Löfstedt, 2007; Eichler et al., 2008; Goldacre, 2012), as well as other 
safety-related incidents (e.g. Mediator and Poly Implant Prothèse breast implants) (Mullard, 
2011; Looney, 2012). Industry has also been accused of deliberately concealing data (Goldacre, 
2012). For example, in 2014 two pharmaceutics companies, Takeda and Eli Lilly, received 
record fines of a total of 9 billion US dollars for “hiding evidence suggesting that their Actos 
diabetes medicine might expose patients to a heightened risk of bladder cancer” (Jack, 2014). 
Although there has been heated debate, one main argument is that the regulators are no longer 
trusted to analyse CSRs in private (Laine et al. 2007; Löfstedt and Way, 2016a; Bouder et al., 
2015). As EMA Executive Director, Guido Rasi, commented: 
 
“Some scandals increase distrust, and that's why we have to rebuild the trust and say, 
'OK, you want to see the data that I see to make my decision? Here are the data.' Why 
not?” (Khamsi, 2012). 
 
Therefore EMA’s CSRs policy seeks to enable ‘independent’ expert re-analyses of CSRs in 
order to hold the regulators and industry accountable, identify conflicts of interest (e.g. in the 
regulators’ interpretation of clinical trial data) and,  in turn, create a more robust pharmaceutical 
system.  
 
A fourth goal of enabling secondary re-analysis of CSRs is to provide additional information 
to Health Technology Assessors (HTAs) and hence enable fully informed decision-making 
(McGauran et al. 2010; Wieseler et al. 2012; IQWiG, 2013; NICE, 2013). HTAs weigh up the 
benefits and risks of medicines and undertake “a multidisciplinary process that summarises 
information about the medical, social, economic, and ethical issues related to the use of a health 
technology” (EUnetHTA47, 2017). Although CSRs are accessible to the EU regulatory 
network48, HTA (and regulators operating outside the EEA) often have to rely on assessments 
                                                
47 European Network for Health Technology Assessment 
48 This includes the EU Commission, NCAs, and EMA, as well as the pharmaceutical companies that wrote them.  
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made by EMA through its centralised procedure. Several HTAs have argued that their agencies 
need full CSRs for fully informed decision-making (McGauran et al. 2010; Wieseler et al. 
2012). As the German agency, IQWiG, argues: 
 
“Full trial information and results are needed for HTA agencies to be able to provide 
appropriate and meaningful assessments of drugs and other health technologies within 
their remit” (IQWiG, 2013: 51).  
 
Many of these arguments centre on the failure of nonpublication and associated biases in the 
medical literature (section 6.2) (IQWiG, 2013). For example, in comments submitted to EMA, 
the EUnetHTA49 commented that HTAs need CSRs because “[scientific journals] are 
insufficient to provide a complete and unbiased picture of a drug” (EUnetHTA, 2013: 51; 
IQWiG, 2013). Therefore several prominent HTA bodies have argued that, if CSRs are not 
available their decision-making will be unreliable and not based on the best available evidence. 
In turn, EMA’s CSRs policy is expected to decrease expenditure on ineffective interventions 
or interventions that are less effective than others (EUnetHTA, 2013: 51; IQWiG, 2013). As 
the UK agency NICE (2013: 67) argues, if CSRs are not made available, cost effectiveness 
decisions may “be made on unreliable valuations that could lead to negative consequences for 
patients and the efficiency of healthcare systems”.  
 
A fifth goal of enabling re-analyses is to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of drug 
development and the clinical trial process (Eichler et al. 2013; Institute of Medicine, 2015). 
These arguments were most prominently made by senior EMA regulators when stating: 
 
“It is ironic that the organizations that most resist wider access to data are the ones 
that stand to benefit so much from greater transparency” (Eichler et al. 2013). 
 
For industry, the regulators argue that CSRs transparency may result in improvements in the 
design and analysis of subsequent trials, speed up the development of drugs (e.g. streamline 
development), enhance a drug’s value in the marketplace (e.g. improve comparativeness 
effectiveness analysis), and reduce duplication effort amongst trial sponsors by, for example, 
preventing “repositions of trials that are doomed from the outset” (see Eichler et al. 2013 for a 
discussion). For improving the clinical trial process more generally, many further arguments 
                                                
49 This is a joint opinion from 33 organisations from across Europe. 
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have been provided (Institute of Medicine, 2015). These include trialists taking more care with 
recording results (e.g. because they know that outsiders may review their work), and CSRs 
informing future research designs (e.g. trialists building on previous work) (Bonini et al. 2014; 
Chan et al. 2014; Institute of Medicine, 2015: 32). In turn, the pace of scientific discovery is 
expected to greatly improve partly because the whole research enterprise will be more efficient 
and effective (Walport and Brest, 2011). EMA’s CSRs transparency policies therefore seek to 
benefit industry and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the clinical trial process.  
 
A six goal of enabling re-analyses is to better inform patients, the public, and healthcare 
professionals about the benefits and risks of medicines Adams, 2015; Chan et al. 2014). As 
Cohen and Billingsley (2011) argue: “[data sharing is expected] to help clinicians and patients 
make better informed decisions”. Although this objective has received far less critical 
examination, EMA made clear when launching its 2014 CSRs policy:  
 
“EMA expects the new policy to increase trust in its regulatory work as it will allow 
the general public to better understand the agency’s decision-making.” (EMA, 2014a). 
 
Or, as the agency stated after first proactively releasing CSRs with 260,000 pages for two newly 
authorised medicines, Kyprolis and Zurampic: 
 
“With EMA’s proactive approach to providing access to the data, patients and 
healthcare professionals will be able to find out more information about the data 
underpinning the approval of medicines they are taking or prescribing” (EMA, 2016a). 
 
Therefore one main argument is that patients and healthcare professionals “need access to help 
make informed decisions” and to gain a ‘complete picture’ of the relative benefit-risks of 
medicines (Rodwin and Abramson, 2012: 872). This means that EMA’s transparency policies 
seek to provide patients and prescribers with empowering medicines information and data 
(EMA, 2014a, 2014b, 2016a; Adams, 2015). The expectation is that EMA will be viewed as 
‘transparent’ as it will not be ‘hiding’ or ‘concealing’ any information from the public (personal 
communication, 2014). Patients are also expected to have a better understanding of how EMA’s 
committees need to balance difficult decisions when approving medicines or as the Institute of 
Medicine makes clear: 
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“Patients and the public will have a better understanding that numerous judgements 
are needed to transform source data” (Institute of Medicine, 2015: 32). 
 
In turn, all of these goals are expected to build public trust in the regulators and EMA’s 
centralised medicines authorization system (although the connection between EMA’s policies 
and trust is rarely discussed in detail) (Adams, 2015; O’Reilly, 2015; EMA, 2015a). 
 
 (6.4.2) Confidentiality and data privacy 
 
Without doubt the single most controversial and widely discussed issue over EMA’s 
publication of CSRs policy has centred on commercially confidential information (Gøtzsche 
and Jørgensen, 2011; Ombudsman, 2010; Roche, 2012; EMA, 2013e, 2014b; Pfizer, 2013; 
EFPIA and PHrMA, 2014; Hunter, 2015). Similar to other EU bodies and institutions, EMA is 
obliged to protect commercial confidentiality under European law (e.g. Regulation (EC) No 
1049/2001/EC). Yet, there have been many arguments that EMA’s CSRs policy does not go 
far enough in doing so. For example, Peter Bogaert, managing partner at law firm Covington 
& Burling, bluntly stated: 
 
“It is obvious that providing full access to all data that were submitted with a marketing 
authorisation application, to the public at large, including actual or potential 
competitors, can undermine the commercial interests of the pharmaceutical company 
involved” (Hunter, 2015). 
 
One argument is that pharmaceutical innovation and competitiveness will be risked if company 
trade secrets are shared when making CSRs public (Eichler et al. 2013; Norgine, 2013; Pfizer, 
2013; BioIndustry Association, 2013; PhRMA and EFPIA, 2013). Competitors could ‘free-
ride’ off investments by accessing CSRs (and hence proprietary information) (PhRMA and 
EFPIA, 2013). This could weaken incentives for companies to invest in pharmaceutical 
research, create unfair competition (e.g. competitors shortening their medical product 
development plans) (BioIndustry Association, 2013; IFAH-Europe50, 2013; Romanian 
ARPIM51, 2013; PhRMA and EFPIA, 2013), or, as the pharmaceutical company Norgine 
(2013) argues:  
 
                                                
50 International Federation for Animal Health Europe  
51 Romanian Association of International Medicines Manufacturers 
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“...competing pharmaceutical companies could engage in re-analysis of each other’s 
data leading to vexatious challenges to the regulatory process”. 
 
A second argument is that companies from other regulatory jurisdictions could use CSRs made 
public in the EU (Lang, 2013). Companies operating outside the EU cannot be easily monitored 
or policed as they are beyond EMA’s jurisdiction (IFAH-Europe, 2013). One concern is that 
making CSRs public may therefore impact negatively on companies as countries have 
“different standards of regulatory data protection, and may prejudice intellectual property 
rights” (Pfizer, 2013: 85). For example, competitors may use CSRs for competing products in 
countries that do not recognize data exclusivity or have weaker patent rules (e.g. India or China) 
(Kapczynski, 2014; Chowdhury et al. 2016).  
 
However, EMA regulators argue that issues around commercial confidentiality has been 
exaggerated and that industry have been overly defensive over sharing CSR data (Eichler et al. 
2013). In particular, senior EMA regulators argue that their policy will foster industry 
innovation (also see section 6.4.1): 
 
“Contrary to industry fears, we argue that access to full – though appropriately 
deidentified – data sets from clinical trials will benefit the research-based 
biopharmaceutical industry. We predict that it will help to increase the efficiency of 
drug development, improve cost-effectiveness, improve comparative-effectiveness 
analysis, and reduce duplication of effort among trial sponsors” (Eichler et al. 2013). 
 
With that said, commercial confidentiality issues have been a persistent and significant 
resource-intensive issue for EMA (personal communication, 2015). Beyond being pressurised 
by industry, the agency has been sued numerous times over providing access to CSRs through 
its reactive policy (EMA, 2013e; EMA, 2017j). 
 
Two examples have been particularly challenging for EMA. First, in 2013 two pharmaceutical 
companies, AbbVie and InterMune, sought and obtained injunctions against EMA to stop the 
agency from releasing CSRs and other detailed information on two drugs: Humira 
(adalimumab) for rheumatoid arthritis and Esbriet (pirfenindone) for idiopathic pulmonary 
fibrosis (EMA, 2013e). As an interim decision, EMA was ordered by the General Court of the 
EU not to provide the requested documents until a final ruling was given (EMA, 2013e). 
Although the case was eventually settled outside of court, EMA did not get legal clarity over 
commercial confidential information contained in CSRs (personal communication, 2014). 
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Second, in December 2015 two court cases were brought to EMA by PTC therapeutics and 
Intervet over public requests for access to CSRs relating to Translarna (ataluren) for Duchenne 
muscular dystrophy and three toxicity studies for Bravecto (fluralaner) a veterinary medicine 
used to treat flea infestations in dogs and cats (EMA, 201j). Again the General Court of the EU 
ordered EMA not to provide the requested documents until the final ruling was given52 (EMA, 
2017j). These cases highlight that there are significant legal challenges with making CSRs 
publicly available and at the very least that CSRs transparency has substantially increased legal 
action against the agency. 
 
Along with commercially confidential information issues, data protection and patient privacy 
concerns relating to EMA’s CSRs policy have been much debated (GlaxoSmithKline, 2013; 
Pfizer, 2013; Roche, 2013; EMA, 2014b; Koenig et al. 2014). One main concern is that 
publishing CSRs will weaken safeguards for clinical trial participants. Providing full public 
access to CSRs presents a risk because they can contain identifiable information about clinical 
trial participants (Institute of Medicine, 2015) and, as ECCO53 (2013) argues, “avoiding the 
retrospective identification of individuals is fundamental”. For example, CSRs can contain 
participant information relating to genetic data, stigmatised diseases (e.g. HIV/AIDS), 
communicable diseases, drug injections, and mental health issues, which could result in abuse, 
harm or other unwanted consequences (Gymrek et al. 2013; MRCT54, 2013; GCGMA55, 2013; 
Institute of Medicine, 2015). In addition, volunteers may be unwilling to participate in clinical 
trial research due to concerns that data will be given to third parties and the public (Koenig et 
al. 2014). 
 
A second closely connected issue centres on medical personnel such as trialists being identified 
(EHA56, 2013: 72; GlaxoSmithKline, 2013; IFAH-Europe, 2013). In particular, there is a risk 
that individuals will be identified in CSRs and singled out by activists, patients, survivors, and 
others (EHA, 2013). For example, there have been many issues with pharmaceutical company 
and research institution employees being identified by animal rights activists (IFAH-Europe, 
2013; Reardon, 2017). As one pharmaceutical company commented: 
 
                                                
52 The cases were still on-going at the time of writing (EMA, 2017). 
53 European Crohn’s and Colitis Organisation 
54 Multi-Regional Clinical Trials Center at Harvard University 
55 Drug Commission of the German Medical Association 
56 European Haematology Association 
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“The inclusion of company personnel names poses significant risks for individuals. A 
number of [GlaxoSmithKline] employees have been targeted by animal rights 
extremists, even though they have not been directly involved in animal research” 
(GlaxoSmithKline, 2013: 57). 
 
In responding to these concerns, EMA’s policy commits to anonymising individual information 
(EMA, 2014b, 2017k). There are, however, difficult challenges with anonymising data and 
deidentifying individuals. First, on the most basic level, anonymisation will mean that some 
data will not be made available and cannot be re-analysed (EFSPI57, 2013: 10; PhUSE58, 2013). 
This exemplifies why full disclosure may not be desirable or feasible. Second, anonymisation 
is immensely complicated with some arguing that it is impossible to completely deidentify 
individuals (EFSPI, 2013: 99). One of the main areas of concern has been with orphan drugs 
(i.e. drugs that treat rare diseases). For example, patients with rare diseases can be more easily 
identified in CSRs as there are fewer individuals with the diseases and smaller sample sizes 
reported (IAPO, 2013). For example, the pharmaceutical company Pfizer, (2013: 95) comment: 
 
“A constellation of seemingly general information may only too easily lead to identify 
of individuals within these small patient populations who may already be stigmatized 
and vulnerable” (Pfizer, 2013: 95).  
 
A second issue is that EMA has had to commit substantial resources to CSRs anonymisation. 
For example, in March 2017 EMA announced a call for experts to join a new technical 
anonymisation group to help the agency develop best practices: 
 
“Anonymisation of clinical reports poses a major challenge to those directly involved 
(pharmaceutical industry, clinical research organisations and EMA) and to those 
accessing the data (patients, healthcare professionals and academia). [...]. As data 
anonymisation is a rapidly evolving field, EMA wants to keep abreast of developments 
and continue to update the guidance with the support of experts.” (EMA, 2017k). 
 
Third, several patient representative groups argue that EMA’s policy does not go far enough to 
protect retrospectively identified patients (EORTC59, 2013, IAPA60, 2013). For example, 
EORTC (2013) comments: “Who would be responsible or liable if a patient’s identity was 
divulged due to inappropriate handling of data?” This issue is complicated by that fact that 
                                                
57 The European Federation of Statisticians in the Pharmaceutical Industry 
58 The Pharmaceutical Users Software Exchange 
59 The European Organisation for Research and Treatment of Cancer 
60 The International Alliance of Patients’ Organisations 
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once CSRs are made public they cannot be returned, or, as IAPA (2013: 95) put it, attempting 
to rectify any data protection breaches after CSRs have been published is “tantamount to 
closing the barn door once the horse escapes”. There are therefore many challenging issues 
with anonymising CSRs and not least substantial EMA resource consumption. 
 
(6.4.3) Poor quality re-analyses 
 
Although high quality re-analyses of data are expected to achieve many of EMA’s re-analysis 
goals, poor quality analyses of data could equally have detrimental outcomes and reverse 
effects for patients and public health (Way et al. 2016). These issues have been discussed at 
great length in the medical community including in a notable 2015 Institute of Medicine report 
(see Institute of Medicine, 2015 for a full discussion). Some of the most widely discussed 
include the potential of distorting the scientific basis for decision-making by, unintentionally 
or otherwise, coming to incorrect conclusions, reducing the efficiency of medical investigations 
(e.g. by creating disincentives for trial sponsors), creating adverse effects for patients (e.g. 
discouraging patients to take certain safe and effective medicines), and producing unnecessary 
anxiety for patients receiving inaccurate or publicly contested information (Eichler et al., 
2012a; Spertus, 2012; Mello et al., 2013; EORTC, 2014; IAPO, 2013; Institute of Medicine, 
2015: 29). As Will Greenacre (2014), policy officer at the Wellcome Trust, and others61 jointly 
commented: 
 
“Potential harm could result from wrongful secondary interpretation of clinical trial 
data. Whilst we agree that greater openness could put clinical trial data under 
productive scrutiny, the consequences of secondary analyses that wrongfully contradict 
the published findings could be severe, and are certainly not in the interest of public 
health.” (Greenacre, 2014). 
 
One widely discussed concern, for example, is that outsiders could misinterpret the 
complicated medicines information posted online (e.g. relating to adverse reactions or 
pharmacological effects), that can take over a year for trained reviewers to analyse, leading to 
a loss of public confidence in a medicine that can significantly affect a patient’s well-being. 
Although there are many other arguments, the overall expectation is that EMAs policies will, 
                                                
61 Joint comments submitted to EMA from the Academy of Medical Sciences, Association of Medical Research 
Charities, Cancer Research UK, the Medical Research Council, Parkinson’s UK, and the Wellcome Trust. 
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optimistically, result in higher rather than poorer quality scientific analyses by outsiders that 
will lead to beneficial and desirable outcomes for public health. 
 
(6.4.4) Capacity of outsiders to re-analyse 
 
Beyond poor quality analyses, a second issue is whether there is sufficient interest by medical 
researchers to re-analyse data. In particular, beyond the Cochrane Collaboration requesting 
data from EMA, how many medical researchers actually want access to CSRs and have the 
capacity to re-analyse them?  At the time of writing, there was no available data on which 
audiences of EMA’s policies have actually been accessing (or not) CSRs on EMA’s web-portal 
(clinicaldata.ema.europa.eu). Indeed, few CSRs were released proactively during the case 
study period. However, illuminating data were available on EMA’s reactive access to 
document policy between 2010 and 2013 including how many requests were made and which 
transparency audiences made those requests (Figure 6.2) (Bonini et al. 2014). The data shows 
that between 2010 and 2013 pharmaceutical companies (33.5%), law firms (17.5%) and the lay 
media (15.9%) were the three highest requestors of documents held by the agency, while 
academic or research institutions received the greatest number of pages (646,207). In contrast, 
only 5.5% of requests came from the ‘general public’ per se and 3.7% from Health Care 
Professionals.  
 
These findings were much discussed at policy meetings attended by the investigator during the 
case study period (Chapter IV). Indeed, although the data concerns EMA’s 2010 reactive 
transparency policies (EMA, 2010a), it does have several implications for EMA’s 2014 CSRs 
policy and its effectiveness. One of the most significant issues is that far fewer medical 
researchers requested access to documents than EMA regulators expected or were hoping 
(personal communication, 2014). This means that EMA’s policy is highly likely to be less 
effective in achieving its goals for medical researchers. One main reason why so few EMA 
documents were requested from medical researchers is that few researchers outside of 
regulatory agencies are even aware of their existence, or as Doshi et al. (2013) put it: “Outside 
of regulatory agencies, few researchers have ever heard of clinical study reports”. This means 
that researchers outside the regulatory network, who are expected to re-analyse data, are likely 
to be inexperienced in mining CSRs. Although researchers may become more aware of CSRs 
and more sophisticated in analysing such large datasets over time, this still presents a 
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significant issue affecting the effectiveness of EMA’s proactive policy. How will external 
researchers re-analyse CSRs if they are unfamiliar with them and unaware of their existence? 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Bar chart showing the number of requests and distribution of requestors for access to EMA documents 
that were either refused (blue shading) or granted (orange shading) between 2010-2013. Parentheses show the 
number of documents released for each requestor. EC denotes European Commission. EU denotes European 
Union. Source data: Bonini et al. (2014). 
 
(6.4.5) The role of intermediaries after re-analysis 
 
EMA’s goal of providing patients and doctors with a better understanding of the benefits and 
risks of medicines is also poorly understood. One assumption with CSRs policies is that more 
information will lead to a better understanding in a simple one-way model of communication. 
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and reading CSRs for themselves (clinicaldata.ema.europa.eu). In turn, they can potentially 
gain a better understanding of medicines they use or may use (EMA, 2014b: 5). Indeed, EMA’s 
web-portal is free to use and available to anyone with access to the Internet. However, this is 
rather unlikely. As Thomas Lang, Austrian Medicines & Medical Devices Agency (AGES), 
argues: 
 
“The benefit to the EU population and patients will not be direct, but indirect only. 
Individual patients will not have the capacity to process data and set these into the 
context of a complex decision making system. This is only feasible through the 
responsible work by third party experts. Therefore, the true benefit will be that further, 
hopefully independent, opinions become available to the public.” (Lang, 2014). 
 
This means that patients and doctors are more likely to indirectly receive information on CSRs 
through intermediaries (e.g. the news media, doctors, external researchers, medical journals, 
non-governmental organizations and others). Intermediaries are therefore essential to the 
effectiveness of EMA’s transparency policies for both (1) enabling re-analyses and (2) better 
informing patients, the public, and doctors about the benefits and risks of medicines.  
 
Patients and doctors can be expected to receive new information on benefits and risks indirectly 
in two main stages. In the first stage, those ‘outside’ the traditional regulatory network – and 
especially ‘independent’ medical researchers (e.g. Cochrane collaboration researchers) – are 
expected, and encouraged, to re-analyse CSRs uploaded onto EMA’s web-portal. In the second 
stage, these outsiders are expected to convey the findings of re-analyses to patients and doctors 
in two possible ways. The first way is that outsiders might convey the results of re-analyses to 
EMA directly and exclusively. This may (or may not) result in the agency communicating new 
information about the benefits and/or risks of a medicine to patients and doctors such as by 
using well-established agency risk communication tools (e.g. updating packaging information 
or recalling a medicine now deemed unsafe) (see Way et al. 2017). For example, this might 
include sharing information with the public, changing beliefs, or changing behaviour and can 
be considered as an output transparency mechanism as the results will have been reviewed by 
EMA’s scientific committees (Way et al. 2017). 
 
The second, and much more likely, way is that outsiders will convey results to patients and 
doctors themselves without (first) contacting the EMA but instead through various other 
information channels (e.g. the media, medical journals, patient group representatives, the 
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Internet etc.) (Maund et al. 2014; Ebrahim et al. 2014; Jefferson et al. 2016). This is the most 
likely way that the results of re-analyses will be conveyed to patients and doctors. Moreover, 
whether re-analyses are conveyed to the regulators first or not, many patients and doctors are 
expected to receive (Bonini et al. 2014), and have already received (e.g. Butler, 2014), new 
information about the benefits and risks of their medicines through secondary re-analyses of 
CSRs62.  
 
There is clear evidence that this second route is the most likely way that patients and doctors 
will receive more information through EMA’s CSRs transparency policy, although this does 
not necessarily mean they will gain a better understanding. First, the usual route of conducting 
systematic analyses and re-analyses of data has been to go through other routes, rather than to 
contact the regulators first. For example, after the Cochrane collaboration conducted a 
systematic review of the literature the organisation published the results on its website, 
submitted a paper to a medical journal and announced its findings through its own information 
channels (e.g. the news media). Second, there is evidence from what medical researchers have 
done with CSRs requested from EMA’s (i.e. its reactive policy) and from other sources (e.g. 
courts demanding companies release data or FOI requests) (Maund et al. 2014). For example, 
this has happened in several cases relating to de-worming treatments, antidepressants etc. 
Furthermore, Ebrahim et al. (2014) conducted a review of re-analyses and found that positive 
confirmatory re-analyses were less likely to be conducted than negative re-analyses that 
question the regulators interpretation.  
 
Third, there are real examples that can be taken from the Tamiflu saga (Löfstedt and Way, 
2016b). After receiving CSRs the Cochrane collaboration announced its results, which 
subsequently received global new coverage [first]. There is clear evidence that this is one of 
the main routes (Gøtzsche and Jørgensen, 2011; Loder et al., 2014). After receiving documents 
held by EMA, the Cochrane Collaboration, an external network of researchers and 
collaborators (Cochrane, 2014), published an online review of Tamiflu (oseltamivir) (Jefferson 
et al., 2014a), which was subsequently reported in several medical journals (e.g. Jefferson et 
al., 2014b) and, in turn, various news outlets across Europe including The Guardian, Financial 
Times, Daily Mail, Der Spiegel, and Le Monde (Boseley, 2014b; Ward and Neville, 2014; Der 
                                                
62 They are, however, unlikely to be aware that the information they received came from a re-analyses of EMA’s 
CSRs. 
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Spiegel, 2014). The open-access report, published by the external researchers, demonstrates 
how information released by EMA under its transparency policies is most likely be conveyed 
to the public indirectly through information mediators.  
 
However, this does raise important questions over how medical researchers will communicate 
the findings of their CSRs re-analyses to patients and doctors. Again the Cochrane saga 
highlights some of these issues. In particular, Cochrane announced that their findings showed 
the drug was less effective than the pharmaceutical company, Hoffman-La Roche, had claimed 
and there was “no good evidence to support claims that it reduces admissions to hospital or 
complications of influenza” (Cochrane, 2014). Since Cochrane released their findings there has 
been continued debate over Tamiflu and Cochrane’s (re)analysis with some raising important 
questions concerning the accuracy of the researchers’ findings and appropriateness of their 
policy suggestions (Muthuri et al., 2014; Kmietowicz, 2014; Public Health England, 2015; 
Dobson et al., 2015). The potential benefits and difficulties of analysing large data sets with 
highly complicated safety-related information where even a well-established and highly 
competent organisation such as the Cochrane Collaboration can come to disputed conclusions. 
It also shows that publishing CSRs online can lead to more public disputes over data with the 
regulators being less involved and industry being criticized heavily. However, what is needed 
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Chapter VII: PATIENT AND DOCTOR SURVEYS 
 
In order to generate more evidence on EMA’s input transparency policies, this chapter presents 
and analyses the results of the patient (N=1,010) and doctor (N=1,005) surveys (Chapter IV)63. 
What is needed is more evidence from the perspectives of patients and doctors in this new 
environment. This includes the quantity and quality of medicines information patients and 
doctors currently receive, their knowledge and awareness of the regulators and their risk 
communication activities, the trustworthiness and usefulness of intermediaries conveying the 
results of re-analyses, and opinions on whether the results of re-analysed CSRs should be 
conveyed before or after regulatory approval, as well as the reactions of patients to receiving 
new information on their medicines from non-regulatory sources. To be clear, although this 
chapter presents statistical generalisations about patients and doctors, its primary purpose is to 
generate evidence on the perspectives of patients and doctors to inform the overall evaluation 
of the effectiveness of EMA’s input transparency policies in Chapter VIII (see Chapter IV for 
a detailed explanation). 
 
In the context of this new more open information environment, the two surveys examined the 
perspectives of patients and doctors in four main ways. First, they examined the state of the 
medicines information and communication environment (that is, in late 2014 and early 2015). 
This means that the questions were asked shortly after EMA published its final October 2014 
CSRs policy. In particular, respondents were asked questions on the quantity and quality of 
medicines information that patients and doctors receive. This revealed, for instance, opinions 
on how well information is currently communicated to these two actors and the influence of 
politics and the media on information quality. 
 
Second, the surveys examined respondents’ perspectives on pharmaceutical regulatory bodies 
including EMA and (relevant) NCAs. This includes questions on whether they have heard of 
them (i.e. awareness questions), and how well they understand the regulatory system (i.e. 
knowledge questions). This was important in order to understand how patients and doctors 
view the regulators and their contribution to the pharmaceutical evaluation system. 
 
                                                
63	The results of the patient and doctor surveys were also published in two Journal of Risk Research papers (Way 
et al. 2016; Löfstedt et al. 2016). Hence much of the text included in this paper is repeated here (also see Appendix 
F). 
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Third, the surveys examined respondents’ perspectives on multiple sources of medicines 
information (e.g. the media, the Internet, pharmacies, medical journals, etc.), which are 
expected to convey the results of CSRs re-analyses indirectly (i.e. transparency 
‘intermediaries’). This includes questions on how useful and trustworthy intermediaries are in 
conveying benefit-risk information. To be clear, these questions were considered especially 
important in a new environment where medical researchers, in particular, are expected to 
convey the results of re-analyses to patients and doctors through non-regulatory information 
channels.  
 
Fourth, the surveys examined respondents’ opinions on receiving medicines information that 
has not been verified by the regulators (e.g. re-analyses conducted by external medical 
researchers). This includes their opinions on whether the regulators should review re-analyses 
before or after they are conveyed to the public and how patients might respond to receiving the 
results of re-analyses from intermediaries. For example, the surveys analysed whether the 
public should be given unverified medicines information that has not been reviewed first by 
the regulators and how patients say they intend to react to receiving such information. 
 
(7.1) Quantity of publicly available information  
 
Two questions measured respondents’ opinions on the quantity of information available to the 
public (that is, at the time of the survey). The first question measured general opinions on 
receiving more safety information on medicines. The majority of patients (80%) and doctors 
(56%) ‘strongly’ or ‘somewhat’ agreed that ‘patients receiving more information on the safety 
of medicines would increase their confidence in taking medicines’ (Table 7.1), although 
doctors were significantly less likely to indicate so (mean differed between doctors and patients 
at p < 0.001 with independent samples t-test).  
 
Table 7.1: The extent to which patients and doctors agreed or disagreed with the statement: Patients receiving 
more information on the safety of medicines would increase their confidence in taking medicines 
 Patients (%) Doctors (%) 
Strongly agree 39 13 
Somewhat agree 41 43 
Neither agree nor disagree 17 26 
Somewhat disagree 2 13 
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Strongly disagree 0 4 
Don’t know 1 1 
 
The second question also measured respondents’ opinions on the quantity of publicly available 
medicines information (Table 7.2). The most common opinion for both patients (42%) and 
doctors (50%) was that there is currently ‘an appropriate amount’ of information publicly 
available. However, patients were more likely than doctors to say that there is ‘too little’ 
information (+7%) and doctors were more likely than patients to say that there is ‘too much’ 
information’ (+15%) (Table 7.2).  
 
Table 7.2: Patient and doctor responses to the question: “Would you say that the amount of information about 
medicines currently publicly available is too much, the appropriate amount, or too little?” 
 Patients (%) Doctors (%) 
Too much 12 27 
Appropriate amount 50 42 
Too little 39 32 
 
(7.2) Quality of publicly available information 
 
Respondents indicated the extent to which they agree or disagree with various statements about 
the medicines and health information that they receive. Three questions measured opinions on 
the influence of politics and mainstream media, as well as health information bias in general 
(Figure 7.1). Specifically, respondents were asked whether they agree or disagree with the 
following statements: 
 
1. Health information for the general public is generally unbiased 
2. Politics affects what health information is communicated to the general public 
3. Mainstream media sensationalises health information 
 
The large majority of patients (69%) and doctors (83%) ‘strongly’ or ‘somewhat’ agreed that 
‘politics affects what health information is communicated to the general public’. The majority 
of patients (63%) and doctors (83%) ‘strongly’ or ‘somewhat’ agreed that ‘mainstream media 
sensationalises health information’. Doctors were significantly more likely than patients to 
agree with both of these statements (mean differed between doctors and patients at p < 0.001 
with independent samples t-test). Doctors (20%) were also significantly less likely than patients 
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(36%) to strongly or somewhat agree that ‘health information for the general public is generally 
unbiased’ (mean differed between doctors and patients at p < 0.001 with independent samples 
t-test).  
 
A further four questions measured opinions on how well medicines and health information is 
communicated to the public including the clarity of those communications (Figure 7.2). 
Specifically, respondents were asked whether they agree or disagree with the following four 
statements: 
 
1. There is a health information communication process in place to communicate with the 
general public effectively 
2. Health information facts are communicated properly 
3. Health information communicated to the general public is easy to understand 
4. Health communications are generally clear 
 
Patients were significantly more likely than doctors to ‘strongly’ or ‘somewhat’ agree with all 
four statements (mean differed between doctors and patients at p < 0.001 with independent 
samples t-test). First, patients (50%) compared to doctors (38%) were significantly more likely 
to ‘agree that ‘there is a health information communication process in place to communicate 
with the general public effectively’. Second, patients (44%) compared to doctors (28%) were 
significantly more likely to agree that ‘health information facts are communicated properly’. 
Third, patients were also significantly more likely to agree that health information 
communicated to the general public is easy to understand (49% vs. 37%) and that health 
communications are generally clear (46% vs. 34%). 
 
(7.3) Awareness of regulatory bodies and their activities 
 
Two questions measured respondents’ awareness of two regulatory authorities: the EMA and 
their relevant NCA (i.e. MHRA [UK], BfArM [Germany], ANSM [France] or AEMPS 
[Spain]64) (Table 7.3). While the vast majority of doctors self-reported that they had heard of 
their relevant NCA (94%), fewer (80%) said the same about the EMA. Although this means 
that the large majority of doctors indicated that they had heard of both regulatory authorities,  
                                                
64 see Table 4.9 to view the agencies’ full English names 
 Figure 7.1: Bar chart comparing the extent to which patient (N=1,010) and doctor (N=1,005) respondents agree or disagree with three statements regarding information about 
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Figure 7.2: Bar chart comparing the extent to which patients (N=1,010) and doctors (N=1,005) agree or disagree with four statements regarding information about medicines 
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it also means that 6% and 20% of doctors respectively indicated that they have not heard of 
their relevant NCA or EMA. For patients, the majority said ‘no’ they have not heard of either 
their NCA (56%) or EMA (67%).  
 
Table 7.3: Comparison of patient and doctor responses to two questions referring to their relevant NCA and EMA: 
Have you heard of the [EMA/NCA]? NCAs for each survey country were the MHRA (UK), BfArM (Germany), 
ANSM (France) and AEMPS (Spain).  
 Response Patients Doctors 
National Competent Authority 
Yes 44% 94% 
No 56% 6% 
European Medicines Agency  
Yes 33% 80% 
No 67% 20% 
 
Two follow-up questions measured respondents’ self-reported awareness of the current 
communication and information provision activities of both agencies (Table 7.4). Over 75% of 
patients and doctors said ‘no’ they were not aware of any specific pieces of information about 
medicines or health alerts, or health communication activities that either EMA or their relevant 
NCA are involved with (at the time of the survey) (Table 7.4).  
 
Table 7.4: Comparison of patient and doctor responses to two questions referring to their relevant NCA and EMA: 
Are you aware of any specific pieces of information about medicines or health alerts or health communication 
activities that [relevant NCA or EMA] is involved with at the present time? NCAs for each survey country were 
the MHRA (UK), BfArM (Germany), ANSM (France) and AEMPS (Spain) (Table 4.9). 
 Response Patients Doctors 
National Competent Authority 
Yes 18% 22% 
No 82% 78% 
European Medicines Agency  
Yes 21% 12% 
No 79% 88% 
 
(7.4) Knowledge of how the regulators assess medicines 
 
One question measured respondents’ knowledge of how EMA and their relevant NCA assesses 
the safety of medicines (Figure 7.3). Specifically, respondents were asked two questions (i.e. 
one question for NCAs and one question for EMA) on whether they agree or disagree with the 
following statement: 
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I have good knowledge of how [NCA/EMA] assesses the safety of [INSERT medical condition] 
medicines 
 
For EMA, only 17% of doctors and 21% of patients self-reported that they ‘strongly’ or 
‘somewhat’ agree that they ‘have good knowledge of how EMA assesses the safety of 
medicines’. Rather, over 50% of doctors and patients indicated that they ‘strongly’ or 
‘somewhat’ disagree with the statement or that they ‘don’t know’.  
 
For their relevant NCA, almost a quarter of patient (24%) and doctor (25%) respondents 
indicated that they ‘strongly’ or ‘somewhat’ agree that they have good knowledge of how their 
NCA assesses the safety of medicines. 42% of doctors and 48% of patients indicated that they 
‘strongly’ or ‘somewhat’ disagreed with the statement or that they ‘don’t know’. 
 
Figure 7.3: Bar chart comparing the extent to which patient and doctor respondents agree or disagree with the 
statement ‘I have good knowledge of how [NCA/EMA] assesses the safety of [medical condition] medicines’. 
Separate questions were asked for their relevant NCA and EMA. Each relevant medical condition was piped in 
where applicable. 
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(7.5) Intermediaries as information providers 
 
A battery of 15 (patients) and 16 (doctors) questions examined how easy respondents find it to 
obtain medicines advice from different sources of information (i.e. intermediaries) (Figure 7.4). 
The three most popular sources for patients, rated most frequently as either ‘very’ or 
‘somewhat’ easy by the majority, were their pharmacy (70%), the Internet (in general) (68%) 
and their doctor (66%) (Figure 7.4A). In contrast, politicians (19%), EMA (34%) and their 
relevant NCAs (37%) were viewed as the three least easy sources to obtain medicines 
information. Thus patients appear to find it easier to obtain information about medicines from 
the media (e.g. newspapers, television, and/or radio) (43%), a friend or relative (not medically 
qualified) (43%), and social media (e.g. Facebook or Twitter) (42%) than either EMA or their 
NCA.  
 
For doctors, the three most popular sources for obtaining medicines information, rated most 
frequently as ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ easy, were medical journals (85%), colleagues (83%), and 
the Internet (in general) (81%) (Figure 7.4B). Doctors viewed politicians (8%), friends or 
relatives (that are not medically qualified) (32%), and social media (34%) as the three least 
useful sources for obtaining medicines information out of the 16 examined. They were also 
more likely than patients to say their NCA (68%) and the EMA (52%) were easier sources for 
obtaining medicines information. 
 
A second battery of 15 (patients) and 16 (doctors) questions examined how trustworthy 
respondents believe the same sources are in providing them with advice on the side effects 
associated with specific medicines (Figure 7.4). The two most trusted sources of information 
for patients, rated most frequently as ‘’very’ or ‘somewhat’ trustworthy, were their doctors 
(78%) and the pharmacy (75%) (Figure 7.6A). For doctors, the most trustworthy sources of 
information were medical journals (90%), their NCAs (86%) and the EMA (83%) (Figure 
7.4B). For both patients and doctors, politicians, social media, and the mass media (e.g. 
newspapers, television, and/or radio) were viewed as the least trustworthy sources of medicines 
information.  
 





Figure 7.4: Bar charts for (A) patients and (B) doctors that compare: (1) respondents (%) that indicated ‘very easy’ 
or ‘somewhat easy’ to the question: “How easy is it for you to obtain information about medicines from each of 
the following sources of information?” (light shading) and; (2) respondents (%) that indicated ‘very trustworthy’ 
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or ‘somewhat trustworthy’ to the question: “How trustworthy do you believe the following sources are in 
providing you with advice on the side effects associated with specific medicines?” (dark shading). Results are 
sorted by ease of obtaining information (light shading). SMPC denotes summary of product characteristics. 
 
(7.6) When new findings should be made publicly available 
 
Two questions measured when respondents think that information on the safety of medicines 
should be made publicly available. In particular, the questions examined opinions on whether 
unverified safety information (e.g. results from CSRs re-analyses) should be conveyed to the 
public. The first question provided four possible options for when respondents think that 
information should be conveyed to the public about a possible safety issue with a medicine that 
they use or may use (Figure 7.5). Just over half (51%) of patient respondents indicated that this 
information on their medicines should be conveyed ‘when there is a possible sign of a safety 
problem’ over all other options (Figure 7.5). Far fewer patient respondents indicated that this 
information should be conveyed after the issue has been investigated first. This includes the 
options ‘when the problem has been investigated and it is not clear whether the issue is related 
to the medicine’ (21%), or after it has been investigated by the (relevant) pharmaceutical 




Figure 7.5: Bar chart comparing answers to the question “At what stage do you think information should be 
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In sharp contrast, the most popular response for doctors was that information about a possible 
safety issue should be conveyed to the public after it has been investigated and the regulators 
believe the problem is related to the medicine (44%). Less than a quarter (24%) of doctor 
respondents indicated that information should be conveyed to the public ‘when there is a sign 
of a safety problem’ (Figure 7.5). Patients differed significantly from doctors over when this 
safety information should be conveyed on all four response options (p < 0.001; using pairwise 
comparisons in a generalised linear model with a binomial distribution, logit link function, and 
doctor/patient as a factor variable).  
 
The second question asked respondents to indicate whether they think it is a ‘good idea’ or a 
‘bad idea’ to inform the general public before a scientific analysis has been completed65. 
‘Scientific analysis’ was clarified to mean “a full review of the available data by the regulators 
and pharmaceutical industry”. In line with the previous question, patients (60%) were more 
likely than doctors (24%) to indicate they think it is a ‘good idea’ to inform the general public 
before a scientific analysis is completed, with a concomitant number of patients (40%) and 
doctors (76%) indicating they think it is a ‘bad idea’.  
 
(7.7) Patients’ reactions to receiving safety information 
 
One question measured respondents’ behavioural intentions66 after receiving potentially 
adverse safety information relating to a medicine they are currently taking. Indeed, although 
patients may be unware of its original source, this information could come from re-analysed 
CSRs results suggesting their medicine is less safe than was previously thought. After 
personally receiving (e.g. via letter, telephone, e-mail etc.) information that points to safety 
problems with a medicine they are currently taking (i.e. information contradicting its safety 
profile), the most popular behavioural intention for patients was to either: ‘seek additional 
advice about the medicine’ (56%) or ‘stop taking the medicine’ (26%) (Figure 7.6A). A further 
8% of respondents indicated they would ‘reduce their dose of their medicine’, while others 
indicated they would ‘continue to take their medicine as usual’ (9%) or said ‘don’t know’ (4%) 
(Figure 7.6A).  
                                                
65 “Overall, do you think it is a good idea or a bad idea to inform the general public before a scientific analysis is 
complete? (By scientific analysis, we mean a full review of the available data by the regulators and pharmaceutical 
industry” (Yes/No). 
66 In other words, respondents’ perceived likelihood of engaging in a given behaviour. 




There were also notable variations between different nations and geographic regions on the 
combined likelihood respondents would stop taking and reduce the dose of their medicine 
(Figure 7.6B). This ranged from 8% of respondents in the South West of England and Wales, 
to 54% in the North-East of France indicating they would stop taking or reduce the dose of 
their medicine. 
 
Several statistically significant differences also emerged between respondents on the combined 
‘stop’ and ‘reduce’ variable when the sample was stratified based on respondents’ nation and 
medical condition (in a generalised linear model with sequential Bonferroni corrections for 
multiple comparisons)67 (Figure 7.7). The number of patients reporting that they would stop or 
reduce – i.e. the combined percentage of respondents across those two response options – in 
the UK sample differed significantly from all other groups at p < 0.001 (Figure 7.5). There 
were no significant differences between any other national samples on these combined 
response categories at p < 0.05. In terms of differences across medical conditions, the number 
of patients reporting that they would stop or reduce their dose in the HIV/AIDS group differed 
significantly from patients with all other medical conditions included in the survey at p < 0.01 
(Figure 7.7). There were no significant differences in the results from patients with any other 
medical condition at p < 0.05.   
 
(7.8) Doctors’ opinions on improving regulatory communication  
 
Doctor respondents were also asked an additional open-ended question about what they think 
would be the best way for regulators to communicate medicines information better and more 
effectively with their patients (Table 7.5). Respondents provided a wide variety of answers that 
were coded into nine categories across all four sample countries. They could provide more than 
one suggestion and an average of 288 suggestions were made in the UK (323), Germany (252), 
Spain (293), and France (282). 
 
                                                
67 Generalised linear models with a binomial distribution and logit link function are a means for assessing the 
effect of categorical and/or continuous variables on a dichotomous outcome variable. Nations were included in 
the sample as the multiple nominal independent variable to examine differences in the response variable across 
nations. Bonferroni corrections for multiple comparisons are a conservative approach to correcting for the 
increased possibility that chance alone could lead to significant findings when conducting multiple pairwise 
comparisons (e.g. between values on the outcome variable for each nation). 
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Table 7.5: Coded doctor responses to the open-ended question: “Based on your medical experience, what would 
be the best way for regulators to communicate medicines information better and more effectively with [medical 
condition] patients?” Each relevant medical condition was included for speciality doctors (e.g. multiple sclerosis) 
or left blank for GPs. The percentages show the average of all suggestions for each country and then overall for 
all countries.  
 UK Germany Spain France Average  
Information should be communicated face-to-face 
with doctors and/ or other healthcare professionals 
24% 22% 29% 29% 26% 
Information should be communicated simply and 
in a comprehensible way to patients 
15% 13% 17% 6% 13% 
Develop more trusted official websites 9% 11% 7% 9% 9% 
Do not release information until it has been fully 
investigated by regulators 
7% 8% 11% 5% 8% 
Improve and/or use the news media  7% 11% 4% 4% 7% 
Send e-mails, leaflets and/or newsletters directly 
to patients 
8% 6% 5% 7% 6% 
Convey information through trusted third parties 
(esp. patient groups) 
6% 3% 4% 12% 6% 
Other suggestions made by <5% (e.g. create 
visuals, make engaging TV programmes, utilise 
social media) 
17% 13% 13% 16% 15% 
No answer or Don't know 7% 13% 10% 12% 10% 
Number of suggestions made* 323 252 293 282 288 
*respondents could provide more than one suggestion. 
 
The most popular answer that accounted for 26% of all suggestions was that medicines 
information should be primarily communicated face-to-face by doctors and other healthcare 
professionals (Table 7.5). Reflecting the sentiments of these respondents, one UK doctor 
commented: 
 
“[Information should be communicated]…via Clinicians/Nurses/Healthcare 
Professionals with whom they have a relationship and can explain to them what the 
new information is with respect to the individual medication” 
 
Or as another suggested: 
 
“I think it would be better [for the regulators] not to communicate information to 
patient[s] at all. It would be better to [use] the patients' doctors who can then interpret 
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the details and explain the facts in lay person terms. This information would be better 
received by the patients from someone they know and trust.” 
 
The second most popular suggestion that accounted for 13% of all responses was that 
medicines information should be communicated simply and in a comprehensible way to 
patients (Table 7.5). For example, a respondent from Germany commented: 
 
“Factual information belongs in the hands of professionals, patients need a simple 
summary that better explains the relations: Laymen need Laymen information”68 
 
Or as a UK respondent stated: 
 
“The results should be analysed and peer reviewed by a trustworthy external body and 
communicated clearly to the public in plain English. Results need to be put into context 
i.e. numbers needed to harm and numbers needed to treat. Leaking raw data into the 
public domain is likely to be harmful”. 
 
The third most popular suggestion that accounted for 9% of all suggestions was that the 
regulators should develop their websites to provide a trusted and easily accessible source of 
information for patients. Other less frequently mentioned suggestions were that information 
should not be released until it has been fully investigated by the regulators (8%) and that the 
regulators should improve and/or use the news media (7%), send e-mails, leaflets and/or 
newsletters directly to patients (6%), and convey information through trusted third parties 
(especially patient groups) (6%). For example, one UK respondent commented: 
 
“Not through the Daily Mail!  Clearly presented safety data to health care 
professionals, can then be disseminated to [the] patient population.  Info should be 
available in a patient friendly manner on approved websites.” 
 
Other individual suggestions were also made that accounted for less than 5% of all responses. 
These include suggestions such as that the regulators should create better visuals (e.g. to 
communicate statistical information more effectively), make engaging TV programmes (e.g. 
about medicines), and utilise social media. 
                                                
68 Fachinformationen gehören in Fachhände, Patienten benötigen eine einfachere Zusammenfassung, welche die 
Zusammenhänge besser erklärt: Laien benötigen Laieninformationen 
 





















Figure 7.6: (A) Respondents’ answers (%) to the question: “If the information you personally received (via letter, telephone, e-mail etc.) points to safety problems with a [insert 
sample group medical condition] medicine you are currently taking, do you think you are more likely to…” (N=1010). (B) Four choropleth maps comparing regional variations 
for patients that indicated ‘stop taking your medicine’ or ‘reduce the dose of your medicine’. The darker the shading the higher the number of respondents in that geographic 
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Figure 7.7: Bar chart comparing respondents divided into country and medical condition groups that answered either reduce your dose of the medicine (light shading) or stop 
taking your medicine (dark shading) (%) for the question: “If the information you personally received (via letter, telephone, e-mail etc.) points to safety problems with a 
[relevant medical condition] medicine you are currently taking, do you think you are more likely to… (a) stop taking your medicine, (b) reduce your dose of the medicine, (c) 
continue taking your medicine as usual, (d) seek additional advice about the medicine or (d) don’t know”. Medical condition abbreviations: MS = Multiple Sclerosis; RA = 
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Chapter VIII: EVALUATION OF EMA’s TRANSPARENCY POLICIES 
 
This chapter evaluates the case study evidence on the effectiveness of EMA’s transparency 
policies. While the previous three chapters presented and analysed evidence from multiple 
perspectives (Chapters V-VII), in this chapter a full discussion of the strengths and weaknesses 
of EMA’s input transparency policies and overall strategy for enhancing transparency is 
provided. In particular, the case study evidence can be used to answer directly and explicitly 
the research question by addressing how effective EMA’s transparency policies have been in 
achieving its public policy objectives. This will also enable a fully informed discussion of the 
main implications of the EMA case study for the broader literature on transparency in risk 
regulation. 
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, the case study evidence is used to identify and explain 
the most significant changes to EMA’s transparency strategy between 1995 and 2016. Three 
salient changes are identified using the typology of transparency in risk regulation (Chapter II) 
and explained drawing primarily on the historical analysis (Chapter V). Second, the case study 
evidence is used to evaluate the effectiveness of clinical trial registration and summary level 
results reporting for the medical research community, patients, and doctors. In particular, the 
section evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of each of EMA’s policies and their 
effectiveness in achieving EMA’s transparency goals. Third, an evaluation of the effectiveness 
of EMA’s CSRs transparency policies in enabling the medical community to conduct re-
analyses of input data is provided. The section focuses on quantity and quality issues, the 
capacity of medical researchers to re-analyse CSRs and the effects of enabling re-analyses. 
Fourth, the survey results are discussed in order to evaluate the effectiveness of EMA’ CSRs 
transparency policies for patients and medical doctors. 
 
(8.1) EMA’s transparency strategy post-2010 
 
Between 1995 and 2016, EMA made significant changes to its transparency strategy (Chapter 
V). This includes changes to what regulatory events and processes the regulators wanted to 
make more transparent (objects), how (mechanisms), why (goals), and for whom (audiences) 
(Chapter II). One of the most important changes centred on which transparency objects the 
regulators sought to make more transparent to those outside the traditional regulatory network. 
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In particular, EMA developed and introduced an unprecedented wave of new input type 
policies immediately after the ombudsman’s 2010 decisions (Chapter V). The most notable 
polices were to implement a new reactive access to documents policy (EMA, 2010a); launch 
EMA’s own publicly accessible online clinical trials register (EMA, 2011b); enable sponsors 
to upload summary level trial results onto the register (EMA, 2013, 2014dd); establish a 
publicly accessible web-portal for viewing a sub-set of suspected adverse reaction data (i.e. 
data on possible side effects) (EMA, 2012c); and, most significantly, EMA became the first 
pharmaceutical regulatory agency in the world to publish CSRs online proactively (EMA, 
2014a, 2014b) (Chapter VI). Broadly speaking, these sought to enhance the transparency of the 
data and information that underpins decision-making in EMA’s scientific committees (Bonini 
et al. 2014; EMA, 2015a) (Chapter V). 
 
Introducing this unprecedented wave of input policies was a significant change for EMA. 
Although the regulators had already been committed to transparency for 15 years (Sauer, 1998; 
EMA, 2009), until 2010 they had not introduced any input policies (Chapter V). Rather, the 
regulators had previously focused on enhancing the transparency of decision-making outputs 
(e.g. European Public Assessment Reports) (Sauer, 1997; Lekkerkerker, 2005) and procedural 
processes (e.g. standard operating procedures) (EMA, 2000a, 2005c, 2009). It is true to say that 
EMA also introduced several new operational transparency policies between 2010 and 2016 
such as publishing meeting minutes online (EMA, 2012b, 2014e) and introducing patient 
representatives onto scientific committees (EMA, 2017l). However, the most significant 
change and the regulators’ main focus was on developing and introducing a multiplicity of new 
input type policies.  
 
A second salient change to EMA’s transparency strategy centred on how the regulators sought 
to enhance transparency (i.e. transparency policy mechanisms) (Chapter VI). In particular, 
EMA shifted from a reactive to a much more proactive approach (Chapters V and VI) (EMA, 
2012b, 2014a, 2014b). Shortly after the ombudsman’s 2010 decisions (Ombudsman 2010a, 
2010b), EMA immediately introduced a new reactive transparency policy, which enabled the 
regulators to meet its legal requirements and provide outsiders with access to documents on a 
case by case basis (i.e. on request) (EMA, 2010a; Ombudsman, 2011). This rapidly changed 
after a milestone 2012 announcement (see EMA, 2012a), after which EMA began developing 
numerous new proactive input transparency policies (EMA, 2011b, 2014b, 2014d). While the 
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new proactive approach started with the publication of relatively small quantities of data (e.g. 
summary level trial results) (EMA, 2011b, 2012c), the regulators began incrementally 
publishing increasingly larger quantities of data and information online (e.g. CSRs with 
thousands of pages) (EMA, 2014b). Therefore the mechanisms for EMA’s transparency 
policies trended towards publishing as much data and information as feasibly possible online 
(Rasi, 2012). There is also clear evidence that EMA want to continue this trend such as with 
the proposed proactive publication of hundreds of thousands of pages of individualised patient 
level data (EMA, 2016), although the regulators make clear that there are challenging issues 
that need to be resolved before doing so (e.g. data anonymisation and patient privacy) (Koenig 
et al. 2014; EMA, 2014b, 2017k). EMA’s input transparency policy mechanisms therefore 
trended from a reactive case-by-case approach to the proactive publication of enormous and 
increasingly large quantities of data online. 
 
A third salient change to EMA’s transparency strategy centred on the goals and connected 
audiences of the agency’s input policies (Chapter V). In particular, the regulators’ became 
increasingly fixated on enhancing input transparency for the benefit of medical researchers 
from outside the traditional regulatory network (i.e. changes to policy goals and audiences) 
(Chapter V). During its first 15 years, the main goals of EMA’s policies were to ensure the 
agency was independent from the Commission, industry, and national regulatory authorities 
(Sauer, 1998; EMA, 2005a) and to communicate clearly and effectively with its many 
stakeholders including patients and healthcare professionals (EMA, 2005a; 2009) (Chapter V). 
This can be most clearly seen with the agency’s incremental “step-wise” introduction of 
procedural process and output type policies (EMA, 2009: 1), which were viewed as a useful 
means for “subjecting the agency’s activities to effective public auditing” (EMA, 1996) and 
communicating effectively with patients and healthcare professionals by providing “useful, 
clear and comprehensive information” (EMA, 2005a).  
 
However, since the ombudsman’s 2010 decisions the regulators have become increasingly 
occupied by significant external pressure from external medical researchers. Although 
numerous goals of different EMA input policies can be clearly identified (e.g. minimising 
dissemination biases and better connecting trialists with patients) (Chapter VI), the regulators 
were primarily occupied by the most radical goal of enabling medical researchers (and others) 
to ‘independently’ re-analyse CSRs (EMA, 2013a, 2014f; Eichler et al. 2012, 2013; Bonini et 
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al. 2014). In turn, the regulators expected to achieve at least four secondary goals for the 
medical community and indirectly provide patients and healthcare professionals with a better 
understanding of the benefits and risks of medicines (Chapter VI). Therefore there is clear 
evidence that, since 2010, EMA regulators have become increasingly fixated on the 
challenging goal of enabling medical researchers to re-analyse clinical trial data. In so doing, 
the agency placed much less emphasis on the objectives of independence and benefit-risk 
communication than it had in previous years (that is, at least with regards to the regulators’ 
transparency policies) (Chapter V).  
 
(8.2) Registration and summary-level results policies 
 
This section evaluates the effectiveness of the first two EMA input transparency policies in 
achieving the regulators’ public policy objectives. These are registering clinical trials through 
establishing an online register called EU-CTR (clinicaltrialsregister.eu) (EMA, 2011b) and 
enabling sponsors to upload summary level clinical trial results onto that register (EMA, 
2012c). At least seven main objectives of these two policies were identified for the medical 
research community (e.g. medical researchers and clinical trialists) (Chapter VI). The two most 
important are (1) to provide a way of finding basic information on trials and their results 
(Viergever and Li, 2015) and (2) to improve the issue of nonpublication and associated biases 
(Chan et al. 2014). Two main objectives for patients and doctors were also identified (Chapter 
VI). These are (1) to better connect patients (and their doctors) with trialists (Dickersin and 
Rennie, 2001) and (2) to inform patients and doctors about the results of clinical trials (Chan 
et al. 2014).  
 
One of the greatest strengths of these two input transparency policies is that the main 
mechanism for achieving transparency, EU-CTR, provides a high-level of technical 
functionality and capacity (EMA, 2011b, 2017i; WHO, 2017). The online web-portal enables 
summary level results to be uploaded (EMA, 2013c) and meets the WHO’s strict criteria 
including on “content, quality and validity, accessibility, unique identification, technical 
capacity and administration” (WHO, 2017). This level of functionality is essential for 
providing a place where all trialists, within EMA’s jurisdiction, can register a clinical trial and 
upload summary level results. EU-CTR is also free to use and publicly accessible online (EMA, 
2017i). This means that all audiences of EMA’s policies can receive the information they need, 
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which is an essential pre-requisite for achieving the regulators’ goals (e.g. to conduct 
systematic analyses, find basic trial information, or inform patients and doctors about clinical 
trials) (Viergerver and Li, 2015). There is also clear evidence that the medical research 
community – but not necessarily doctors and patients – have the capacity to process, digest, 
and use the information contained in trial registers including summary results (Song et al. 2010; 
de Wetering et al. 2012; Freshwater et al. 2013; Miller et al. 2015; Chen et al. 2016). For 
example, medical researchers have used trial results for many years in order to conduct 
systematic reviews (Ioannidis, 2005), which are considered by many as the “gold standard” of 
evidence on medicines (Dickersin and Rennie, 2003; Doshi et al. 2012). 
 
However, there are also several significant weaknesses of EMA’s two input transparency 
policies that significantly limit their effectiveness for all audiences. One of the most important 
issues is that EU-CTR does not contain the desired quantity of registered clinical trials or 
reported summary-level results needed for fully achieving any of the regulators’ goals. In 
particular, there has been a distinct lack of compliance with registration and results reporting 
from clinical trialists (Song et al. 2010; Prayle et al. 2012; Miller et al. 2015; Viergerver and 
Li, 2015; Chen et al. 2016). This is an issue because all trials need to be registered and reported 
in order to achieve the highest level of effectiveness. For example, the goals of providing basic 
trial information, better connecting trialists with patients, and mitigating dissemination biases 
are dependent on trialists registering and reporting results on EU-CTR (Chapter VI). In turn, 
this non-compliance issue has a priori limited the effectiveness of EMA’s two policies in 
achieving its secondary goals such as reducing the wastage of scientific resources, reducing 
unnecessary harm to patients, and improving systematic reviews. 
 
A second weakness of EMA’s policies is that they are focused too narrowly on tackling non-
compliance through mandatory reporting. Similar to the FDA, EMA’s main mechanism for 
improving compliance has been to mandate that sponsors post trial results on EU-CTR either 
six months or one year after trial completion or premature termination (EMA, 2014d). There 
is some evidence that this will result in reducing non-compliance such as for industry sponsored 
clinical trials (i.e. trialists that have the capacity and incentives to register and report) (Rawal 
and Deane, 2015). However, a significant issue with mandatory reporting is that it is unlikely 
to address some of the underlying reasons for non-compliance (Bian and Wu, 2010). This 
includes trialists not being aware of reporting or its importance; resource constraints for 
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registering and reporting (e.g. a lack of time); unclear regulatory responsibilities among 
trialists; a lack of incentives and many others (Chapter VI) (Law et al. 2011; Smyth et al. 2011; 
Weber et al. 2015; Viergerver and Li, 2015). There is also clear evidence that other policies 
are likely to be much more effective in tackling non-compliance (Bian and Wu, 2010). 
Therefore, the regulators will need to implement measures beyond mandating registration and 
results reporting in order to achieve EMA’s ultimate transparency goals for all audiences, 
(Viergerver and Li, 2015). This will require first to fully understand and address the underlying 
reasons why many trialists do not register and report results such as by conducting in-depth 
empirical research on the perspectives of trialists (Scherer et al. 2015). 
 
A third weakness of EMA’s input transparency policies is that mandatory reporting only 
applies to trials conducted in the EEA and EU member states (EMA, 2014d). As a decentralised 
EU agency, EMA cannot mandate clinical trial registration and results reporting outside of its 
jurisdiction. Yet, the issue of non-compliance is a global issue (Wager and Williams, 2013; 
Viergerver and Li, 2015; Zarin et al. 2015). Although mandatory reporting can improve rates 
in Europe, there are significant issues of non-compliance across the world including notable 
regional variations. In turn, these global issues have weakened the effectiveness of EMA’s 
transparency policies in achieving its goals. This is because all audiences of input transparency 
need clinical trial information not just from EMA jurisdiction countries (e.g. to obtain basic 
trial information or mitigate dissemination biases). Therefore the regulators need to widen the 
scope of their policies beyond their jurisdiction in order to improve the effectiveness of their 
policies. This will necessarily require working more closely with other regulatory authorities 
across the world on issues of non-compliance, which is essential if the regulators’ want to 
achieve the ultimate goals of their transparency policies. 
 
Beyond these transparency quantity issues, one of the most significant weaknesses of these two 
policies is that they do not meet the desired information quality needed to achieve the 
regulators’ goals. All audiences of EU-CTR need high quality information (Laine et al. 2007; 
Viergerver and Ghershi, 2011; Viergever et al. 2014). If high quality information is not 
provided then the medical research community, patients and doctors cannot trust or use trial 
registers. One of the most significant issues is that EU-CTR does not have the same peer review 
process as medical journals (Science and Technology Committee, 2013). This has resulted in 
many trial entries being incomplete or of poor quality (Viergever and Ghershi, 2011; Manzoli, 
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2014). Although trial registers are not expected to meet the quality standards of medical 
journals, this weakness still significantly affects their reliability and usefulness for all audiences 
(Viergever and Ghershi, 2011). For this reason, many individuals, groups, and institutions 
make clear that trial registration should “complement not replace” medical journal reporting 
(Zarin et al. 2011; Science and Technology Committee, 2013). Therefore until the quality of 
trial registers meets that of medical journals EU-CTR will never be as effective for 
disseminating trial results. 
 
A second quality issue is that EU-CTR is significantly less useful for doctors than the medical 
research community. Most prescribing doctors will be able to process, digest, and use 
information on clinical trials that are registered and reported on EU-CTR (e.g. to inform 
prescribing or identify recruiting trials) (Tuffs, 2005). Yet, not all doctors will have the time to 
go through EMA’s register in order to review the latest evidence on medicines they prescribe, 
let alone other registers as well (British Medical Association 2015). What is more likely is that 
prescribing doctors will continue to use peer review medical journals to inform decision-
making (e.g. systematic reviews of the literature). As the survey results showed (Chapter VII), 
doctors viewed medical journals as their most trustworthy (90%) and useful (85%) source for 
obtaining medicines information.  
 
A third quality issue is that most patients are unlikely to be able use the information made 
available in EU-CTR. In contrast to doctors, patients may have more time to access EU-CTR 
(e.g. to view trials relevant just for their specific medicines). However, most patients are much 
less likely to be able to understand the results of trials reported in registers (Garcia-Retamero 
and Galesic, 2013). This includes interpreting results that were originally written for medical 
researchers and how they fit into their own decision-making context (ibid, 2013). Due to these 
issues with EU-CTR, the European Parliament introduced layperson summaries for trial results 
as a way of better communicating results to patients (and participants) (Clinical Trial 
Regulation EU no. 536/2014). However, recent studies have made clear that even the 
developing ‘layperson’ summaries, let alone the original trial entries, may be difficult for 
patients to understand (e.g. without prior knowledge of the clinical trial process) (Sroka-Saidi 
et al. 2015; Chamberlain-James, 2015; Nottbohm et al. 2016). Thus EMA’s registration and 
reporting policies have significant issues that weaken their effectiveness in achieving the 
regulators’ goals for patients and doctors.  
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(8.3) Re-analysing CSRs 
 
This section evaluates the effectiveness of EMA’s CSRs transparency policy in achieving the 
regulators’ public policy objectives for the medical community (e.g. medical researchers, 
industry, trialists, and health technology assessors). The first overriding goal of the “landmark” 
policy is to enable the medical community to re-analyse the main inputs used for decision-
making in EMA’s scientific committee (Bonini et al. 2014). In turn, re-analyses conducted by 
those outside of regulatory agencies are expected to achieve numerous secondary goals 
(Chapter VI). These include improving the scientific knowledge base on pharmaceuticals 
(Eichler et al. 2013; Bonini et al. 2014); overcoming the failure of registration and results 
reporting (e.g. mitigating dissemination biases) (Wieseler et al. 2012; Doshi et al. 2013; Muand 
et al. 2014); scrutinising regulatory decisions and interpretations of CSRs (Goldacre, 2012; 
Chan et al. 2014); enabling informed decision-making for non-EMA decision-makers 
(McGuaran et al. 201; IQWiG, 2013; NICE, 2013); improving the efficiency and effectiveness 
of drug development and the clinical trial process (Eichler et al. 2013; GlaxoSmithKline, 
2013); and better informing patients and doctors about the benefits and risks of medicines 
(EMA, 2014a; 2016a) (Chapter VI).  
 
(8.3.1) Desirability and feasibility of full disclosure 
 
One of the main advantages of EMA’s CSRs policy for the medical community is that the 
regulators are releasing high quantities of data needed to enable re-analyses (EMA, 2014a). In 
particular, the policy seeks to make as much data as possible publicly available from CSRs 
approved after January 2015 (i.e. after the policy came into force) (EMA, 2014b, 2016a, 
2017m). A key approach to achieving such quantities of transparency is the regulators’ default 
position that CSRs should not be considered confidential and so limited redactions should be 
made (Bonini et al. 2014; EMA, 2016d). Providing high quantities of CSR data is highly 
desired by most re-analysers and is viewed as an important pre-requisite for achieving the 
regulators’ secondary goals (Gøtzsche, 2011; Doshi et al. 2013; Chalmers et al. 2014). While 
some have argued that high levels are needed for conducting comprehensive re-analyses (e.g. 
as otherwise key data might be omitted through redactions) (Wieseler et al. 2012; Maund et al. 
2014), others have argued that enabling all outsiders with access to CSRs and not just re-
analysers is important (Jefferson et al. 2011). For example, enabling anyone that wants to see 
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CSRs data is considered by some as an ethical requirement in the reliability and reproducibility 
of scientific research and peer review (e.g. to assesses the quality of re-analyses) (Prinz, 2011; 
Bohannon et al. 2012; Buthe et al. 2015). A key strength of EMA’s policy, for those expected 
to re-analyse data at least, is therefore that the regulators have sought to provide large quantities 
of CSRs data. 
 
However, providing large quantities of CSRs transparency to enable re-analyses has also 
created significant issues that have limited the effectiveness of the regulators’ policy (Chapter 
VI). In particular, three main issues collectively show that there are complicated and important 
legal and technical challenges that inhibit the full disclosure of CSRs. The first issue is that 
EMA’s policy only applies to CSRs approved after January 2015 (EMA, 2014b). This means 
that it does not enable re-analyses of CSRs for any medicines approved before this date (EMA, 
2014b). This is primarily due to significant technical and resource issues with disclosing CSRs 
relating to previously approved medicines (e.g. reviewing enormous quantities of data for 
possible redactions) (EMA, 2013b). This has significantly weakened the effectiveness of 
EMA’s policy in achieving its secondary goals. For example, for medicines authorised prior to 
January 2015 biases in the published literature cannot be mitigated and exploratory analyses 
cannot be conducted.  
 
The second issue is that  EMA’s policy falls short of providing the most granulated levels of 
input data, which is referred to as ‘patient level data’ or the fourth level of clinical trial data 
transparency (Science and Technology Committee, 2013; Koenig et al. 2014). While 
consulting various stakeholders on its CSRs policy, EMA regulators removed the publication 
of patient level data from its 2014 policy (Koenig et al. 2014). This was primarily due to patient 
privacy and data anonymisation challenges that would have stalled the release of CSRs (EMA, 
2013, 2014). However, by removing patient-level data from EMA’s policies the agency 
admitted that there are limitations to the quantity of data that could be released under its 2014 
policy. In turn, limiting the quantity of data made available limits the effectiveness of EMA’s 
policies in achieving its goals. For example, less comprehensive exploratory re-analyses can 
be conducted (Koenig et al. 2014). 
 
The third issue is that not all actors agree with the publication of such large quantities of data 
desired by many re-analysers (see Price II and Minssen, 2015). First, although EMA’s policy 
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makes clear that most data should not be considered confidential (EMA, 2014b; 2016d), CSRs 
still do contain information that has caused real concerns for some companies about 
competitors using proprietary information (PhRMA and EFPIA, 2013; Pfizer, 2013; Hunter, 
2015). For example, EMA has been sued numerous times for attempting to release CSRs 
through its reactive access to documents policy (EMA, 2013e; EMA, 2017j). Second, CSRs 
contain data and information that could result in the identification of individuals (e.g. trial 
participants or company employees) (EHA, 2013; GlaxoSmithKline, 2013; IFAH-Europe, 
2013). Although some argue that this information can simply be redacted, there are concerns 
that EMA’s policy does not sufficiently address complicated issues with data anonymisation 
(GlaxoSmithKline, 2013; EMA, 2017k). These two issues in particular mean that there are 
significant restrictions over what information can feasibly be made publicly available and that 
some audiences of EMA’s policies do not agree with full disclosure (Chapter VI). In turn, this 
reduces the effectiveness of EMA’s policies in achieving its goals due to the negative effects 
of legal action (e.g. resource consumption), restrictions on the quantity of data that can feasibly 
be made public (e.g. commercially confidential information), and unwanted consequences for 
industry (e.g. competitors accessing proprietary information). 
 
(8.3.2) Capacity to re-analyse CSRs 
 
A second key advantage of EMA’s CSRs policy for the medical research community is that it 
provides high quality data needed for conducting rigorous re-analyses. While registration and 
results reporting quality have been strongly criticised (Viergever and Li, 2015), CSRs differ in 
that they are inherently of high quality as they are written by pharmaceutical companies that 
have to adhere to strict guidelines for licensing approval (e.g. they follow the International 
Council for Harmonisation Guidelines) (EMA, 2012d; International Council for 
Harmonisation, 2017). EMA’s policy therefore enables re-analysers to receive high quality 
information on clinical trial data, which can enable high quality re-analyses to be conducted in 
the achievement of the regulators’ secondary goals. For example, CSRs contain full protocol 
and protocol amendments information that are not always found in trial registers or medical 
journals (Maund et al. 2014). However, an important subsequent question relating to the quality 
of published information centres on whether there are receptors capable of processing, 
digesting and using the information made available (Heald, 2006). This is particularly 
important because CSRs have traditionally been used for discussions between those within the 
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regulatory network (i.e. the Commission, industry, and regulatory authorities) and so may be 
unfamiliar to outsiders (e.g. medical researchers) (Doshi et al. 2013).  
 
On the one hand, there is clear evidence that industry has the capacity to re-analyse CSRs. 
Pharmaceutical companies write and use CSRs for approving their own medicines and so are 
familiar and up-to-date with changes to their structure and format (EMA, 2012d). There is 
evidence that industry are interested in conducting re-analyses (Chapter VI). For example, 
between 2010 and 2013 the pharmaceutical industry made the highest number of requests for 
EMA documents under the agency’s reactive access policy (Bonini et al. 2014). There is also 
evidence that some individuals and institutions from outside the traditional regulatory network 
have the capacity to re-analyse CSRs and hence achieve at least some of EMA’s goals such as 
identifying outcome reporting biases or scrutinising scientific committee decision-making 
(Maund et al. 2014). For example, a few medical researchers and health technology assessors 
have conducted studies using CSRs that were requested through FOI requests and other legal 
challenges (Vedula et al. 2013; Maund et al. 2014; Hodkinson et al. 2016).  
 
On the other hand, far fewer medical researchers operating outside the regulatory network than 
might be assumed currently have the capacity to conduct high quality CSRs re-analyses. 
Although medical researchers are familiar with analysing summary level results in medical 
journals and trial registers, CSRs present a very different prospect. One of the most significant 
issues is that very few medical researchers have ever even heard of CSRs let alone re-analysed 
them. For example, even those who strongly demanded that EMA release CSRs without delay 
admit they are unfamiliar with them including Cochrane Collaboration reviewers (Doshi et al. 
2013: 2; Doshi and Jefferson, 2013b). This may also partly explain why so few academic or 
research institutions requested access to CSRs or other documents between 2010 and 2013 
through EMA’s reactive access policy (Chapter VI) (Bonini et al. 2014). In the long-term, 
researchers may become more familiar with CSRs as they become increasingly publicly 
available and receivers become more sophisticated in analysing such large datasets (Doshi et 
al., 2013; Ebrahim et al. 2014). However, in the short term at least, there is unlikely to be the 
anticipated capacity from those outside the regulatory network to re-analyse CSRs that have 
traditionally been exclusively used by industry and the regulators. In turn, these capacity issues 
significantly weaken the effectiveness of the regulators’ policy in achieving most of its goals.  
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(8.3.3) Conveying the results of re-analyses 
 
Another advantage of EMA’s CSRs policy for the medical community is that there are no 
restrictions on conducting re-analyses (EMA, 2014b). While EMA was developing its CSRs 
policy, the regulators debated placing requirements and safeguards to ensure re-analyses were 
high quality and underwent rigorous regulatory scrutiny (Eichler et al. 2012). This included 
establishing quality standards, establishing a system for regulatory action, requesting statistical 
analysis plans from prospective re-analysers, and establishing a “view on-screen only” 
document presentation mode (Eichler et al. 2012; EMA, 2013a; Norgine, 2013; EORTC, 2013; 
Torjesen, 2014). However, the agency’s final policy placed no such safeguards on the quality 
of re-analyses or how results should be conveyed to the regulators and the public (EMA, 
2014b). For those outside the regulatory network, this policy decision has the distinct advantage 
of reducing unnecessary burdens on those conducting re-analyses. In particular, some argued 
that any restrictions would have “watered down” the effectiveness of EMA’s policy in enabling 
re-analyses (Torjesen, 2014). For example, EMA removed an original view on-screen only 
document presentation mode so that outsiders could “download, save, and print clinical data” 
(Bonini et al. 2014). EMA’s CSRs policy also enables outsiders to freely re-analyse documents 
without first contacting the regulators, which can potentially reduce the burden on EMA (e.g. 
not having to review proposals). Therefore EMA’s policy has the strength of enabling re-
analyses of CSRs data without the involvement of the regulators thus potentially improving its 
effectiveness in achieving its overriding goal of enabling re-analyses. However, there are also 
important consequences of removing all restrictions on re-analyses for the achievement of 
EMA’s ultimate goals.  
 
One important issue is that removing all restrictions enables poor quality re-analyses to be 
conducted. In turn, this significantly weakens the effectiveness of EMA’s policies in achieving 
all of its policy goals (Serptus, 2013; Mello et al. 2013; EORTC, 2014; IAPO, 2014; Greenacre, 
2014; Institute of Medicine, 2015; FEAM69, 2013). Poor quality re-analyses can occur when 
re-analysers misinterpret complicated CSRs data (Greenacre, 2014). There are many examples 
of when EMA regulators have experienced medical researchers conducting meta-analyses that 
were later found to be flawed and contradicted by future studies (Michele, 2010; EMA, 2011c; 
Krumholz and Ross, 2011; Eichler et al. 2012; BioIndustry Association, 2013; IAPA, 2013). 
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‘Independent’ re-analysers can also have conflicts of interest that weaken the quality of their 
results (Ebrahim et al. 2014). For example, EMA regulators identify numerous reasons why 
those outside the regulatory network may be motivated to conduct poor quality analyses 
including “personal advancement in academia, confirmation of previously defended positions, 
or simply raising one’s own visibility within the scientific community” (Eichler et al. 2012). 
By not introducing safeguards, poor quality analyses can reduce the effectiveness of EMA’s 
policy in achieving any of its goals and have unwanted consequences (EFPIA, 2013; Institute 
of Medicine, 2015). 
 
A second issue is that placing restrictions on re-analyses has resulted in more disputes over the 
benefits and risks of medicines (Löfstedt and Way, 2016b). CSRs are complicated documents 
and the results of re-analyses can be contested and debated with ‘independent’ medical 
researchers coming to conflicting conclusions. This can be most clearly seen when Cochrane 
Collaboration researchers re-analysed CSRs on Tamiflu. The results were immediately 
published on Cochrane’s website and in the British Medical Journal, notably, without the 
involvement of the regulators (Cochrane Collaboration, 2014; Jefferson et al. 2014). The 
results subsequently received worldwide media coverage and were then strongly contested and 
debated in the public domain by numerous scientists (Muthuri et al. 2014; Kmietowicz, 2014; 
Butler, 2014). What is interesting is that these discussions took place in the public domain 
rather than behind closed doors at academic meetings (Löfstedt and Way, 2016b). Therefore 
EMA’s policy has resulted in disputes over the regulators’ interpretations of CSRs taking place 
in the public domain. 
 
A third issue is that not placing restrictions on re-analyses has questioned the competence of 
decision-making in EMA’s scientific committees. In contrast to summary level results reported 
in medical journals and trial registers, CSRs are the main source of information used by 
scientific committees to interpret the benefits and risks of medicines. This means that re-
analyses with findings that question the benefit-risk balance of a medicine will indirectly be a 
criticism of the regulators’ scientific committees’ opinions and competence. Beyond Tamiflu, 
the results of many re-analyses were also directly used to question the competence of the 
regulators’ decision-making process including studies on antidepressants, heart medications, 
de-worming treatments, and others (Butler, 2014; Ebrahim et al. 2014). There is also clear 
evidence that re-analyses that challenge the regulators’ scientific opinions receive much greater 
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attention – and are much more likely to be published – than positive confirmatory analyses (see 
Ebrahim et al. 2014 for a discussion). Therefore EMA’s policies has significantly increased 
the number of criticisms of scientific committee experts. 
 
Taken together these three issues have important consequences for the effectiveness of EMA’s 
CSRs policy. First, EMA’s policy will continue to cause outsiders to question the competence 
of EMA’s scientific committees, which could result in undermining trust in the regulatory 
approval system (Institute of Medicine, 2015; EuropaBio, 2013; EFPIA, 2013).  In turn,  there 
are concerns that this could cause significant unwanted effects of EMA’s policy or as the 
Institute of Medicine (2015) puts it: “mistrust could ultimately lead to seriously flawed clinical 
care decisions, unwarranted patient concerns about the quality of care, or avoidable patient 
anxiety” (Institute of Medicine, 2015). Second, EMA’s policy will continue to increase the  
need for the regulators to respond to invalid secondary re-analyses, which is an issue that others 
have found particularly difficult in the past (see Wallentin et al. 2014 for a discussion). Third, 
EMA’s policy has resulted in patients and doctors receiving more (uncertain) information 
pointing to potential safety problems with their medicine. This raises important questions about 
EMA’s role in ensuring that patients receive high quality information from re-analyses. As the 
International Alliance of Patient Organisations (IAPO, 2013: 96) comments: “So what are the 
patient and public (and even clinicians) to do in the case of contradictory or challenging 
findings based on a secondary analysis?”. Therefore there are important consequences for the 
effectiveness of EMA’s CSRs policy from not implementing a system of quality control and 
how the results of re-analyses are to be disseminated.  
 
 (8.4) Implications of survey findings 
 
The overriding goal of EMA’s input policies for patients and doctors is to better inform them 
about the benefits and risks of medicines evaluated by EMA’s scientific committees. For 
EMA’s CSRs policy, in particular, the case study evidence shows that patients and doctors are 
highly unlikely to become better informed by accessing trial registers or EMA’s CSRs web-
portal directly (Lang, 2013). Instead, they are much more likely to (potentially) gain a better 
understanding of the benefits and risks of EMA approved medicines indirectly from 
intermediaries re-packaging information and conveying the results of re-analyses (Chapter VI). 
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In order to understand the effectiveness of EMA’s policies in achieving its goals for patients 
and doctors, five main findings from the surveys are discussed. 
 
(8.4.1) Patients and doctors want more and better quality information 
 
One implication of the survey findings is that many patients and doctors agree with the main 
goals of EMA’s input policies of providing more information to improve decision-making 
(Chapter VI) (EMA, 2014b, 2015a; 2016a). One finding was that patients and, to a lesser 
extent, doctors desire more information on medicines. Almost 40% of patients said that there 
is too little information on medicines currently publicly available (Table 7.2). While 
significantly fewer doctors felt the same, almost a third still indicated that they feel there is too 
little information available. The large majority of patients and just over 50% of doctors also 
agreed that patients receiving more information on the safety of medicines would increase their 
medicine-taking confidence (Table 7.1)70. 
 
A second implication of the surveys is that providing patients and doctors with a better 
understanding of the benefits and risks of medicines is also a highly desirable and appropriate 
goal for EMA’s input policies. A second key survey finding was that large numbers of patients 
and especially doctors believe that medicines information currently publicly available is of 
poor quality and communicated ineffectively. The large majority of patients and even more 
doctors felt that the health information they receive is affected by politics, sensationalised by 
the media, and generally biased (Figure 7.1). Over 40% of doctors also felt that health 
information facts are not communicated properly, are not easy to understand by the general 
public, and are generally not clear (Figure 7.3). Although patients were less negative about the 
quality of information and how it is communicated, over a quarter of patients also shared these 
views.  
 
Taken together these findings have direct implications for EMA’s policy decision not to place 
safeguards on outsiders conducting re-analyses (EMA, 2014b). In particular, along with 
ensuring that re-analyses conducted outside the regulatory network are highly accurate, the 
                                                
70 This should not be misinterpreted as showing that respondents’ confidence would necessarily increase after 
receiving ‘more’ information. Rather, that the majority of doctors and patients agree that more information in 
general would be expected to increase patients’ confidence in taking medicines. 
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regulators will have to ensure that patients receive better quality and well communicated 
information from re-analyses. This is important because as, the European Organisation for 
Research and Treatment of Cancer (EORTC) comments: “Incorrect analysis and interpretation 
of results could result in considerable damage to public health [and] this damage could be 
irreversible” (EORTC: 89: 1-2). In other words, EMA needs to respond proactively to re-
analyses that are being disputed in the public domain. This will also present a challenging task 
for the regulators because poor quality or poorly communicated re-analyses of CSRs could 
further damage an already vulnerable pharmaceutical information and communication 
environment. For example, the Institute of Medicine (2015) make clear that the regulators may 
find it difficult to refute spurious claims publicised in the media even if they are later 
disapproved in other published articles.  
 
(8.4.2) Patient and doctors are confused about the contribution of the regulators  
 
Another main survey finding was that many patients and even doctors have not heard of the 
authorities that regulate medicines. While over three quarters of patients and 20% of doctors 
indicated that they had not even heard of EMA, 56% of patients and 6% of doctors said the 
same about their relevant NCA. These figures are also likely to be higher as this is a self-
reported awareness question that is susceptible to social desirability bias (Fisher, 1993). 
Further, when comparing these findings with other surveys, EMA and, to a lesser extent, NCAs 
can also be seen to be much less well known than comparable agencies such as the US FDA 
and EFSA (EFSA, 2010; Löfstedt et al. 2011). For example, the results of a 2011 survey 
showed that 98% of US public respondents (N=1,000) had at least heard of the FDA. This lack 
of visibility in the channels of information also does not deviate fundamentally from earlier 
general public survey findings (Bouder et al., 2015).  
 
Several further questions also showed that, even if some patients and doctors have heard of the 
institutions that regulate pharmaceuticals, the large majority are confused about their 
contribution to the pharmaceutical system. First, the large majority of patients and doctors are 
unaware of the regulators’ medicines, health alerts, or other health communication activities. 
This means that most patients and doctors are unaware of the benefit-risk communication 
activities of both their national and supranational EU regulatory authorities. Second, over three 
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quarters claimed not to have a good knowledge of how EMA and their NCA assess the safety 
of medicines71. 
 
The findings that patients and doctors are confused about the contribution of regulatory 
authorities to the pharmaceutical system has important implications. First, the findings provide 
further evidence that patients and doctors are highly unlikely to read CSRs directly by going 
online and accessing EMA’s CSRs web-portal (Lang, 2013; Drug Commission of the German 
Medical Association, 2013). For example, as the Drug Commission of the German Medical 
Association comment: 
 
“Performing a proper re-analysis on the basis of raw data will need much expertise, 
high skills and technical equipment usually not available to interested clinicians” 
 
Although the results do not directly examine comprehension (e.g. whether patients do actually 
understand information in EMA documents), it seems very unlikely that patients and doctors 
will become more informed about an institution simply by receiving documents used by the 
agency that are so unfamiliar and which operates in such a technical field (e.g. documents used 
by experts working in EMA’s scientific committees to evaluate the safety and efficacy of 
medicines) (Lang, 2013). Second, the findings raise important questions about EMA’s ability 
to respond to the results of CSRs re-analyses whether they are positive or negative. Although 
the regulators see themselves as key providers of safety information (EMA, 2014g), refuting 
the results of poor quality analyses will be especially difficult if patients and the public are 
unaware of who the regulators are (see Tuler and Kasperson, 2014; Siegrist et al. 2007; 
Kasperson et al. 2014). Therefore this is one notable issue that needs to be addressed if the 
regulators’ transparency goals are to be achieved for patients and doctors.  
 
(8.4.3) Patients and doctors disagree over when re-analysed data should be conveyed 
 
The fourth main finding from the surveys was that doctors and patients disagree over when 
newly found information pointing to a safety issue should be conveyed to the public. While the 
                                                
71 To be clear, rather than measuring whether respondents do, indeed, have good knowledge of how the regulators 
assess the safety of medicines, the self-reported nature of this question points to respondents’ confidence in their 
knowledge of how the regulators’ assesses the safety of medicines. This means that most patients and doctors 
either have low knowledge of how medicines are evaluated or, at least, have low confidence in their knowledge 
of how medicines are evaluated. 
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majority of patients (60%) think it is a good idea to inform the general public about a possible 
safety issue before a scientific analysis has been conducted, the majority of doctors (76%) think 
doing so would be a bad idea. In agreement with this finding, over half of patients surveyed 
also indicated that they would prefer to receive safety information when there is a possible sign 
of a safety problem (i.e. as soon as it is available) and before it has been investigated at all and 
before either industry or the regulators believe the issue is related to the medicine. In sharp 
contrast to the views of patients, less than a quarter of doctors indicated the same. Instead, over 
60% of doctors indicated that either industry or the regulators should investigate the possible 
safety issue first and that information should only be conveyed when they believe that the 
problem is related to the medicine. 
 
These results have important implications for EMA’s decision not to review the results of re-
analyses before they are made public. First, the majority of patients are likely to agree with 
EMA that the results of CSRs re-analyses should be conveyed to the public before first being 
investigated by the regulators or industry (i.e. to confirm their findings). They are also likely 
to agree with EMA that external researchers should not have to discuss their findings with the 
regulators before publishing their results. Rather, the results should be conveyed to the public 
when re-analysers identify a possible sign of a safety problem.  
 
In sharp contrast to patients, the majority of doctors are likely to strongly disagree with the 
regulators’ decision. This is not a surprising finding. For example, a February 2015 British 
Medical Association (BMA) study of 15,560 UK GPs found that 37% think their workload is 
unmanageable (BMA, 2015). If more unsubstantiated medicines data is released without being 
investigated by industry or the regulators then doctors will arguably be the ones taking on the 
burden of dealing with concerned patients. This is also most likely why the two most popular 
open ended responses for doctors regarding the best way to communicate medicines 
information were (1) information should be conveyed face-to-face with doctors and (2) 
healthcare professionals and information should be communicated simply and in a 
comprehensible way (Table 7.3). Thus once doctors become aware of EMA’s CSRs policy they 
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(7.4.4) Patients will have varying reactions to re-analysed data 
 
One of the most important findings from the surveys was that patients are likely to have varying 
reactions to receiving the results of CSRs re-analyses that point to safety problems with their 
medicines. The majority of patients (56%) indicated that they would ‘seek additional advice 
about the medicine’. Although this result does not show whether patients would actually seek 
additional advice, it shows their perceived likelihood of doing so (i.e. behavioural intentions). 
On the one hand, it is highly promising that the majority of patients would ‘seek additional 
advice’ when receiving uncertain information on their medicines. For example, this behaviour 
is what would be recommended by the regulators and healthcare professionals in such a 
scenario with NHS Choices (2015), the official health website of the UK National Health 
Service, making clear that patients should “…only ever stop taking prescribed medication if 
your GP specifically advises you to”. This advice is also especially relevant considering the 
sample was of individuals with serious long-term medical conditions. One consequence of this 
finding is that the impact of poor quality re-analyses of CSRs on prescription compliance is 
likely to be much weaker for these groups assuming they sought advice from sources that were 
aware that the re-analyses were of poor quality (e.g. doctors or pharmacists). On the other hand, 
the capacity may not exist to attend to patients seeking additional advice over the safety of 
medicines after the results of re-analyses have been disseminated. Therefore the high quantity 
of information seekers suggests that doctors are likely to see an increase of patients when the 
results of both high and low quality CSRs re-analyses are communicated to the public via 
intermediaries. In particular, the majority of patients are most likely to obtain such additional 
information from their pharmacist, or their doctor as these were rated as two of the easiest and 
most trustworthy sources for patients to obtain medicines information. As discussed in the 
previous section, this could cause concern for healthcare professionals as many are already 
overworked and overloaded with patients. 
 
An arguably more significant issue is the finding that, although many would seek additional 
advice, a large numbers of patients would either stop (26%) or reduce (9%) the dose of their 
medicine. One key implication of these results is that, in the event that the results of CSRs re-
analyses identify a possible safety issue with a medicine, then a large downfall of prescription 
compliance can be expected. For example, it took only one article (Nissen and Wolski, 2007) 
published in the New England Journal of Medicine and four months for 60% of patients taking 
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Avandia (roglitazone)—a type II diabetes drug—to discontinue their medication based on 
incomplete information (Saul, 2007; Löfstedt, 2010).  
 
Furthermore, the likelihood of patients indicating one of these two options also varied 
significantly depending on their medical condition and, moreover, their country and geographic 
region. For example, when combining these response categories (country and medical 
condition), 68% of respondents from Germany diagnosed with IPF compared to 11% of UK 
respondents diagnosed with HIV/AIDS said they would more likely ‘stop taking’ or ‘reduce 
the dose’ of their medicine (Figure 4). Confirming the results from a general public survey 
(Bouder et al. 2015), patients from Germany, Spain, and France were also significantly more 
likely to stop taking their medicine than respondents from the UK. The surveys also show that 
a prescription non-compliance response is also likely to vary between medical conditions and 
nations. With that said, even patients with HIV/AIDS taking antiretroviral treatments can be 
expected to stop taking their medicines if they receive information on a possible safety issue 
from re-analysed CSRs with almost 30% of patients from Germany indicating they would 
either stop taking their medicine or reduce the dose. It is therefore clear that EMA will have to 
work closely with national authorities and patient groups that have intimate localised 
knowledge of national healthcare systems and patient communities. This includes an in-depth 
understanding of the actor groups that are at the coal-face of communicating benefit-risk 
information with the public and, as this study shows, who are crucial for maintaining public 
trust in the pharmaceutical system. In so doing, one goal will be to improve doctors’ 
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Chapter IX: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This thesis explored and critically examined the concept of transparency in risk regulation in-
depth. The first main contribution of the study is the creation of an original typology (Chapter 
II). The typology crucially enabled the investigator to disambiguate the concept of transparency 
in risk regulation and create clear distinctions between different policies (Chapter II) (Heald, 
2006; Meijer et al. 2015). Such distinctions were made between what risk regulators seek to 
make more transparent (objects), how (mechanisms), why (goals), and for whom (audiences) 
(Gupta and Mason, 2014). The typology can now be used by future researchers seeking to 
navigate the seriously fragmented transparency literature (Chapter III). For example, in this 
study the typology enabled the investigator to identify that, although there have been numerous 
studies examining the effectiveness of output transparency policies (Arvai and Rivers III, 2014; 
Way et al. 2017), much more empirical evidence on the effectiveness of input transparency 
policies was, and still is, needed (Etzioni, 2010; Löfstedt, 2013). The typology can also be used 
by future researchers measuring and evaluating transparency policy effectiveness. For 
example, in this study the typology enabled the investigator to identify significant changes to 
EMA’s transparency strategy over time including the remarkable evolution of input type 
policies (Chapters V-VIII).  
 
The second main contribution of this thesis is that it provides much needed empirical evidence 
on the effectiveness of transparency in risk regulation. In particular, the EMA case study 
generated in-depth evidence on the effectiveness of various input transparency policies in 
achieving the agency’s public policy objectives. The case study narrative in itself provides a 
significant contribution to the literature (Chapter VIII). Yet, one of the most important 
overriding outcomes was that regulatory authorities should not assume that introducing policies 
designed to enhance transparency will necessarily achieve their expected goals. Rather, 
transparency policies need to be measured and evaluated for their effectiveness in the 
achievement of specific and attainable objectives (Coglianese, 2012; Heald, 2012). While the 
case study identified many important arguments for transparency (Chapter VI), it also found 
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(9.1) Captivated by full disclosure 
 
One of the most important issues that significantly weakened the effectiveness of EMA’s 
transparency strategy centred on the quantity of transparency. In particular, the EMA case study 
showed that over time the regulators became more and more captivated with publishing 
increasingly large quantities of input data online (Chapter VIII). There is evidence that the 
regulators felt they had little choice (personal communication, 2013) and the extent of the 
external pressure put on EMA should not be underestimated. For example, the regulators 
received criticisms from a multiplicity of different stakeholders and actors ranging from 
medical researchers wishing to re-analyse industry data (Gøtzsche and Jørgensen, 2011; Doshi 
et al. 2013) to a succession of European ombudsmen (Ombudsman, 2010; O’Reilly, 2013, 
2014), and several MEP politicians (Willmott, 2013) (Chapters V and VI). Yet, the in-depth 
case study also identified many reasons why becoming captivated by the quantity of 
transparency can significantly weaken the effectiveness of different policies. This is 
particularly important because many other regulatory authorities have taken or are debating 
taking a similar approach to EMA (Url, 2014; FDA, 2014). For example, since 2014 EFSA has 
begun providing a “treasure trove” of food safety input data from its “data warehouse” (Url, 
2014).  
 
One important issue with being captivated by the quantity of transparency is that there are many 
reasons why full input disclosure may not be feasible or desirable (Birchall, 2011; Gupta and 
Mason, 2014). Although some have argued that industry have been overly defensive (e.g. 
Eichler et al. 2013), there are still significant unresolved commercial confidentiality and 
privacy issues that limit the quantity of information that can feasibly or desirably be made 
publicly available (see Price II and Minssen, 2015 for a discussion). Publishing large quantities 
of input data has also resulted in substantially increasing legal action against EMA (EMA, 
2013, 2015). Second, the assumption that all documents and information can simply be 
uploaded online with the click of a mouse is naïve. There are complicated challenges with 
anonymising data, creating online systems for sharing data, and tackling non-compliance. 
Therefore full input disclosure is not necessarily feasible or desirable, which raises questions 
over when transparency in risk regulation is satisfied (Hood, 2001). 
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A second main issue with being captivated by the quantity of transparency is that the capacity 
and infrastructures needed to achieve the regulator’s goals may not yet exist. A key assumption 
with introducing any new transparency policy is that outsiders can understand the information 
made available and have the capacity and resources needed to achieve the regulator’s second 
order goals (Roberts, 2006; Gupta, 2008). As Mitchell (2011) argues: “complex infrastructures 
of monitoring and verification are needed to render disclosed information usable”. Yet, the 
EMA case showed that many of the audiences of transparency are highly unlikely to be able to 
use much of the information being made available (Chapter VIII). While there are significant 
issues with trial registration and results reporting (EMA, 2013, 2014; Viergever and Li, 2015; 
Chen et al. 2016), those demanding EMA provide access to CSRs openly admit that most 
medical researchers have never heard of the documents (Doshi et al. 2013). This seriously 
questions whether full disclosure will actually enhance transparency if the information made 
available is not comprehensible or actionable (Gupta and Mason, 2014). It also seriously 
questions how intermediaries will repackage and convey their own interpretations (O Neill, 
2006; Mason and O’Neill, 2008). For example, the EMA case showed that publishing large 
quantities of data has resulted in more poor quality re-analyses being conducted, more disputes 
over what the transparent data means, and more criticisms of the regulator’s competence in 
interpreting data (Chapter VIII). This means that there are important issues with full disclosure 
that centre on the capacity of outsiders to interpret and use the data made available and, in turn, 
convey key findings as intermediaries (O’Neill, 2006). 
 
A third main issue with being captivated by the quantity of transparency is that the regulators 
have inadvertently ignored the importance of communication. Information made publically 
available has to be interpreted for meaning and in the context of medicines this requires expert 
understanding and communication (Fischhoff et al. 2011; Fischhoff, 2013). If transparency 
policies are not accompanied by effective (benefit-risk) communication, then they are unlikely 
to achieve the regulator’s goals (Löfstedt and Bouder, 2014). For example, O’Neill and Mason 
(2008) comment: 
 
“Complete transparency might entail such detailed and complex discussion of the 
scientific process by which conclusions were reached as to obscure the major points of 
an argument made to non-expert audiences or to weaken the policy relevance and 
vividness of the communication”. 
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This means that the rise of input transparency policies presents a new challenge for 
transparency and risk communication scholars especially with regard to addressing the tension 
between the accessibility and comprehensibility of information made publicly available (Hood, 
2007; Meijer, 2016). While there is a need for transparency policies to be accompanied by 
state-of-the-art risk communication science (Löfstedt and Bouder, 2014), there is equally a 
need for the sub-field of risk communication to engage with the challenges presented by 
transparency (see section 9.2) (Meijer, 2016).  
 
A fourth main issue with being captivated by the quantity of transparency is that full disclosure 
is resource intensive. The EMA case study showed many ways that seeking to enhance 
transparency can consume substantial resources (Chapter VI). This includes EMA responding 
to external re-analyses of CSRs, anonymising and redacting millions of pages of regulatory 
documents, dealing with legal action against the agency, and developing and managing 
information systems for making data publicly available, as well as many other resource 
intensive activities (Chapter VIII). For example, in September 2013 EMA established “a 
dedicated multidisciplinary team of 13 full-time equivalent staff members working every day 
on access to documents and requests for documents” (Pott, 2015). 
 
One important issue with consuming so many resources is that the agency will be less able to 
respond to the new more open information environment. For example, EMA will be less able 
to respond to the results of both high and poor quality re-analyses of regulatory data that 
challenge the benefit-risk profile of medicines authorised through EMA’s centralised 
procedure. A second key issue is that focusing on full disclosure will mean that EMA will have 
fewer resources to put towards other policies that may be more effective in achieving their 
ultimate public policy objectives (Meijer et al. 2015). For example, the large resource 
consumption of EMA’s CSRs policy means that the agency will have fewer resources to 
improve trial registration and results reporting, which are two policies that many have argued 
will be much more effective in achieving the regulators’ ultimate goal of minimising non-
publication and associated biases (Science and Technology Committee, 2013; Hoffmann et al. 
2017). Therefore full disclosure policies are unlikely to be the most effective way of achieving 
the regulator’s goals as they can draw resources away from other potentially more useful 
policies (Meijer et al. 2015). 
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(9.2) Re-conceptualising transparency as a communication process 
 
The results of this study have important implications for how transparency has been 
conceptualised in the academic literature and policymaking. Transparency is widely 
understood by most scholars to mean more than just access to documents (Birkinshaw, 2006). 
Several academics and policymakers also make clear that the concept extends beyond 
‘openness’ to “embrace simplicity and comprehensibility” (see Alemanno, 2014 for a 
discussion; Heald, 2006, 2015; Meijer et al. 2012; Baume and Popodoupolos, 2015). As Heald 
(2006: 26) explains:  
 
“...it is possible for an organisation to be open about its documents and procedures but 
yet not be transparent to relevant audiences if the information is perceived as 
incoherent. Openness might therefore be thought of as a characteristic of an 
organisation, whereas transparency also requires external receptors capable of 
processing the information made available”.72 
 
Therefore a central tenet underpinning contemporary transparency theory is that 
data/information needs to be comprehensible and understandable in order to be processed by 
‘outsiders’ (i.e. the audiences of the regulator’s policies). This has also been emphasised by 
some policymakers and many academics (Coglianese, 2009; Alemanno, 2014). When defining 
transparency, Robert Soderman, the first European ombudsman, emphasised that “the process 
through which public authorities make decisions should be understandable and open” [italics 
added for emphasis] (Curtin and Meijer, 2006: 110). Patrick Birkinshaw (2006) highlighted the 
importance of comprehensibility and simplicity when noting that “complexity and disorder” 
are an “obstacle” to transparency. What this means is that in order to enhance transparency, 
rather than simply become more open or provide access to documents (e.g. as a legal 
requirement), organisations need to ensure that data/information is comprehensible and hence 
can be received, digested, processed and used by target audiences (Heald, 2006; Gupta and 
Mason, 2014).  
 
However, this study shows that these dominant conceptualisations of transparency do not go 
far enough. What has been largely omitted from contemporary transparency theory is the 
                                                
72 Heald (2015: 3) also clarifies: “If there is to be a distinction, openness might be seen as pertaining to the 
‘watched’ (e.g. information is made available) whereas transparency also requires the watcher to be able to 
process that information”. 
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paramount importance of actually communicating the data/information made publicly available 
by regulatory authorities. If information is not communicated then it is unlikely to be 
comprehensible or understood by any audience (Tsoukas, 1997; Fenster, 2006; Keohane et al. 
2014). Emphasising communication may seem trivial. Yet, there is clear evidence from this 
thesis that EMA regulators and many transparency scholars have inadvertently ignored the 
importance and complexity of communicating information. For example, the EMA case study 
showed that the regulators became captivated by increasing the quantity of data/information 
made publicly available (e.g. the number of pages uploaded) (section 9.1). In turn, they paid 
insufficient attention to how that data/information is received, understood, and used by external 
receptors (Chapter VIII). This crucial issue is concisely explained by O’Neill (2006): 
 
“An emphasis on transparency encourages us to think of information as detachable 
from communication, and of information as a process of ‘transferring’ content, rather 
than as achieved only by speech-acts that communicate with specific audiences. […]. 
[By conceptualizing transparency in this way] …it then becomes natural to see 
informing mainly as a matter of disclosure and/or dissemination by those in control of 
information, and to overlook or downplay the fact that effective communication must 
reach audiences”. 
 
Effective transparency requires effective (benefit-risk) communication and if communication 
is not integrated with transparency theories then data/information will continue to be ‘hidden 
in plain sight’ (Fischhoff, 2013). 
 
Following this line of argumentation, it is strongly argued in this thesis that transparency in 
risk regulation needs to be re-conceptualised as a risk communication process. Although a 
handful of others have discussed the intersection between transparency and communication (O’ 
Neill, 2006; Fenster, 2006; Keohane et al. 2014; Bouder et al. 2015; Way and Lofstedt, 2016a, 
2016b; Meijer, 2016), this thesis provides concrete evidence on why integrating 
communication and contemporary transparency theory is so important. In particular, the EMA 
case showed that transparency is unlikely to be effective and the regulator’s goals unlikely to 
be achieved if policies focus on simply providing greater access to raw data while not 
recognising the importance of communicating information made publicly available to relevant 
audiences (Chapter VIII). To be clear, while most researchers have focused on simply 
connecting transparency with comprehensibility, this thesis argues that there needs to be a 
much more explicit engagement with the process of communicating data/information 
effectively with different audiences. 
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(9.3) Implications and recommendations 
 
Reconceptualising transparency as a communication process subsequently has important 
implications for risk research and especially the sub-field of risk communication. One main 
implication is that the risk communication literature can be usefully applied to understanding 
the effectiveness of many existing transparency policies. While several transparency scholars 
have lamented the lack of empirical research on transparency (e.g. Etzioni, 2010), others have 
argued that since 2010 there has been a noticeable growth of empirical research primarily in 
the form of policy experiments (Cucciniello et al. 2017). Yet, when transparency is 
reconceptualised as a risk communication process, over 50 years of theoretical and empirical 
research can be directly applied to understanding the effectiveness of different regulatory 
policies. For example, when reviewing the literature on transparency in risk regulation, this 
thesis found that output and process transparency policies especially have been long debated 
in the risk communication literature (Chapter III). Therefore many transparency policies can 
be improved by drawing on the collective wealth of scientific risk communication research 
(Slovic, 2000; Fischhoff et al. 2011; Fischhoff, 2013; Arvai and Rivers III, 2014; National 
Academy of Science, 2016; Jamieson et al. 2017).  
 
A second main implication of reconceptualising transparency as a risk communication process 
is that risk communication scholars can significantly contribute to improving transparency 
policy effectiveness. The case study identified two areas where the sub-field of risk 
communication could make the most significant impact. First, the EMA case highlighted the 
importance of intermediaries in assessing/analysing data and then communicating new 
findings. Risk communication scholars could play a central role in investigating and improving 
how these new intermediaries communicate findings from publicly available data (Mitchell, 
2011; Dunwoody and Griffin, 2014). They could examine how effective intermediaries are in 
achieving the ultimate risk communication goals that underpin most transparency policies 
(Brewer, 2011). Risk communication scholars could also analyse the impact of transparency 
on increasing the amount of uncertainty over scientific findings that is available in the public 
domain (e.g. public debates over Tamiflu or human papilloma virus vaccines) (Lofstedt and 
Bouder, 2017). For example, the social amplification of risk framework could inform new 
studies investigating the impact of the regulator’s policies on public understanding of risk, 
benefit-risk information and medical science (Kasperson et al. 1988; Pidgeon, 2003).  
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Second, the EMA case found that transparency policies have profoundly changed the risk 
communication environment. This has led to new, previously unexamined, risk communication 
challenges for regulatory agencies. For example, making the data that underpins decision-
making in EMA’s scientific committees publicly available was found to substantially increase 
public scrutiny of the regulators and led to indirect challenges of their competence (Chapter 
VIII). Regardless of whether these re-analyses or criticisms have been beneficial, accurate or 
fair, enabling external scrutiny presents a major new risk communication challenge for 
practitioners. For example, how should the regulators respond to growing challenges to their 
competence? How should government authorities and scientists respond when there may be 
little time to check the quality of external re-analyses? By re-conceptualising transparency as 
a risk communication process, scholars can examine the new regulatory environment and help 
tackle the most pressing transparency challenges affecting practitioners.  
 
A third main implication of re-conceptualising transparency as a risk communication process 
is that risk communication scholars and practitioners can work more closely together on 
improving policy effectiveness. On the one hand, this will mean that researchers will have to 
ensure that new findings are applicable to the new challenges affecting regulatory authorities. 
Indeed, increasing the policy relevance of risk communication research can be a significant 
issue or as Fischhoff et al. (2011: 2) put it:  
 
“...academic researchers’ theoretical interests often lead to studying communication 
processes in isolation, leaving gaps as to how research results apply to complex, real-
world situations. Unable to access the research literature, practitioners rely on their 
intuition, unproven best practices, and popular accounts of psychological research.”  
 
In order to improve the relevance of risk communication research, academics will need to more 
proactively engage with the new more transparent risk communication environment. In so 
doing, there is an important role for academics to make evidence-based recommendations that 
are suited to the rapidly changing and more transparent risk communication environment.  
 
On the other hand, there is equally a need for regulatory authorities to provide meaningful 
opportunities for scholars to contribute. This presents a major challenge as transparency is often 
discussed at a level of abstraction that obscures the crucial connection between 
comprehensibility and communication. Furthermore, there was clear evidence from the case 
study that the regulators have increasingly divided the concepts of transparency and risk 
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communication over time. For example, while EMA emphasised the importance of 
communication in the development of its transparency strategy in 2005 (EMA, 2005b), the 
agency had all but removed ‘communication’ from its transparency policies by 2013 (Chapter 
VIII). Some interviewees described this as a ‘silo-ing’ effect where transparency and 
communication have been increasingly separated within the organisation (personal 
communication, 2014). Thus connecting transparency with (risk) communication will be a 
major challenge for regulatory authorities and improving transparency policy effectiveness.  
 
Taken together, these key issues highlight the need to measure and evaluate the effectiveness 
of transparency in risk regulation and not just in the pharmaceutical domain. In seeking to 
identify and implement the most effective transparency policies, fives concrete 
recommendations are provided.  
 
(9.3.1) Establish an independent benefit-risk communication advisory board at EMA 
 
EMA should establish an independent Benefit-Risk Communication Advisory Board (Bouder, 
2011; Bouder et al. 2015). As suggested by the investigator and colleagues (Bouder et al. 
2015), the board can be modelled on the FDA’s highly successful Risk Communication 
Advisory Committee (RCAC, 2017). The board should not be a new EMA committee such as 
PRAC or CHMP. Rather, it should be comprised of experts from the sub-field of risk 
communication and the medical community. The main purpose of the board would be to 
provide support for EMA in a new more transparent risk communication environment. For 
example, the FDA’s RCAC has addressed topics such as recent developments in the risk 
communication literature, the challenges of communicating more effectively with healthcare 
professionals, how to improve agency message designs, and many others (Fischhoff et al. 2011; 
FDA, 2016). The first objective of EMA’s board could be to review the evidence on the 
effectiveness of the agency’s transparency policies and its risk communication strategies. For 
example, the board could first conduct a review on the state-of-the-art risk communication 
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 (9.3.2) Build relationships with trusted intermediaries 
 
The second recommendation is that EMA should build closer relationships with trusted 
intermediaries. EMA’s policies have resulted in enormous quantities of input data and 
information being published online. There is clear evidence that re-analysers will convey their 
findings to patients and doctors via intermediaries without first consulting the regulators 
(Jefferson et al. 2014; Butler 2014; Ebrahim et al. 2014). This means that intermediaries will 
have a new role in communicating benefit-risk information to the public. As several senior 
EMA regulators make clear: “the media play a key role and need to provide accurate 
information gleaned from documents they receive from EMA” (Bonini et al. 2014). Yet, EMA 
cannot assume that intermediaries including the media and others will be effective in 
communicating benefit-risk information (Kasperson et al. 1988; Pidgeon et al. 2003; Barnett 
and Breakwell, 2003). Rather, EMA need to build relationships with trusted intermediaries so 
that they are more prepared to respond to the results of re-analyses. For example, the regulators 
can establish trusted networks with patients and doctor groups and key news media outlets. 
Building trusted relationships can also help to ensure that the regulators can respond quickly 
and effectively to the results of both high and low quality re-analyses of clinical trial data. This 
is particularly important because EMA does not have the capacity or resources to ensure that 
the results of all re-analyses are communicated effectively by itself. This is especially true with 
the new resource-intensive demands of the UK exiting the EU and the agency most likely being 
forced to move its headquarters out of London (Wilsdon, 2017). 
 
(9.3.3) A conference on evidence-based transparency  
 
The third recommendation is that a conference on evidence based transparency should be held 
at the European Commission (Bouder et al. 2015). The ambiguity of transparency in risk 
regulation and the tendency for regulatory to become captivated by full disclosure emphasize 
the need to improve the regulator’s transparency strategies. Policymakers often declare that 
transparency is important and needed. Yet, there is still little understanding of what needs to 
be made transparent, how, why and for whom, as well as the desired quantity and quality of 
transparency (Gupta and Mason et al. 2014). A conference could bring together both regulators 
and academics so that the latest evidence can be conveyed on which transparency policies work 
best, for whom, and why. Moreover, while historically there have been few critical 
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examinations of transparency in risk regulation (Etzioni, 2010; Löfstedt, 2013), recent findings 
show that more theoretical and empirical research is beginning to be conducted (Cucciniello et 
al. 2017). This means that there is much that has been learnt in recent years that could 
significantly benefit the regulators’ strategies. 
 
(9.3.4) Conduct more empirical research on effectiveness 
 
One of the main findings from the literature review was that few real-world empirical studies 
have been conducted on transparency in risk regulation. While there is evidence of more 
research being completed (Cucciniello et al. 2017), there is still a great need to conduct more. 
Two main research avenues could be prioritised (also see O’Connor, 2016). First, the results 
of the EMA case study need to be compared with those of other regulatory organisations 
responsible for human health and the environment (e.g. EFSA, ECHA, FDA, Health Canada). 
Although EMA was considered a “typical” case (Chapter V), additional studies can investigate 
how EMA’s policies and experiences compare with others. Second, there is a need to conduct 
more studies on the effectiveness of input and process transparency policies (Heald, 2006). 
While output transparency policies have received a great deal of attention in the fragmented 
literature, there remains only a handful of studies examining the effectiveness of other types of 
transparency (see Chapter, III for a discussion). Transparency promises a great deal. Yet, if the 
effectiveness of polices designed to enhance transparency are not measured and evaluated and 
key findings are not disseminated then they will never achieve their potential.  
 
(9.3.5) A call for proposals from risk researchers   
 
There is a real need for the risk research community and especially risk communication 
scholars to explore how transparency policies can become more effective. Although some have 
pointed to a connection between transparency and communication, this thesis clearly shows a 
fundamental and problematic disconnect between transparency and risk communication in the 
literature and policymaking. This disconnect needs to be reconciled and there is a wealth of 
expertise that would significantly benefit the development of effective policies (section 9.2). 
In order to reconcile this disconnect, this thesis calls for proposals exploring and examining 
the many ways that transparency connects and interacts with risk communication both 
theoretically and practically. By re-conceptualising transparency as a risk communication 
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process and with the evidence-based support of risk researchers, government regulatory 
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Appendix A: Geographic regions of patient and doctor samples 
 
Great Britain (%) France (%) Spain (%) Germany (%) 
Region Patients Doctors Region Patients Doctors Region Patients Doctors Region Patients Doctors 
North & 
Yorkshire 13 12 
Paris 






















Midlands 13 15 North East 19 17 East 15 19 







& Wales 11 15 
South 
West 19 15 
South and 






& Anglia 22 20 
South 
East 20 26    
Nielsen V (a&b) 
(Barvaria) 7 4 







Scotland 7 8       Nielsen VII (Thuringia) 6 6 
Northern 
Ireland 1 2          
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Thank you for your interest in participating in our study about health issues. 
 
Your answers to our questions will be kept confidential, and will not be associated with 
your identity.  Only group results will be reported. 
 
You do not have to answer any questions you do not want to, and you can stop answering 
questions and end the survey at any time.  If you choose to end the survey before 
completion, your answers will then be destroyed. 
 
In determining whether you are an appropriate candidate for this survey, please answer 
the following questions. 
 
PS1. In what year were you born? 
  
_________ (Year of birth) 
 
(IF 1996 OR HIGHER: TERMINATE) 
 
PS 2. Please indicate whether you have been diagnosed with any of the following 
conditions. (For the purposes of this questionnaire, please select one answer only)  
 
 (ALPHABETISED LIST) 
1 HIV/AIDS 
2 Idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis (IPF) 
3 Multiple Sclerosis 
4 Osteoporosis 
5 Rheumatoid arthritis 
6 Other 
 
[If ONLY ‘OTHER’ SELECTED: TERMINATE] 
 
PS 3. How long have you been diagnosed with this condition? 
 
1. Less than a year  
2. 1-2 years 
3. 2-5 years 
4. 5-10 years 
5. 10 + years 
 










PATIENT SCREENER CONTINUED 
 
 
Please read the following five points carefully before agreeing to participate in this research. 
 
· The aim of this research is to gain your views for academic research and improving 
healthcare communication only and is not intended to be promotional. 
· The identity of respondents is confidential and none of your details will be passed 
on to any 3rd party. 
· Any information you disclose will be treated in the strictest confidence and the 
results of the research aggregated to provide an overall picture of attitudes to the 
areas being covered in this survey.  No answers will be attributable to you as an 
individual. 
· You have the right to withdraw from the survey at any time and to withhold 
information as you see fit.  
· This survey is supported by a pharmaceutical company. 
 
By proceeding to the next page, please confirm that you have read and understood the points 
above and are happy to proceed with the market research survey on this basis 
 




TERMINATE TEXT:  We’re sorry, but you are not eligible to participate in this study.  We 




























GENERAL COMMUNICATION OF HEALTH INFORAMTION 
 
 
The remainder of the survey will take approximately 15 minutes to complete. Just as a 
reminder, you can stop answering questions and end this survey at any time.  
 
We would first like to ask you some general questions about the communication of 
health information 
 
Q1. Overall, do you feel that information about medicines and health alerts on issues such 






Q2. Would you say that the amount of information about medicines currently publicly 
available is too much, the appropriate amount, or too little? 
 
1. Too Much 
2. Appropriate amount 
3. Too Little 
 
Q3. Please indicate the extent to which you ‘agree’ or ‘disagree’ with each of the 
following statements regarding the communication of information about medicines 


















1.There is a health information communication process in 
place to communicate with the general public effectively 
2.Health information is readily available 
3.There are several sources for health information 
4.Health information communicated to the general public is 
easy to understand 
 
Q4. Please indicate the extent to which you ‘agree’ or ‘disagree’ with each of the 
following statements regarding information about medicines and health information?  



















1.Politics affects what health information is communicated to 
the general public 
2.Health information for the general public is generally 
unbiased 
3.Health information facts are communicated properly 
4.Health communications generally have consistent 
information 
5.Health communications are generally clear  
6.I trust health information from pharmaceutical companies 
7.I trust health information from medicines regulators 
8.Mainstream media sensationalizes health information 
 
Q5(a). How easy is it for you to obtain information about medicines from each of the 
















2.Local hospital  
3.Internet in general 
4.Media (e.g. newspapers, television, radio, etc.) 
5.A medically qualified friend or relative 
6.Patient advocacy groups 
7.Pharmacy 
8.Nurses 
9.[Insert NCA – TBC ] 
10. EMA - European Medicines Agency 
11. Medical Journals 
12. Politicians 
13. Pharmaceutical companies (including their websites) 
14. Another friend or relative (not medically qualified) 
15. Social media (e.g. twitter, Facebook)  
 
Q5(b). How trustworthy do you believe the following sources are in providing you with 



















2.Local hospital  
3.Internet in general 
4.Media (e.g. newspapers, television, radio, etc.) 
5.A medically qualified friend or relative 
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6.Patient advocacy groups 
7.Pharmacy  
8.Nurses 
9.[Insert NCA – TBC ]  
10. EMA - European Medicines Agency  
11. Medical Journals 
12. Politicians 
13. Pharmaceutical companies (including their websites) 
14. Another friend or relative (not medically qualified) 
15. Social media (e.g. twitter, Facebook) 
 
 
Q6(a).  Have you, personally, ever distrusted a source of information about medicines so 




3. Don’t recall 
 
ASK IF Q6a = 1 
Q6(b). You mentioned that your distrust for a source of information about medicines caused 
you NOT to take a specific medication.  Which of the following information sources 





















Q7. How important is each of the following when you decide whether to use a 

















1. Patient Advocacy Groups  
2. Friends/Family 
3. Doctors  
4. Nurses 
5. Local News 




10. Pharmaceutical Companies 
11. Politicians 
12. [Insert NCA – TBC ] 
13. European Medicines Agency 
14. Medical Researchers 




1. Trust in sources for health information regarding 
the specific medication 
2. How well the medication works 
3. Safety of taking the medication 
4. Number of clinical research/trials  
5. Whether it can be used in combination with other 
medications  
6. Side effects 
7. How frequently I would take the medication 
8. Medication form (pill, liquid, injection, etc.) 
 
Q8(a). How effective do you consider the [UK = NHS, FR =  Système de santé Français, 
SP =  , DE = ] are at providing members of the general public with information on 













Q8(b)  How effective do you consider the [FOR UK SHOW = UK government, FOR FR 
SHOW: French Government, FOR DE SHOW: German government, FOR ES 
SHOW: Spanish government] are at providing members of the general public with 













Q9. At what stage do you think information should be conveyed to the public about a 
possible safety issue of a medicine that they use or may use? (Please choose one 
answer only) 
 
1. When there is a possible sign of a safety 
problem 
2. When the problem has been investigated; 
not clear if related to the medicine 
3. When the problem has been investigated and 
pharmaceutical company believes it is 
related to the medicine 
4. When the problem has been investigated and 
regulators believe it is related to medicine  
 
Q9B 
Randomise codes 1 - 4 
If the information you personally receive (via letter, telephone, email etc…) points to safety 
problems with a [Insert specialty group selected @PS2 CODES 1 - 5] medicine you are 
currently taking, do you think you are more likely to… 
 
Please choose one answer only  
 
1. Stop taking your medicine 
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2. Reduce your does of the medicine 
3. Continue taking your medicine as usual 
4. Seek additional advice about the medicine 
5. Don’t know 
 





1. Patients receiving more information on the safety of 
medicines would increase their confidence in taking 
medicines. 
2. I am satisfied with the safety information I receive 
on medicines from regulators 
3. As a result of medicines safety incidents I am 
suspicious about certain medicines 
 
ASK IF ‘Strongly Agree’ or ‘Agree’ at Q10A No. 3 ‘As a result of medicines safety 
incident I am suspicious about certain medicines’ 
 
Q10B. You indicated that you [INSERT response option from Q10A No. 3.] that as a result 
of medicines safety incidents you are suspicious about certain medicines. Which specific 






(Please only state the medicine you indicated) 
 
Now we would like to ask your opinions of two specific organisations. The first concerns 
[INSERT NCA]. 
 
Q11. Have you heard of the [Insert NCA] [i.e. MHRA (GB); Bfarm (Germany); ANSM 
(France); AEMSPS (Spain)] 
 
1. Yes 
2. No  
 
Q12. Overall, what is your impression of [INSERT NCA] [MHRA (GB); Bfarm 
















The MHRA (Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency) is the medicines 
regulator for the United Kingdom. They are responsible for regulating all medicines 
and medical devices in the UK by ensuring they work and are acceptably safe. We are 
now going to ask you a few questions on your perceptions of how medicines are 
regulated in the UK. 
 
(SKIP Q.13(a) – 13(b) IF ANSWERED DON’T KNOW FOR NCA AT Q5a AND Q5b] 
 
ASK IF Q5a_11 = 1 – 5 
Q13(a). Previously, you mentioned it is [INSERT RESPONSE FROM Q. 5(a)] to 
obtain information about medicines from [INSERT OPTION 11 SHOWN @Q5a] 






ASK IF Q5b_11 = 1 – 4 
Q13(b). Previously, you mentioned [INSERT OPTION 11 SHOWN @Q5b] is 
[INSERT RESPONSE SELECTED @ Q5 (b)] for information about medicines.  







Q14(a) Are you aware of any specific pieces of information about medicines or health alerts, 
or health communication activities that [INSERT OPTION 11 SHOWN @Q5a] is 
involved with at the present time?  
 
1. Yes 
2. No (SKIP TO Q15a) 
 
ASK IF Q14a = 1  
Q14(b). What specific pieces of information about medicines or health alerts, or health 
communication activities the [INSERT OPTION 11 SHOWN @Q5a] is involved 






ASK IF Q14a = 1 or 2 
Q15(a). Please indicate the extent to which you ‘agree’ or ‘disagree’ with each of the 




















1. I have good knowledge of how [INSERT OPTION 11 SHOWN 
@Q5a] assesses the safety of [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM 
DS1 OR OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK 
FOR CODE 1 @DS1] medicines 
2. [INSERT OPTION 11 SHOWN @ Q5a] have the expertise to 
make competent judgements about [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 
FROM DS1 OR OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE 
BLANK FOR CODE 1 @DS1] medicines  
3. [INSERT OPTION 11 SHOWN @ Q5a] will do what is right 
for society regarding [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR 
OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR CODE 
1 @DS1]  medicines  
4. [INSERT OPTION 11 SHOWN @ Q5a] will tell the truth about 
the safety of [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR 
OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR CODE 
1 @DS1] medicines 
5. [INSERT OPTION 11 SHOWN @ Q5a] maintain appropriate 
distance from the pharmaceutical industry when evaluating 
[INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR OPTIONS 1 – 5 
FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR CODE 1 @DS1] 
medicines 
6. I believe that the [INSERT OPTION 11 SHOWN @ Q5a] will 
disclose all necessary [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 
OR OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR 
CODE 1 @DS1] information to prescribers regarding the risks 
and benefits of medicines  
7. [INSERT OPTION 11 SHOWN @ Q5a] communicate openly 
about its decisions/opinions on [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 
FROM DS1 OR OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE 
BLANK FOR CODE 1 @DS1] medicines  
 
 
ASK IF Q14a = 1 or 2 
Q15(b) Please indicate the extent to which you ‘agree’ or ‘disagree’ with each of the 




1. [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR OPTIONS 1 – 5 
FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR CODE 1 @DS1] [IF 
CODE 1@ DS1 SHOW “Medicines” IF INSERTERTING 











medicines] information is communicated well to patients by 
[INSERT OPTION 11 SHOWN @Q5a] 
2. [INSERT OPTION 11 SHOWN @Q5]  are a useful source of 
information on [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR 
OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR CODE 
1 @DS1] medicines  
3. [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR OPTIONS 1 – 5 
FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR CODE 1 @DS1] [IF 
CODE 1@ DS1 SHOW “Patients” IF INSERTERTING 
OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM show 
patients] find [INSERT OPTION 11 SHOWN @Q5a]’s 
medicines communications comprehensible and understandable  
4. With respect to [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR 
OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR CODE 
1 @DS1] medicines information, I trust [INSERT OPTION 11 
SHOWN @Q5a] to provide me with enough information to 
prescribe medicines to patients   [SHOW IF dSAMPLE = 1 
ONLY] 
5. With respect to [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR 
OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR CODE 
1 @DS1] medicines information, I trust [INSERT OPTION 11 
SHOWN @Q5a] to provide timely information regarding changes 
to a medicines safety profile.  
6. Too many [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR 
OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR CODE 
1 @DS1] communications are decided by regulators from 
[INSERT OPTION 11 SHOWN @Q5a] without adequate 
consultation with those affected 
 
The second set of questions concerns the European Medicines Agency (EMA). 
 
Q16. Have you heard of the European Medicines Agency (EMA)? 
 
1. Yes 
2. No  
 

















The EMA (European Medicines Agency) is a decentralised agency of the European 
Union. The Agency is responsible for the scientific evaluation of medicines developed by 
pharmaceutical companies for use in the European Union. We are now going to ask you 





[SKIP Q18(a) – 18(b) IF ANSWERED DON’T KNOW FOR EMA AT Q5a AND Q5b] 
 
ASK IF Q5a_12 = 1 – 5 
 
Q18(a) Previously, you mentioned it is [INSERT RESPONSE SELECTED @Q5a for 
CODE 12] to obtain information about medicines from EMA.  Why do you say that?  






ASK IF Q5a_12 = 1 – 4 
Q18(b) Previously, you mentioned EMA is [INSERT RESPONSE SELECTED @Q5b for 
CODE 12] for information about medicines.  Why do you say that?  (Please be as 







ASK IF Q17 = 1 – 6 
Q19(a). Are you aware of any specific pieces of information about medicines or health 
alerts, or health communication activities that the European Medicines Agency is 
involved with at the present time?  
 
1. Yes 
2. No (SKIP TO Q. 20) 
 
ASK IF Q19a = 1 
Q19(b) What specific pieces of information about medicines or health alerts, or health 
communication activities the EMA is involved with at the present time are you aware 






Q20(a).Please indicate the extent to which you ‘agree’ or ‘disagree’ with each of the 





















1. I have good knowledge of how EMA assesses the 
safety of [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR 
OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK 
FOR CODE 1 @DS1] medicines  
2. EMA have the expertise to make competent 
judgements about [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM 
DS1 OR OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE 
BLANK FOR CODE 1 @DS1] medicines  
3. EMA will do what is right for society regarding 
[INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR 
OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK 
FOR CODE 1 @DS1] medicines  
4. EMA will tell the truth about the safety of [INSERT 
OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR OPTIONS 1 – 5 
FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR CODE 1 
@DS1] medicines 
5. EMA maintain appropriate distance from the 
pharmaceutical industry when evaluating [INSERT 
OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR OPTIONS 1 – 5 
FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR CODE 1 
@DS1]  medicines 
6. I believe that the EMA will disclose all necessary 
[INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR 
OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK 
FOR CODE 1 @DS1]  information to prescribers 
regarding the risks and benefits of medicines  
7. EMA communicate openly about its 
decisions/opinions on [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 
FROM DS1 OR OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM PS2 OR 
LEAVE BLANK FOR CODE 1 @DS1] medicines  
8. EMAs online scientific committee meeting minutes 
are a useful source of information on [INSERT 
OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR OPTIONS 1 – 5 
FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR CODE 1 
@DS1] medicines being evaluated 
 
Q20(b) Please indicate the extent to which you ‘agree’ or ‘disagree’ with each of the 
following statements regarding how the EMA communicates. 
 
(RANDOMISE) 
1. [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR OPTIONS 1 – 
5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR CODE 1 @DS1]  
[IF CODE 1@ DS1 SHOW “Medicines” IF 
INSERTERTING OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR 
OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM show medicines]  information is 











2. EMA are a useful source of information on [INSERT 
OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM 
PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR CODE 1 @DS1]  
medicines 
3. Too many [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR 
OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR 
CODE 1 @DS1]  communications are decided by regulators 
from EMA without adequate consultation with those affected 
4. [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR OPTIONS 1 – 
5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR CODE 1 @DS1]  
[IF CODE 1@ DS1 SHOW “Patients” IF 
INSERTERTING OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR 
OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM show patients]  find EMA’s 
medicines communications comprehensible and 
understandable  
5. With respect to [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR 
OPTIONS 1 – 5  FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR 
CODE 1 @DS1]  medicines information, I trust EMA to 
provide me with enough information to prescribe medicines 
to patients  [ONLY SHOW IF dSAMPLE = 1] 
6. With respect to [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR 
OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR 
CODE 1 @DS1]  medicines information, I trust EMA to 































Finally, a few questions for classification purposes only. 
 
 
ASK IF dSAMPLE = 2 
SC 






ASK IF dSAMPLE = 2 
SC 
ONLY SHOW OPTIONS FOR RELEVANT COUNTRY 
PD2. In which of the following regions do you live? 
 
UK 
1. North & Yorkshire 
2. North West 
3. Midlands 
4. South West & Wales 
5. South East & Anglia 
6. London 
7. Scotland 
8. Northern Ireland 
 
France 







1. Noroeste and Noreste 
2. Madrid and Centro 
3. Este 
4. Sur and Canarias 
 
Germany 
1. Nielsen I 
2. Nielsen II 
3. Nielsen IIIa 
4. Nielsen IIIb 
5. Nielsen IV 
6. Nielsen V (a&b) 
7. Nielsen VI 




ASK IF dSAMPLE = 2 
SC 
PD3.  And are you... 
 
1. Working 30 hours or more a week (Full-time)           
2. Working 8 - 29 hours a week (Part-time)               
3. Not working (under 8 hrs) – housewife / houseman                  
4. Not working (under 8 hrs) – unemployed     
5. Not working (under 8 hrs) – unemployed (not Registered but 
looking for work) 
6. Not working (under 8 hrs) – retired                   
7. Not working (under 8 hrs) – student                   
8. Not working (under 8 hrs) – other (inc. disabled)     
 
 
ASK IF dSAMPLE = 2 
SC 
PD4. Into which of the following categories would you place your total household income from all sources 
before tax and any other deductions?  
 
1. Under £10,000 
2. Over £10,000 but less than £20,000 
3. Over £20,000 but less than £30,000 
4. Over £30,000 but less than £40,000 
5. Over £40,000 but less than £50,000 
6. Over £50,000 but less than £75,000 
7. Over £75,000 
8. Don’t know 
9. Prefer not to answer 
ASK IF dSAMPLE = 2 
SC 
PD5. Please select the highest educational or professional qualification you have obtained. 
 
1. GCSE / O-level / CSE 
2. Vocational qualifications (=NVQ1+2) 
3. A-Level or equivalent (=NVQ3) 
4. Bachelor Degree or equivalent 
(=NVQ4) 
5. Masters / PhD or equivalent 
6. No formal qualifications 
7. Still studying 
8. Other 
9. Don’t know 
 
ASK IF dSAMPLE = 2 
SC 
PD6.  Which one of these ethnic groups would you describe yourself as belonging to?  
 
1. White – British                                      
2. White – Irish                                          
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3. White – any other white background                    
4. Asian or Asian British – Indian                        
5. Asian or Asian British – Pakistani                     
6. Asian or Asian British – Bangladeshi                   
7. Asian or Asian British – any other Asian background            
8. Black or black British – Caribbean                     
9. Black or black British – African                       
10. Black or black British – any other black background 
11. Mixed – white and black Caribbean                      
12. Mixed – white and black African                        
13. Mixed – white and Asian                                
14. Mixed – any other mixed background                     
15. Chinese or other ethnic group – Chinese                
16. Chinese or other ethnic group – any other background 
17. Prefer not to answer 
 
How long have you been a member of a patient group or organization?  
 
1. Not a member of a patient group 
2. Less than a year 
3. 1-2 Years 
4. 2-5 years 
5. 5-10 years 
6. 10 years+. 
 
That concludes our survey. 





















Appendix C: Doctor Questionnaire 
 
MEDICAL DOCTOR SCREENER 
 
Thank you for your interest in our study.   
 
This information is being collected for research purposes only.  All of the results will be held 
completely confidentially and only aggregate group findings will be reported. 
 
First,      We would appreciate some information about your practice to determine if the study is 
appropriate for your medical practice. 
 
In determining whether you are an appropriate candidate for this study, please answer the following 
questions. 
 
DS 1. What is your primary medical specialty?    
 
 (ALPHABETISED LIST) 
1 General Practitioner 
2 HIV/AIDS 
3 Idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis (IPF) 
4 Multiple Sclerosis 
5 Osteoporosis 
6 Rheumatoid arthritis 
7 Other (Please specify) 
 
[If ONLY ‘OTHER’ SELECTED: TERMINATE] 
 
DS 2. Excluding your residency and fellowship, how many years have you been in practice, post-
residency? _____________ years.  
 
[If LESS THAN 2 OR MORE THAN 35 YEARS: TERMINATE] 
 
DS 3. Approximately how many hours per week do you work in clinical practice? 
 

















MEDICAL DOCTOR SCREENER CONTINUED 
 
 
Please read the following five points carefully before agreeing to participate in this research. 
 
· The aim of this research is to gain your views for academic research and improving healthcare 
communication only and is not intended to be promotional. 
· The identity of respondents is confidential and none of your details will be passed on to any 3rd 
party. 
· Any information you disclose will be treated in the strictest confidence and the results of the 
research aggregated to provide an overall picture of attitudes to the areas being covered in this 
survey.  No answers will be attributable to you as an individual. 
· You have the right to withdraw from the survey at any time and to withhold information as you see 
fit 
· This survey is supported by a pharmaceutical company. 
 
By proceeding to the next page, please confirm that you have read and understood the points above and are 
happy to proceed with the market research survey on this basis 
 
(Please put a cross in the box)  
 
 
TERMINATE TEXT:  We’re sorry, but you are not eligible to participate in this study.  We appreciate 
































GENERAL COMMUNICATION OF HEALTH INFORAMTION 
 
The remainder of the survey will take approximately 25 minutes to complete. Just as a reminder, you can 
stop answering questions and end this survey at any time.  
 
We would first like to ask you some general questions about the communication of health information 
 
Q1. Overall, do you feel that information about medicines and health alerts on issues such as H1-





Q2. Would you say that the amount of information about medicines currently publicly available is too much, 
the appropriate amount, or too little? 
 
4. Too Much 
5. Appropriate amount 
6. Too Little 
 
 
Q3. Please indicate the extent to which you ‘agree’ or ‘disagree’ with each of the following statements 
regarding the communication of information about medicines and health information?  (Select one 


















5.There is a health information communication process in 
place to communicate with the general public effectively 
6.Health information is readily available 
7.There are several sources for health information 
8.Health information communicated to the general public is 
easy to understand 
 
Q4. Please indicate the extent to which you ‘agree’ or ‘disagree’ with each of the following statements 
regarding information about medicines and health information?  (Select one per row)  
 
Agree 












9.Politics affects what health information is communicated to 
the general public 
10. Health information for the general public is generally 
unbiased 
11. Health information facts are communicated properly 
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12. Health communications generally have consistent 
information 
13. Health communications are generally clear  
14. I trust health information from pharmaceutical companies 
15. I trust health information from medicines regulators 
16. Mainstream media sensationalizes health information 
 
 















16. Colleagues [SHOW IF dSAMPLE = 1 ONLY] 
17. Doctors [SHOW IF dSAMPLE = 2 ONLY] 
18. Local hospital  
19. Summary of Product Characteristics (SmPC) 
document [SHOW IF dSAMPLE = 1 ONLY] 
20. Internet in general 
21. Media (e.g. newspapers, television, radio, etc.) 
22. A medically qualified friend or relative 
23. Patient advocacy groups 
24. Pharmacy 
25. Nurses 
26. [Insert NCA – TBC ] 
27. EMA - European Medicines Agency 
28. Medical Journals 
29. Politicians 
30. Pharmaceutical companies (including their websites) 
31. Another friend or relative (not medically qualified) 
32. Social media (e.g. twitter, Facebook)  
 
Q5(b). How trustworthy do you believe the following sources are in providing you with advice on the side 


















16. Colleagues [SHOW IF dSAMPLE = 1 ONLY] 
17. Doctors [SHOW IF dSAMPLE = 2 ONLY] 
18. Local hospital  
19. Summary of Product Characteristics (SmPC) 
[SHOW IF dSAMPLE = 1 ONLY] document 
20. Internet in general 
21. Media (e.g. newspapers, television, radio, etc.) 
22. A medically qualified friend or relative 
23. Patient advocacy groups 
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24. Pharmacy  
25. Nurses 
26. [Insert NCA – TBC ]  
27. European Medicines Agency EMA - European 
Medicines Agency  
28. Medical Journals 
29. Politicians 
30. Pharmaceutical companies (including their websites) 
31. Another friend or relative (not medically qualified) 
32. Social media (e.g. twitter, Facebook) Emergency 
services (e.g. 999  or 112) 
 
Q8(a). How effective do you consider the [UK = NHS, FR =  Système de santé Français, SP =  , DE = ] 
are at providing members of the general public with information on health alerts such as a health 













Q8(b)  How effective do you consider the [FOR UK SHOW = UK government, FOR FR SHOW: 
French Government, FOR DE SHOW: German government, FOR ES SHOW: Spanish 
government] are at providing members of the general public with information on health alerts such 













Q9. At what stage do you think information should be conveyed to the public about a possible safety 
issue of a medicine that they use or may use? (Please choose one answer only) 
 
5. When there is a possible sign of a safety 
problem 
6. When the problem has been investigated; 
not clear if related to the medicine 
7. When the problem has been investigated and 
pharmaceutical company believes it is 
related to the medicine 
8. When the problem has been investigated and 
regulators believe it is related to medicine  
 






4. Patients receiving more information on the safety of 
medicines would increase their confidence in taking 
medicines. 
5. I am satisfied with the safety information I receive 











6. As a result of medicines safety incidents I am 
suspicious about certain medicines 
 
ASK IF ‘Strongly Agree’ or ‘Agree’ at Q10A No. 3 ‘As a result of medicines safety incident I am 
suspicious about certain medicines’ 
 
Q10B. You indicated that you [INSERT response option from Q10A No. 3.] that as a result of medicines 







(Please only state the medicine you indicated) 
 
Now we would like to ask your opinions of two specific organisations. The first concerns [INSERT 
NCA]. 
 




4. No  
 































The MHRA (Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency) is the medicines regulator for 
the United Kingdom. They are responsible for regulating all medicines and medical devices in the UK 
by ensuring they work and are acceptably safe. We are now going to ask you a few questions on your 





(SKIP Q.13(a) – 13(b) IF ANSWERED DON’T KNOW FOR NCA AT Q5a AND Q5b] 
 
Q13(a). Previously, you mentioned it is [INSERT RESPONSE FROM Q. 5(a)] to obtain 
information about medicines from [INSERT OPTION 11 SHOWN @Q5a] Why do you say that?  






Q13(b). Previously, you mentioned [INSERT OPTION 11 SHOWN @Q5b] is [INSERT 
RESPONSE SELECTED @ Q5 (b)] for information about medicines.  Why do you say that?  







Q14(a) Are you aware of any specific pieces of information about medicines or health alerts, or health 
communication activities that [INSERT OPTION 11 SHOWN @Q5a] is involved with at the 
present time?  
 
3. Yes 
4. No (SKIP TO Q15a) 
 
Q14(b). What specific pieces of information about medicines or health alerts, or health 
communication activities the [INSERT OPTION 11 SHOWN @Q5a] is involved with at the 






Q15(a). Please indicate the extent to which you ‘agree’ or ‘disagree’ with each of the following 






8. I have good knowledge of how [INSERT OPTION 11 SHOWN 
@Q5a] assesses the safety of [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM 
DS1 OR OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK 
FOR CODE 1 @DS1] medicines 
9. [INSERT OPTION 11 SHOWN @ Q5a] have the expertise to 
make competent judgements about [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 
FROM DS1 OR OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE 
BLANK FOR CODE 1 @DS1] medicines  
10. [INSERT OPTION 11 SHOWN @ Q5a] will do what is right 














OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR CODE 
1 @DS1]  medicines  
11. [INSERT OPTION 11 SHOWN @ Q5a] will tell the truth about 
the safety of [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR 
OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR CODE 
1 @DS1] medicines 
12. [INSERT OPTION 11 SHOWN @ Q5a] maintain appropriate 
distance from the pharmaceutical industry when evaluating 
[INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR OPTIONS 1 – 5 
FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR CODE 1 @DS1] 
medicines 
13. I believe that the [INSERT OPTION 11 SHOWN @ Q5a] will 
disclose all necessary [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 
OR OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR 
CODE 1 @DS1] information to prescribers regarding the risks 
and benefits of medicines  
14. [INSERT OPTION 11 SHOWN @ Q5a] communicate openly 
about its decisions/opinions on [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 
FROM DS1 OR OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE 
BLANK FOR CODE 1 @DS1] medicines  
 
 
Q15(b) Please indicate the extent to which you ‘agree’ or ‘disagree’ with each of the following statements 






7. [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR OPTIONS 1 – 5 
FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR CODE 1 @DS1] [IF 
CODE 1@ DS1 SHOW “Medicines” IF INSERTERTING 
OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM show 
medicines] information is communicated well to patients by 
[INSERT OPTION 11 SHOWN @Q5a] 
8. [INSERT OPTION 11 SHOWN @Q5]  are a useful source of 
information on [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR 
OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR CODE 
1 @DS1] medicines  
9. [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR OPTIONS 1 – 5 
FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR CODE 1 @DS1] [IF 
CODE 1@ DS1 SHOW “Patients” IF INSERTERTING 
OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM show 
patients] find [INSERT OPTION 11 SHOWN @Q5a]’s 
medicines communications comprehensible and understandable  
10. With respect to [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR 
OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR CODE 
1 @DS1] medicines information, I trust [INSERT OPTION 11 
SHOWN @Q5a] to provide me with enough information to 












11. With respect to [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR 
OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR CODE 
1 @DS1] medicines information, I trust [INSERT OPTION 11 
SHOWN @Q5a] to provide timely information regarding changes 
to a medicines safety profile.  
12. Too many [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR 
OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR CODE 
1 @DS1] communications are decided by regulators from 
[INSERT OPTION 11 SHOWN @Q5a] without adequate 
consultation with those affected 
 
SHOW ALL   
The second set of questions concerns the European Medicines Agency (EMA). 
Q16. Have you heard of the European Medicines Agency (EMA)? 
 
3. Yes 
4. No  
 

















The EMA (European Medicines Agency) is a decentralised agency of the European Union. The 
Agency is responsible for the scientific evaluation of medicines developed by pharmaceutical 
companies for use in the European Union. We are now going to ask you a few questions on what you 
think about medicines regulated in Europe. 
 
[SKIP Q18(a) – 18(b) IF ANSWERED DON’T KNOW FOR EMA AT Q5a AND Q5b] 
 
 
Q18(a) Previously, you mentioned it is [INSERT RESPONSE SELECTED @Q5a for CODE 12] to 







Q18(b) Previously, you mentioned EMA is [INSERT RESPONSE SELECTED @Q5b for CODE 12] for 






Q19(a). Are you aware of any specific pieces of information about medicines or health alerts, or 







4. No (SKIP TO Q. 20) 
 
Q19(b) What specific pieces of information about medicines or health alerts, or health communication 







Q20(a). Please indicate the extent to which you ‘agree’ or ‘disagree’ with each of the following 








9. I have good knowledge of how EMA assesses the 
safety of [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR 
OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK 
FOR CODE 1 @DS1] medicines  
10. EMA have the expertise to make competent 
judgements about [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM 
DS1 OR OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE 
BLANK FOR CODE 1 @DS1] medicines  
11. EMA will do what is right for society regarding 
[INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR 
OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK 
FOR CODE 1 @DS1] medicines  
12. EMA will tell the truth about the safety of [INSERT 
OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR OPTIONS 1 – 5 
FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR CODE 1 
@DS1] medicines 
13. EMA maintain appropriate distance from the 
pharmaceutical industry when evaluating [INSERT 
OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR OPTIONS 1 – 5 
FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR CODE 1 
@DS1]  medicines 
14. I believe that the EMA will disclose all necessary 
[INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR 
OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK 
FOR CODE 1 @DS1]  information to prescribers 
regarding the risks and benefits of medicines  
15. EMA communicate openly about its 
decisions/opinions on [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 
FROM DS1 OR OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM PS2 OR 
LEAVE BLANK FOR CODE 1 @DS1] medicines  
16. EMAs online scientific committee meeting minutes 












OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR OPTIONS 1 – 5 
FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR CODE 1 
@DS1] medicines being evaluated 
 
 
Q20(b) Please indicate the extent to which you ‘agree’ or ‘disagree’ with each of the following statements 






7. [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR OPTIONS 1 – 
5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR CODE 1 @DS1]  
[IF CODE 1@ DS1 SHOW “Medicines” IF 
INSERTERTING OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR 
OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM show medicines]  information is 
communicated well to patients by EMA 
8. EMA are a useful source of information on [INSERT 
OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM 
PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR CODE 1 @DS1]  
medicines 
9. Too many [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR 
OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR 
CODE 1 @DS1]  communications are decided by regulators 
from EMA without adequate consultation with those affected 
10. [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR OPTIONS 1 – 
5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR CODE 1 @DS1]  
[IF CODE 1@ DS1 SHOW “Patients” IF 
INSERTERTING OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR 
OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM show patients]  find EMA’s 
medicines communications comprehensible and 
understandable  
11. With respect to [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR 
OPTIONS 1 – 5  FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR 
CODE 1 @DS1]  medicines information, I trust EMA to 
provide me with enough information to prescribe medicines 
to patients  [ONLY SHOW IF dSAMPLE = 1] 
12. With respect to [INSERT OPTIONS 2 – 6 FROM DS1 OR 
OPTIONS 1 – 5 FROM PS2 OR LEAVE BLANK FOR 
CODE 1 @DS1]  medicines information, I trust EMA to 




MEDICAL DOCTOR DEMOGRAPHICS 
 
Finally, a few questions for classification purposes only. 
 
DD1. Are you . . .? 
Male - 1 













SCDD2. Which of the following best describes your primary practice?   
 
Solo Practice - 1 
Group Practice - 2 
Clinic - 3 






ONLY SHOW OPTIONS FOR RELEVANT COUNTRY  
DD3. Which of the following best describes the location of your primary practice? 
 
UK 
1. North & Yorkshire 
2. North West 
3. Midlands 
4. South West & Wales 
5. South East & Anglia 
6. London 
7. Scotland 
8. Northern Ireland 
 
France 







1. Noroeste and Noreste 
2. Madrid and Centro 
3. Este 
4. Sur and Canarias 
 
Germany 
1. Nielsen I 
2. Nielsen II 
3. Nielsen IIIa 
4. Nielsen IIIb 
5. Nielsen IV 
6. Nielsen V (a&b) 




DD4. Which of the following best describes the size of the hospital or surgical centre where 
you are mainly based? 
 
1. Less than 100 beds 
2. 100-299 beds 
3. 300-499 beds 
4. 500 or more beds 
5. Not applicable 
 
DD5. Approximately how many patients in total did you treat in the last month? 
 
_____ (Enter Number of Patients) 
 
DD6. In your practice, what percent of your total patients are children or adolescents and 




  _______% ADULT PATIENTS  




That concludes our survey. 










































Appendix D: Four example screenshots of adrreports.eu for Deltyba (delamanid), a 































Appendix E:  Example summary level results document for a vaccine trial that ended in 




Clinical trial results: 
Immunogenicity and Safety of the Inactivated, Split-Virion 






















































General information about the trial 
 
Main objective of the trial: 
To check the compliance, in terms of immunogenicity, of the inactivated, split-virion 
influenza vaccine Northern Hemisphere 2007-2008 formulation with the requirements of the 
Committee for Human Medicinal Products (CHMP) Note for Guidance (NfG) 
CPMP/BWP/214/96. 
 
Protection of trial subjects: 
Only subjects who met all the study inclusion and none of the exclusion criteria were 
vaccinated in the study. Vaccinations were performed by qualified and trained study 
personnel. Subjects with allergy to any of the vaccine components were not vaccinated. 
After vaccination, subjects were also kept under clinical observation for 30 minutes to 
ensure their safety. Appropriate medical equipment were also available on site in case of any 
















































A total of 130 subjects who met all inclusion criteria and none of the exclusion criteria were 















Subjects aged 18 to 60 years who received one dose of inactivated, split-virion influenza 







Dosage and administration details: 
0.5 mL, intramuscular into the deltoid muscle, one dose on Day 0 
Arm title 
Arm description: 
Subjects aged 61 years or older who received one dose of inactivated, split-virion influenza 







Dosage and administration details: 
0.5 mL, intramuscular into the deltoid muscle, one dose on Day 0 
 
Number	of	subjects	in	period	1	 18	to	60	years	 61	years	or	older	 	
Started	 65	 65	 	
61 years or older 
	314 
	
Completed	 64	 65	 	
Not	completed	 1	 0	 	







Reporting group description: 
Subjects aged 18 to 60 years who received one dose of inactivated, split-virion influenza 
vaccine, Northern Hemisphere 2007-2008 formulation on day 0. 
Reporting group title 
Reporting group description: 
Subjects aged 61 years or older who received one dose of inactivated, split-virion influenza 
vaccine, Northern Hemisphere 2007-2008 formulation on day 0. 
 
Reporting	group	values	 18	to	60	years	 61	years	or	older	 Total	












Children	(2-11	years)	 0	 0	 0	
Adolescents	(12-17	years)	 0	 0	 0	
Adults	(18-64	years)	 65	 23	 88	
From	65-84	years	 0	 42	 42	









Female	 28	 31	 59	
Male	 37	 34	 71	






Yes	 20	 51	 71	




Yes	 3	 1	 4	




Reporting group description: 
Subjects aged 18 to 60 years who received one dose of inactivated, split-virion influenza 
vaccine, Northern Hemisphere 2007-2008 formulation on day 0. 
Reporting group title 
Reporting group description: 
Subjects aged 61 years or older who received one dose of inactivated, split-virion influenza 
vaccine, Northern Hemisphere 2007-2008 formulation on day 0. 
 
 
Primary: Summary of Geometric Mean Titers (GMTs) of Influenza Vaccine 
Antibodies Before and After Vaccination with Inactivated, Split-Virion Influenza 
Vaccine, Northern Hemisphere 2007-2008 Formulation by the Intramuscular 
Route 
End point title Summary of Geometric Mean Titers (GMTs) of Influenza 
Vaccine Antibodies Before and After Vaccination 
with 
Inactivated, Split-Virion Influenza Vaccine, Northern 
Hemisphere 2007-2008 Formulation by the 
Intramuscular Route[1] End point description: 
Influenza vaccine antibodies were assessed using the hemagglutination inhibition technique. 
 
Notes: 
[1] - No statistical analyses have been specified for this primary end point. It is expected 
there is at least one statistical analysis for each primary end point. 
61 years or older 
Primary End point type 
Day 0 (pre-vaccination) and Day 21 post vaccination 
End point timeframe: 
	317 
	
Justification: Descriptive analyses were performed based on the study groups and the study 





Subject	group	type	 Reporting	group	 Reporting	group	 	 	
Number	of	subjects	analysed	 63	 65	 	 	
Units:	Titers	 	 	 	 	
geometric	mean	(confidence	interval	
95%)	

























































No statistical analyses for this end point 
 
Primary: Summary of Geometric Mean Titers Ratios (GMTR) of Influenza Vaccine Antibodies After 
Vaccination with Inactivated, Split-Virion Influenza Vaccine, 
Northern Hemisphere 2007-2008 Formulation by the Intramuscular Route 
End point title Summary of Geometric Mean Titers Ratios (GMTR) of Influenza 
Vaccine Antibodies After Vaccination with 
Inactivated, SplitVirion Influenza Vaccine, Northern Hemisphere 2007-2008 Formulation 
by the Intramuscular Route[2] End point description: 
Influenza vaccine antibodies were assessed using the hemagglutination inhibition technique. 
Geometric mean titer ratio is the geometric mean of the individual post-vaccination/pre-
vaccination titer of antibodies to the influenza virus antigens. 
 
Notes: 
Primary End point type 
Day 0 (pre-vaccination) and Day 21 post vaccination 
End point timeframe: 
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[2] - No statistical analyses have been specified for this primary end point. It is expected 
there is at least one statistical analysis for each primary end point. 
Justification: Descriptive analyses were performed based on the study groups and the study 





Subject	group	type	 Reporting	group	 Reporting	group	 	 	
Number	of	subjects	analysed	 63	 65	 	 	
Units:	Titer	ratios	 	 	 	 	
geometric	mean	(confidence	interval	
95%)	





















No statistical analyses for this end point 
 
Primary: Percentage of Subjects with Seroprotection Against the Influenza Vaccine Antigens Before and 
After Vaccination with Inactivated, Split-Virion Influenza 
Vaccine, Northern Hemisphere 2007-2008 Formulation by the Intramuscular 
Route End point title Percentage of Subjects with Seroprotection Against the 
Influenza Vaccine Antigens Before and After 
Vaccination with 
Inactivated, Split-Virion Influenza Vaccine, Northern 





[3] - No statistical analyses have been specified for this primary end point. It is expected 
there is at least one statistical analysis for each primary end point. 
Justification: Descriptive analyses were performed based on the study groups and the study 
vaccine administered for this outcome. 
Influenza vaccine antibodies were assessed using the hemagglutination inhibition technique. 
Seroprotection was defined as titers ≥40 (1/dil) on Day 0 and Day 21. 
End point description: 
Primary End point type 
Day 0 (pre-vaccination) and Day 21 post vaccination 







Subject	group	type	 Reporting	group	 Reporting	group	 	 	
Number	of	subjects	analysed	 63	 65	 	 	
Units:	Percentage	of	subjects	 	 	 	 	
number	(not	applicable)	 	 	 	 	
Flu	A/SolomonIslands/3/2006	(H1N1;	
Day	0)	
19	 20	 	 	
Flu	A/Wisconsin/67/2005	(H3N2;	Day	0)	 42.9	 56.9	 	 	
Flu	B/Malaysia/2506/2004	(B	native;	
Day	0)	
4.8	 10.8	 	 	
Flu	B/Malaysia/2506/2004	(B	split;	Day	
0)	
7.9	 44.6	 	 	
Flu	A/SolomonIslands/3/2006	(H1N1;	
Day	21)	
98.4	 87.7	 	 	
Flu	A/Wisconsin/67/2005	(H3N2;	Day	
21)	
98.4	 93.8	 	 	
Flu	B/Malaysia/2506/2004	(B	native;	
Day	21)	
60.3	 40	 	 	
Flu	B/Malaysia/2506/2004	(B	split;	Day	
21)	
93.7	 84.6	 	 	
Statistical analyses 
 
No statistical analyses for this end point 
 
Primary: Percentage of Subjects Achieving Seroconversion or Significant Increase Against the Influenza 
Vaccine Antigens Before and After Vaccination with 
Inactivated, Split-Virion Influenza Vaccine, Northern Hemisphere 2007-2008 
Formulation by Intramuscular Route 
End point title Percentage of Subjects Achieving Seroconversion or Significant 
Increase Against the Influenza Vaccine Antigens 
Before and 
After Vaccination with Inactivated, Split-Virion 
Influenza 
Vaccine, Northern Hemisphere 2007-2008 
Formulation by Intramuscular Route[4] End point description: 
Influenza vaccine antibodies were assessed using the hemagglutination inhibition technique. 
Seroconversion was defined as subjects with a titer <10 (1/dil) on Day 0 and a post-injection 
titer ≥40 
(1/dil) on Day 21 or significant increase was defined as subjects with a titer ≥10 (1/dil) on 
Day 0 and a 








[4] - No statistical analyses have been specified for this primary end point. It is expected 
there is at least one statistical analysis for each primary end point. 
Justification: Descriptive analyses were performed based on the study groups and the study 





Subject	group	type	 Reporting	group	 Reporting	group	 	 	
Number	of	subjects	analysed	 63	 65	 	 	
Units:	Percentage	of	subjects	 	 	 	 	
number	(not	applicable)	 	 	 	 	
Flu	A/SolomonIslands/3/2006	(H1N1)	 88.9	 66.2	 	 	
Flu	A/Wisconsin/67/2005	(H3N2)	 81	 36.9	 	 	
Flu	B/Malaysia/2506/2004	(B	native)	 54	 20	 	 	
Flu	B/Malaysia/2506/2004	(B	split)	 81	 26.2	 	 	
Statistical analyses 
 
No statistical analyses for this end point 
 
Primary: Percentage of Subjects with at Least One Reaction Corresponding to those Listed in the EMEA 
Recommendation Within 3 Days After Vaccination with 
Inactivated, Split-Virion Influenza Vaccine, Northern Hemisphere 2007-2008 
Formulation by Intramuscular Route 
End point title Percentage of Subjects with at Least One Reaction 
Corresponding to those Listed in the EMEA Recommendation 
Within 3 Days After Vaccination with Inactivated, Split-Virion 
Influenza Vaccine, Northern Hemisphere 
2007-2008 Formulation by Intramuscular Route[5] End point description: 
Solicited injection site: Induration and Ecchymosis. Solicited systemic reactions: 






[5] - No statistical analyses have been specified for this primary end point. It is expected 
there is at least one statistical analysis for each primary end point. 
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Justification: Descriptive analyses were performed based on the study groups and the study 





Subject	group	type	 Reporting	group	 Reporting	group	 	 	
Number	of	subjects	analysed	 65	 65	 	 	
Units:	Percentage	of	subjects	 	 	 	 	
number	(not	applicable)	 	 	 	 	
Injection	site	induration	>5	cm	for	>3	
days	
0	 0	 	 	
Injection	site	ecchymosis	 10.9	 4.6	 	 	
Temperature	>38˚C	for	≥24	hours	 0	 0	 	 	
Malaise	 17.2	 6.2	 	 	
Shivering	 6.3	 4.6	 	 	
Statistical	analyses	
	 	 	
No statistical analyses for this end point 
 
Primary: Percentage of Subjects Reporting Solicited Injection-site or Systemic Reactions Within 3 Days 
After Vaccination with Inactivated, Split-Virion Influenza 
Vaccine, Northern Hemisphere 2007-2008 Formulation by the Intramuscular 
Route 
End point title Percentage of Subjects Reporting Solicited Injection-site or 
Systemic Reactions Within 3 Days After Vaccination with 
Inactivated, Split-Virion Influenza Vaccine, Northern 
Hemisphere 2007-2008 Formulation by the 
Intramuscular Route[6] End point description: 
Solicited injection site: Pain, Erythema, Swelling, Induration and Ecchymosis. Solicited 
systemic reactions: Fever, Headache, Malaise, Myalgia, and Shivering. Grade 3 injection 
site: Pain – 
Incapacitating, unable to perform usual activities; Erythema, Swelling, Induration, and 
Ecchymosis – ≥5 cm. Grade 3 systemic reactions: Fever – >39.0°C; Headache, Malaise, 








[6] - No statistical analyses have been specified for this primary end point. It is expected 
there is at least one statistical analysis for each primary end point. 
Justification: Descriptive analyses were performed based on the study groups and the study 





Subject	group	type	 Reporting	group	 Reporting	group	 	 	
Number	of	subjects	analysed	 65	 65	 	 	
Units:	Percentage	of	subjects	 	 	 	 	
number	(not	applicable)	 	 	 	 	
Injection	site	Pain	 39.1	 24.6	 	 	
Grade	3	Injection	site	Pain	 0	 0	 	 	
Injection	site	Erythema	 9.4	 10.8	 	 	
Grade	3	Injection	site	Erythema	 1.6	 4.6	 	 	
Injection	site	Swelling	 12.5	 12.3	 	 	
Grade	3	Injection	site	Swelling	 1.6	 1.5	 	 	
Injection	site	Induration	 15.6	 9.2	 	 	
Grade	3	Injection	site	Induration	 1.6	 0	 	 	
Injection	site	Ecchymosis	 10.9	 4.6	 	 	
Grade	3	Injection	site	Ecchymosis	 0	 0	 	 	
Fever	 1.6	 0	 	 	
Grade	3	Fever	 0	 0	 	 	
Headache	 26.6	 16.9	 	 	
Grade	3	Headache	 4.7	 1.5	 	 	
Malaise	 17.2	 6.2	 	 	
Grade	3	Malaise	 1.6	 1.5	 	 	
Myalgia	 23.4	 10.8	 	 	
Grade	3	Myalgia	 1.6	 0	 	 	
Shivering	 6.3	 4.6	 	 	





No statistical analyses for this end point 
 
Primary: Percentage of Subjects Reporting Solicited Injection-site or Systemic Reactions More than 3 
Days After Vaccination with Inactivated, Split-Virion 
Influenza Vaccine, Northern Hemisphere 2007-2008 Formulation by the 
Intramuscular Route 
End point title Percentage of Subjects Reporting Solicited Injection-site or 
Systemic Reactions More than 3 Days After Vaccination with 
Inactivated, Split-Virion Influenza Vaccine, Northern 
Hemisphere 2007-2008 Formulation by the 
Intramuscular Route[7] End point description: 
Solicited injection site: Pain, Erythema, Swelling, Induration and Ecchymosis. Solicited 
systemic reactions: Fever, Headache, Malaise, Myalgia, and Shivering. Grade 3 injection 
site: Pain – 
Incapacitating, unable to perform usual activities; Erythema, Swelling, Induration, and 
Ecchymosis – ≥5 cm. Grade 3 systemic reactions: Fever – >39.0°C; Headache, Malaise, 






[7] - No statistical analyses have been specified for this primary end point. It is expected 
there is at least one statistical analysis for each primary end point. 
Justification: Descriptive analyses were performed based on the study groups and the study 





Subject	group	type	 Reporting	group	 Reporting	group	 	 	
Number	of	subjects	analysed	 65	 65	 	 	
Units:	Percentage	of	subjects	 	 	 	 	
number	(not	applicable)	 	 	 	 	
Injection	site	Pain	 0	 0	 	 	
Grade	3	Injection	site	Pain	 0	 0	 	 	
Injection	site	Erythema	 0	 0	 	 	
Grade	3	Injection	site	Erythema	 0	 0	 	 	
Injection	site	Swelling	 0	 0	 	 	
Grade	3	Injection	site	Swelling	 0	 0	 	 	
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Injection	site	Induration	 0	 0	 	 	
Grade	3	Injection	site	Induration	 0	 0	 	 	
Injection	site	Ecchymosis	 0	 0	 	 	
Grade	3	Injection	site	Ecchymosis	 0	 0	 	 	
Fever	 0	 0	 	 	
Grade	3	Fever	 0	 0	 	 	
Headache	 1.6	 0	 	 	
Grade	3	Headache	 0	 0	 	 	
Malaise	 0	 1.5	 	 	
Grade	3	Malaise	 0	 0	 	 	
Myalgia	 0	 3.1	 	 	
Grade	3	Myalgia	 0	 0	 	 	
Shivering	 0	 0	 	 	
Grade	3	Shivering	 0	 0	 	 	
Statistical analyses 
 





Adverse events information 
 
Timeframe for reporting adverse events: 








Reporting group description: 
Subjects aged 18 to 60 years who received one dose of inactivated, split-virion influenza 
vaccine, Northern Hemisphere 2007-2008 formulation on day 0. 
Reporting group title 
Reporting group description: 
Subjects aged 61 years or older who received one dose of inactivated, split-virion influenza 
vaccine, Northern Hemisphere 2007-2008 formulation on day 0. 
 










Frequency threshold for reporting non-serious adverse events: 5 % 




































































occurrences	(all)	 15	 7	 	
 
Notes: 
[1] - The number of subjects exposed to this adverse event is less than the total number 
of subjects exposed for the reporting group. These numbers are expected to be equal. 
Justification: This was a solicited adverse event recorded in a diary card within 3 days of 
vaccination; the total number (N) reflects those subjects for which the diary cards were 
returned and for which data were available for the event during the period. 
[2] - The number of subjects exposed to this adverse event is less than the total number 
of subjects exposed for the reporting group. These numbers are expected to be equal. 
Justification: This was a solicited adverse event recorded in a diary card within 3 days of 
vaccination; the total number (N) reflects those subjects for which the diary cards were 
returned and for which data were available for the event during the period. 
[3] - The number of subjects exposed to this adverse event is less than the total number 
of subjects exposed for the reporting group. These numbers are expected to be equal. 
Justification: This was a solicited adverse event recorded in a diary card within 3 days of 
vaccination; the total number (N) reflects those subjects for which the diary cards were 
returned and for which data were available for the event during the period. 
[4] - The number of subjects exposed to this adverse event is less than the total number 
of subjects exposed for the reporting group. These numbers are expected to be equal. 
Justification: This was a solicited adverse event recorded in a diary card within 3 days of 
vaccination; the total number (N) reflects those subjects for which the diary cards were 
returned and for which data were available for the event during the period. 
[5] - The number of subjects exposed to this adverse event is less than the total number 
of subjects exposed for the reporting group. These numbers are expected to be equal. 
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Justification: This was a solicited adverse event recorded in a diary card within 3 days of 
vaccination; the total number (N) reflects those subjects for which the diary cards were 
returned and for which data were available for the event during the period. 
[6] - The number of subjects exposed to this adverse event is less than the total number 
of subjects exposed for the reporting group. These numbers are expected to be equal. 
Justification: This was a solicited adverse event recorded in a diary card within 3 days of 
vaccination; the total number (N) reflects those subjects for which the diary cards were 
returned and for which data were available for the event during the period. 
[7] - The number of subjects exposed to this adverse event is less than the total number 
of subjects exposed for the reporting group. These numbers are expected to be equal. 
Justification: This was a solicited adverse event recorded in a diary card within 3 days of 
vaccination; the total number (N) reflects those subjects for which the diary cards were 
returned and for which data were available for the event during the period. 
[8] - The number of subjects exposed to this adverse event is less than the total number 
of subjects exposed for the reporting group. These numbers are expected to be equal. 
Justification: This was a solicited adverse event recorded in a diary card within 3 days of 
vaccination; the total number (N) reflects those subjects for which the diary cards were 
returned and for which data were available for the event during the period. 
[9] - The number of subjects exposed to this adverse event is less than the total number 
of subjects exposed for the reporting group. These numbers are expected to be equal. 
Justification: This was a solicited adverse event recorded in a diary card within 3 days of 
vaccination; the total number (N) reflects those subjects for which the diary cards were 
returned and for which data were available for the event during the period. 
More information 
Substantial	protocol	amendments	(globally)	
Were there any global substantial amendments to the protocol?  No 
 
Interruptions (globally) 














Appendix F – Statement on Dominic Way’s contribution to research at KCRM 
  
I, Ragnar Löfstedt, and in the capacity of his primary supervisor have written this statement to 
clarify Dominic Way’s contribution to the KCRM research group during his PhD. Before 
Dominic started his thesis in October 2012, I had already conducted research in the US on the 
FDA’s transparency and risk communication strategy. This resulted in two papers specifically 
examining transparency policy relating to the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research’s 
(CDER) adverse event reporting system (Löfstedt et al. 2011; Chakraborty and Löfstedt, 2012).  
  
Shortly after completing these projects, Dominic asked me during his KCRM Risk Analysis 
Master’s course for recommendations on possible risk communication topics for a PhD 
proposal. One of the five options I gave him was on the relation between transparency and risk 
communication and the policies being implemented in different sectors. After discussing what 
policy domain Dominic might focus on, we agreed that pharmaceuticals and the European 
Medicines Agency’s policies would be ideal: Dominic conducted his Undergraduate and 
Master’s dissertations on healthcare and medicines policy. He subsequently conducted an 
explorative literature review on transparency and trust in the European pharmaceutical domain 
that informed a proposal for his PhD. At the same time, a former PhD student of mine, Dr. 
Bouder (Maastricht University), and I wrote our own paper on transparency in risk regulation 
that Dominic generously provided comments and suggestions on in late 2012 and early 2013 
(Löfstedt and Bouder, 2014). 
  
During the first year of his PhD, Dr. Bouder led a project on antivirals and the swine and avian 
flu pandemics. After discussions between Dr. Bouder, Dominic and myself, we decided that 
the results of the project were also highly relevant to understanding the relation between 
transparency and risk communication. Dominic subsequently led on all data analyses and co-
wrote an exploratory paper on transparency in Europe (Bouder, Way, Löfstedt and Evensen 
2015). Meanwhile Dominic and I conducted experiments investigating the link between 
transparency and risk communication in Europe. We designed those experiments together and 
Dominic carried out all the data collection work in all four sample countries: the UK, the 
Netherlands, Spain and Germany (Löfstedt and Way, 2016a, 2016b). The results of neither of 
these studies are reported in Dominic’s thesis but did inform his approach to investigating 
transparency, the type of data he collected, and how. He has discussed this in the methodology 
chapter (Chapter IV, pp. 95-96). 
  
To aid Dominic in collecting data on EMA’ policies, I also connected him with senior EMA 
staff in November 2012 at the agency’s headquarters during what became a milestone 
workshop on transparency. Following this event, Dominic developed his own networks and 
contacts in the pharmaceutical domain. This enhanced his understanding of EMA, enabled him 
to keep up with policy developments, and allowed him to undertake his own research on 
transparency and risk communication reported in his thesis. Dominic was subsequently invited 
to and organised elite policy meetings and interviews between 2012 and 2016 (pp. 84-90). 
Dominic also led on the design and implementation of two survey projects examining the 
perspectives of European patients and doctors. He led on designing the questionnaires, worked 
daily with the polling agency we contracted in London Bridge (Ipsos), contacted patient groups, 
and liaised with his own regulatory contacts in each sample country (e.g. to check translations). 
After the data had been collected, Dominic then led on all data analyses for both patient and 
doctor samples. While Dominic led on the longer theory paper and patient results (Way, 
Bouder, Löfstedt and Evensen, 2016), he also wrote all the results and data analyses for a 
second paper on the perspectives of doctors (Löfstedt, Way, Bouder and Evensen, 2016). 
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Dominic then used the survey data to independently carry out further statistical analyses 
comparing the perspectives of patients and doctors and contextualising the results for his own 
PhD research agenda. These results are reported in Chapter VII and his personal interpretations 
of the results are reported in Chapter VIII with no input from the research team. 
  
Dominic’s PhD thesis has a total of nine chapters and I can clarify the influence of our research 
team on each specific chapter.  
  
1. Introduction. 100% Dominic. 
2. Typology. 100% Dominic. 
3. Literature review. 100% Dominic. While the decision to focus his PhD on transparency and 
risk communication was influenced by a book chapter written by myself and Dr. Bouder 
(Löfstedt and Bouder, 2014), his literature review chapter was written entirely separately 
from the research team. 
4. Methodology. 100% Dominic. 
5. History of transparency at EMA. 100% Dominic. While Dominic was writing this historical 
analysis, I wrote a paper separately on the history of transparency at EFSA. A joint paper 
led by Dominic comparing EMA (Dominic) and EFSA’s (Ragnar) transparency policies is 
currently under review in EJRR (Way and Löfstedt, forthcoming) 
6. EMA’s three input policies. 100% Dominic. 
7. Patient and doctor survey results. As explained above, Dominic led on designing the 
questionnaires, collecting the results with Ipsos, analysing the data and publishing the 
results in two journal articles. The subsequent analyses reported in this chapter, comparison 
of patients and doctors, and interpretation of the data was conducted entirely by Dominic 
and independently from the rest of the research team. 
8. Evaluation of EMA’s policies. 100% Dominic. 
9. Conclusion and recommendations. The conclusions were 100% Dominic. 
Recommendations 1 and 2 have been developed by the research team over the years but 
improved and explained in more detail by Dominic. The rest of the recommendations are 
100% Dominic. 
 
Professor Ragnar Löfstedt 
27th June, 2017 
 
